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European Police College - CEPOL
The 2013 CEPOL Annual European Police Research 
and Science Conference which took place at the 
German Police University in Münster, Germany, 
was actually the tenth of its kind since the 
European Police College introduced the event as 
a place where police educators and professionals 
would meet and exchange perspectives with 
academic scientists and institutional researchers 
and scientists. In the year before, in 2012 in 
Lyon, the contributions had centred on the 
development of police science in Europe and its 
potential impact on police practice and police 
education and training in general terms. This 
time, in 2013, when the repercussions of the 
crisis that took off in 2008 in the international 
banking sector have had already a strong impact 
on the budgets of governments across European 
countries, and affecting their willingness or 
ability to fund public expenditure for services like 
the police, a more practically issue was put to 
experts and the participants of the conference 
to be examined and discussed: what are the 
challenges for policing, police officers, police 
trainers and those who demand or receive their 
services in times of severe economic constraints?
Budget cuts, austerity, Euro–crisis, doing more 
with less – these were then the topic headlines, 
dominating the political and public discourse. 
While police forces and organisations are 
confronted with the political demand to reform 
and streamline their business, a growing number 
of citizens began to feel under economic distress 
as well, caused by widespread unemployment, 
in particular among the young, or by sinking 
living standards among the middle and working 
classes. The full force of the social consequences 
of financial turmoil and the corresponding 
economic downturn has not been shared equally 
across EU member states, but even lesser affected 
countries inside or outside of the Euro-zone 
could not escape the side-effects of the crisis 
in development. Social protest, scapegoating 
of minorities and distrust in governments and 
their bodies is often an inescapable upshot and 
police officers can be literally caught “between 
the lines” - on the one hand being subject to 
worsening working conditions and pay imposed 
by their political masters, on the other hand 
blamed and confronted by the disadvantaged 
and marginalised for being oppressed or not 
being sufficiently protected and cared for. In 
democratic, open societies, police forces and 
police officers have to square the wheel in 
finding the right balance between upholding the 
rule of law, professional conduct and efficiency 
while respecting not just fundamental human 
rights, but also meeting the European citizens’ 
reasonable expectation of their sound public 
service.
It was with a reference to this economic, political 
and social background, the organisers of the 
conference from the German Police University, 
the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de la Police, the 
Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security at the 
University of Maribor, and CEPOL, had invited 
contributions and papers from experts and 
scholars from Europe and overseas: What would 
scientific research have to contribute, and if 
any, what could be the ramifications for police 
training and education?
In all 44 keynotes, papers, and presentations 
were on the programme, encouraging lively, 
occasionally controversial discussions and 
debates among the overall 220 participants 
and speakers. Holding the strong belief, that 
the further development of European police 
science and a good public police service is not 
just a matter of small expert circles, CEPOL has 
committed itself to share the outcomes of the 
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conference with interested individuals and the 
wider public as far as possible. Recordings of the 
spoken presentations and files of presentation 
slides are available either from the public 
CEPOL website (1) or from the CEPOL extranet, 
depending on technical circumstances, delivery 
and permission given by the authors. The 
organisers approached also the speakers about 
the delivery of a full paper for a publication of the 
conference proceedings a posteriori, resulting in 
the publication at hand (2), featuring nineteen 
delivered and editorially accepted papers. 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS
Few of the presentations are actually addressing 
the impacts or effects of economic constraints on 
police or training directly. Instead, the majority 
deals rather with the epiphenomena – either 
as empirically detectable negative influences 
on police performance, ethics or public trust, 
or as encouragement to rethink policing and 
innovating the way how it is organised or done. 
While there is variously differing emphasis on 
the reasons, causes and perspectives to be 
applied appropriately, there seems to be one 
universal assessment to be shared by everyone 
involved: that there has been a significant shift in 
conditions and circumstances how policing has 
to be organised and executed in the democratic 
societies of the European continent. As so 
often in conferences that try to build bridges 
between different experiences and professions, 
there are those who try to enhance common 
understanding by applying sharp analytical tools 
to the area of concern at hand, and those stressing 
new opportunities and possible solutions.
In the keynote of the conference, James Sheptycki, 
a Canadian scholar with large empirical 
experience of policing studies in Europe, offered 
what he termed a “Constabulary Ethic”, not as 
a full solution to the dilemmas police officers 
see themselves confronted within their spot of 
a transnationalised, tensioned and torn world 
of conflicts and crime, but as personalised 
professional fundament, on which actions and 
activities of “good policing” can rest and built 
upon. The paper, co-written with UK-based 
Ben Bowling, makes a start from a number of 
empirical observations that was also stated 
earlier as relevant for the development of a 
European police science (Jascke et al. 2007): 
policing has become increasingly transnational 
and has expanded into the global; legitimacy is 
a crucial factor for successful policing, not just in 
democratic societies; policing is not monolithic 
– it is concerned with different priorities and 
performed by a multitude of societally organised 
actors, dissolving into various subcultures. From 
their view that “…under transnational conditions 
(…) policing practice has transcended the 
boundaries of ‘the state’” they perceive a risk 
of iatrogenesis, a case of falling for a security-
paradox, “where the proscribed cure for an 
illness actually makes matters worse”.
Instead their plea is for an emphasis on reflexive 
thinking within the police profession, aiming 
towards the “development of an ethical 
standpoint”. If it is a standpoint or a conceptual 
point of is not entirely clear, but Sheptycki 
and Bowling seem to consider it as well as an 
imperative on the system level of global policing, 
but also as a rather personalised attitude of the 
individual officers, guiding their daily practice.
Several of the papers presented at the conference 
dealt with the nexus between the sometime 
volatile relationship between citizens and the 
police, where, under conditions of increasing 
economic constraints, conflicts can rise more 
easily, putting the trust in the police as a functional 
element of the state at stake. The tricky problems 
coming along with an attractive idea of “good 
governance” or good police behaviour on the 
officer level, are exemplified and discussed in the 
contribution of Christian Mouhanna, Director of 
the Center for Sociological Research on Law and 
Criminal Justice Institutions (CESDIP) in France 
on the perils of rigidity in encounters of citizens 
with law enforcement. With a key reference to 
sociological classic Max Weber and underlined 
by empirical observations, Mouhanna illustrates 
the potential dilemma police officers on the 
streets regularly get caught into, when they 
have to individually balance partly contradictory 
expectations from their superiors citing legal 
rules and regulations and members of the public, 
who require police protection from harm, but 
(1) https://www.cepol.europa.eu/science-research/conferences/2013
(2) The unfortunate delay in publishing this special conference issue of the Bulletin is the sole responsibility of CEPOL and the 
author of these lines, while the college had been challenged by an extraord
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also seek leniency and understanding when they 
themselves are under scrutiny. In this perspective 
the irrefutable requirements of governance by 
regulation paradoxically undermine the street 
performance of the police officers, which it is 
meant to increase.
Trusting that the police do their job in a fair and 
right way, not at least from a citizen protester’s 
perspective, is also the core theme of David 
Waddington’s case study of ‚softer’ tactics of 
policing political protest in South Yorkshire, UK. 
In his essay he traces dialogue-based police tactics 
that recently surfaced in Europe, like the Swedish 
inspired GODIAC project, back to concepts that 
were already applied in metropolitan London 
20 years ago and describes in detail how this 
approach unfolds in practice. While he recognises 
the positive results in form of a bigger chance 
for civilised encounter between protesters and 
police forces and the building of rapport in the 
long-term, he stresses that the (mutual) trust 
goes only so far and that those tactics are not 
appreciated from all sections of the police force, 
where some favour still a more traditional robust 
approach.
The robust side of policing and its meaning for the 
contemporary self-understanding and training of 
police professionals is as well the topic of Rafael 
Behr’s contribution from Germany, a turned into 
teaching academic former operational police 
officer. Relating to a public debate in Germany 
on violence against the police, he aims at an 
enhanced understanding of violent police-citizen 
encounters by examining the interpretative 
dynamics on both sides. His hypothesis is that 
the probability of violence increases, triggered by 
a growing estrangement between the police and 
marginalised parts of the society, where especially 
younger police officers are not equipped with 
sufficient knowledge about using alternatives 
to force, when dealing with people in social 
or economic poverty. Admitting that a sound 
empirical base to underpin his hypothesis is still 
to be found, he calls for scientific examination 
to steer public debates away from the risks of 
hysteria and hype.
In democratic societies, where the rule of 
law prevails and the respect for fundamental 
human rights is enshrined in legislative as well 
as in executive practices, citizen’s suffering from 
unjustified police violence or misconduct will be 
given recourse to legal remedies. The analysis of 
the development of police complaint procedures 
in England and Wales by Dermot Walsh provides 
little optimism that those instruments are fully 
fit to instil confidence of the concerned public 
in the soundness and functioning of a balanced 
policing system, as he identifies five structural 
weaknesses in addressing individual legal cases. 
One could understand the existence and work 
of Amnesty International as an institutionalised 
response of civil society insisting on good, 
human-rights compliant, non-discriminatory 
policing. Anja Bienert from the Dutch AI section 
describes in her contribution the progress that 
has been made in dialogue with police authorities 
so far, while highlighting areas in further need of 
improvement. 
An encouraging positive example, how a well-
considered police training programme can 
underpin the formation of a positive relationship 
to populations at the fringe of established societies 
is delivered by the description of a community 
policing approach for Roma communities in 
Slovenia. Branko Lobnikar demonstrates how 
the introduction of special training programme 
on “policing in a multi-ethnic community” at 
police academy reaped benefits by significantly 
increasing the trust in proper police conduct and 
police procedures among influential members of 
the Roma community.
The significance of trust - and its strong 
connection with perceived legitimacy of both 
police actions as well as police procedure systems 
- has been the central analytical focus of three 
contributions:
• For a comparative analysis among eight 
countries in Central Eastern Europe, Gorazd 
Meško, Chuck Fields, Jerneja Šifrer and Katja 
Eman issued a web-questionnaire to a 
sample of law-students, inquiring about their 
perception of police authority and procedural 
justice, applying various statistical analysis 
methods to the outcomes.
• Restricted to Germany, but based on a 
much broader population sample, Mai Sato, 
Rita Haverkamp and Mike Hough looked into 
the reasons, why trust in the police and 
police procedures are higher in Germany, 
compared to the European average data 
set. Interestingly, they found that there were 
no significant differences between ‘native’ 
Germans and those respondents with a 
migration background.
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• In differentiation to the approaches and 
conclusions taken in the two previous 
mentioned papers, Juha Kääriäinen from the 
Finnish University Police College, has doubts 
that reported variations regarding the trust 
in policing in a number of surveyed countries 
can be attributed to the level of perceived 
efficiency and fairness of police actions. 
He considers that the differences in trust 
in the police might be triggered rather by 
more broader factors like the spenditure for 
police resources in relation to overall welfare-
spending within a society.
Although all papers are relating to different 
samples, chosen methods and reference 
countries, their outcomes underpin that 
measuring the level of trust in the police, can be 
a strong indicator of how the performance and 
status of the police as an institution or force is seen 
and experienced in a general climate of financial 
and economic constraints, which in certain 
places and circumstances could undermine the 
state’s role as a warrantor of security and social 
peace.
There is one area in contemporary society, which 
has seen unrelenting growth and influence on 
the social fabric, regardless of any financial, 
economic or political crisis: the rise of the digital 
sphere and the emergence of a new dimension of 
public exchange. Cyber and virtual have become 
integral elements of modern life and various 
branches of the police apparatus are beginning 
to feel the full weight of its impact on their work 
and work environment.
Nick Keane, Digital Engagement Advisor of the 
College of Policing in the UK, and among the 
first to be aware of the change, social media are 
bringing towards the police officers’ job, gives an 
account of how the likes of Facebook and Twitter 
conquered the cunning police officers mind, 
and where future research could help in better 
understanding and mastering the 21th century’s 
preferred communication tools of the masses.
A pressing need for more research, both on 
the impact of how police organisations are 
functioning, as well as on communications with 
the public is the outcome of Jeremy Crump’s 
paper on social media research and policing. 
He identifies three particular areas where more 
research has to be done: Big Data, analysis of 
online networks and the impact of social media 
on police (work) culture. 
Speaking of new territories, difference in 
culture and changing modes of cooperation 
– but in a comparative sense: Saskia Hufnagel 
provided a paper in one of the open sessions, 
comparing practices and perceptions of police 
cooperation among practitioners and officials 
between Australia (as a federal state system with 
independent forces) and the European Union. 
Her most striking finding: cooperation in the 
EU generates more enthusiasm in comparison 
– maybe it is because it is still considered 
international business and thus more exciting.
Any attempt to assert a clear logical leitmotif 
running through the sequence of papers 
presented here, would not stand close scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, there is a shared perspective taken 
in the rest of the papers, which invites clustering 
them: ideas and visions on what could and should 
be done to alleviate the ramifications of the 
financial and economic crisis affecting individual 
police officers, diverse police organisations or 
entire policing systems.
Gloria Laycock (UK) promotes a paradigmatic shift 
towards “crime science”, which aims at reducing 
crime either by preventing it from happening 
in the first place or at catching offenders 
more quickly post crime. Empirical analysis of 
objectified data and preventive design measures 
are the pillars of her model offering. Thus being a 
systemic approach to answer any crisis triggered 
by economic constraints for traditional policing 
models, the applied scientific rationality is in 
clear contrast to the one suggested by Sheptycki 
and Bowling. Comparing approaches side-
by-side, it becomes instantly clear that there is 
not such a thing as ‚one science’, but various, 
occasionally competing, approaches to analysis 
of a complex phenomenon like crime and 
the policing of it. However, at closer scrutiny 
connecting intellectual undercurrents become 
apparent: policing in our hypermodern times 
cannot improve without resorting for taking 
(more) time to analyse and reflect.
Based on his long experience with police training 
and education on national, international and 
European level, János Fehérváry’s paper tackles the 
impacts of austerity policies on the perspectives for 
law enforcement head on. Listing the various areas 
of cut-backs, he delivers a detailed break down of 
the actual and potential practical consequences. 
While he finds that doing more in quality training 
with less politically admitted resources is clearly 
often deemed to be a mission impossible, he 
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nevertheless considers the attached challenges 
and risks of the situation. In consequence he calls 
for a research initative how quality police training 
and education for the police could be salvaged in 
times of constant austerity.
One example what could be done on an 
internationally aggregated level is what Barbara 
Rohmann describes UNICRI has developed and 
achieved in regard to providing support and 
training for the security planning of major public 
events.
That police work is a stressful occupation, is often 
taken for granted. It is also unlikely that austerity 
measures will reduce stress-levels for individual 
officers. In view of this situation, Marianne Kaiseler, 
Christina Queirós and Susana Rodrigues offer an 
innovative method to measure occupational 
stress levels among officers in a comparative 
international approach.
Marisa Silvestri examines the outlook of women’s 
careers in policing under the prefix of organisational 
and political austerity measures. Although 
she recognises a cultural change of policing 
philosophies and strategies affiliated with the rise 
of numbers in female officers, she is less optimistic 
that this tendency will continue in times of severe 
economic constraints in public expenditure. 
When it is all about change management – what 
is possible in police organisations, which have a 
general reputation to be aversive to change?
Finding out about effective change management 
on a European level – that is the exact topic of a 
paper by Natalie Hirschmann and Jochen Christe-
Zeyse, describing in a nutshell the structure and 
findings of the comparative Composite project. 
Among other relevant preliminary outcomes and 
conclusions of this cross-European project the most 
striking one is that police cultures and practices are 
not the same anywhere, thus a serious caution is 
put on the “best-practice-to-be-copied”-approach.
CONCLUDING NOTE
The papers collected in this special conference edition of the European Police Science and Research 
Bulletin are a selective, but authentic representation of the wealth of information and science- based 
insights that were exchanged among the participants on the days of the conference in Münster. The 
conference discourse was certainly dynamic, during the sessions and continuing in the coffee breaks 
and meals, when reactions to the presentations were traded among attending police officers, academic 
scholars and police educators. One of course could have expected a multiplicity of standpoints and 
perspectives, when experts and participants from more than two dozen countries in Europe and from 
overseas are invited to consider and to discuss a complex issue like “policing civil societies in times of 
economic constraints”. 
When talking about contemporary crisis-situations, it will always be very difficult to ascertain, if the 
crisis is already past its peak and will be over soon, or if it is going to get worse, before it becomes 
better. In any case, it is a feature of hypermodern societies, that the search for solutions and remedies 
will not stop – but there will certainly be no lasting results before a thorough and adequate analysis 
has taken place. This is the role of scientific research.
While the conference contributions were strong on analysis, there were also plenty of research-based 
and science-inspired hints and directions, where policing and related training and education for it 
shall go next. A satisfactory conference experience for some is to leave with new answers and inspired 
ideas – for others it is to go home with new and challenging questions. The conference organisers 
and editors of this volume trust that the 2013 CEPOL Annual European Police Research and Science 
Conference delivered to both ends.
Finally the editors would like to remind the readers that the presentation files and video recordings 
of even more speakers and contributions are available from the public CEPOL website and the CEPOL 
eNet for registered users. With the publication of the conference content, sharing it with a wider 
interested public, the European Police College and its network partners in the EU member states 
underpin their commitment to facilitate the further development of police science in Europe and by 
that fostering good policing to all citizens.
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Abstract: This paper brides a gulf between the Enlightenment idea of a science of policing and 
contemporary police techno-science and asks questions about how such ideas can be brought into 
accord with notions of ‘good policing’. Policing has been central to the art of governance since the 
modern period began more than two hundred years ago. Policing under transnational conditions 
presents enormous challenges. The system of global governance is highly complex and this is especially 
evident with regard to the conceptual field of policing. Globally speaking, police legitimacy is projected 
through a functionalist rhetoric predicated on certain folkdevils and suitable enemies, to which strong 
police measures are said to be the only answer. The original science of police was deeply imbued with 
normative thinking, since it was concerned with notions of the general welfare of society and state. In 
present times, police science is being reduced to experimental criminology and crime science. 
This paper aims to affect thinking within the occupational world of policing by pointing to the idea of 
a Constabulary Ethic as an appropriate short-hand term for a broader normative standpoint for global 
policing. Empirical research is a necessary part of doing good police work, but it is not sufficient. Good 
science, like good governance, is possible only in an open society that fosters a dialogue that includes 
all its members. This essay aims to show the imperative of developing an ethical standpoint (called the 
Constabulary Ethic) for the system of subcultural meanings that inscribe the lifeworld of global policing.
INTRODUCTION
Global policing and the global system are 
synchronous, homologous and heteronymous. 
As such, the study of global policing concerns 
much more than international law enforcement. 
Coming to terms with the nature and practice 
of global policing involves understanding the 
global system. For the police agents who do 
this work, the most important question should 
be how to police the global system well. It is 
now common to speak in terms of transnational 
networks of police agents in a globalising world. 
This essay is part of a continuing development 
of the theoretical language for talking about the 
phenomenon of global policing (Bowling and 
Sheptycki, 2012). What we do here is provide a 
sense of where the science of policing has come 
from and where it has arrived. In a sense the 
essay aims to bridge an historical gap between 
the original modern conception of the science of 
policing and 21st century police techno-science. 
This inevitably raises normative questions since, 
in trying to think about policing in scientific 
terms, over time questions arise about how to 
‘do it better’, which require an evaluation of 
what ‘it’ is. This should orientate theories about 
global policing around the central question: 
‘what is good policing?’. We are interested to 
encourage exploration into what a practical 
ethics of policing science on a global (or even 
planetary) basis might look like. The notion of 
the Constabulary Ethic is, we argue, absolutely 
crucial because, instead of narrowly focusing on 
questions of the measurability of effectiveness, 
efficiency and economy in policing work, it 
encourages questions about the relationship 
(1) I would like to thank Paul Rock, Ben Bowling, Auke van Dijk, Frank Hoogewoning, Steve Tong and Eduardo Manuel Ferreira 
for their useful comments relating to this paper.
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
10
between ‘good policing’ and the ‘good society’. 
Here we aim to introduce an idea concerning 
an appropriate ethical standpoint for global 
policing: the Constabulary Ethic.
ORIGINS OF THE POLICE 
IDEA: FROM VON JUSTI’S 
ENLIGHTENMENT TO 
FOUCAULT’S TEARS
The police idea is a thoroughly modern one and 
it is intimately connected with the building up of 
that modern edifice of governance known as ‘the 
State’ (Mann, 1984). There is a huge literature 
concerning this notoriously difficult concept (eg. 
Jessop 1990; Tilly, 1975). The historical basis of 
the state idea lies in the Enlightenment period 
(Hampson, 1968; Pagden, 2013). Discussions 
about the state commonly reference Hobbs, 
Locke, Rousseau and Kant, among others, and 
note the many competing definitions of such 
terms as the ‘social contract’ and the ‘state of 
nature’ or ‘civilisation’. From the Enlightenment 
period until the present time, except perhaps in 
a few isolated instances where Theocracy holds 
sway, the idea of a ‘social contract’ is the basis 
of all discussions concerning the legitimacy of 
government. During the closing years of the last 
century a number of thinkers made exaggerated 
claims concerning the ‘death of the social’ and 
consequently dramatic reconfigurations in 
political rationalities of rule (Baudrillard, 1983; 
Rose 1996). It is nevertheless interesting to 
notice the changing arch of meaning given to 
the terms ‘police’ and ‘police science’ (Brodeur, 
2010), because this transformation is part of the 
changing nature of state governance.
Beginning sometime in the 18th century, if not 
before, European thinkers began to cast off the 
trappings of religious ideology as the theoretical 
basis of social order as slowly (and sometimes 
violently) the old feudal arrangements were 
supplanted by modern ones. That ‘strange 
word police’ was an important part of the new 
lexicon of governance (Radzinowicz, 1956; 
Pasquino, 1991). More than one Enlightenment 
age thinker sought to systematically articulate 
an understanding of the ‘science of police’. 
Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717-1771) 
was prominent among them. He understood 
policing to be a ‘science to organise the internal 
constitution of the state in such a way that the 
welfare of individual families should constantly 
be in a precise connection with the common 
good’ (Jaschke, et al. 2007 p. 32). His near 
contemporary Joseph von Sonnenfels shifted the 
focus of policing more onto the security of the 
state itself. Together these thinkers elaborated 
a system of ideas; von Justi was concerned with 
‘low policing’ with policing as general social 
welfare, discipline and social order, whereas von 
Sonnenfels with state security, that is with ‘High 
policing’ (Brodeur, 1983). Von Justi conceived 
police essentially as cura promovendi salutem 
publicam (concerned with the promotion of 
the public good). Sonnenfels defined the task 
of police more narrowly, as cura avertendi mala 
futura, (concerned to avert future ills). Both did 
so by assigning policing an overarching state-
objective in the governance of civil society. The 
distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low policing’ 
remains pertinent in the post-9-11 era of 
heightened global security (Brodeur, 2007).
The language of Polizeiywissenschaft tipped into 
Polizeiwissenschaft, and the science of police, 
became more narrowly focused. By the mid-
19th century in Germany, Hannoverean Police 
Commissioner Gustave Zimmermann was in a 
position to argue that, in practice, police was 
an institution devoted to preserving the state 
by ‘observation, prevention, repression, and 
discovery’, rather than by benevolent welfare 
measures. Here we can distinguish a positive 
and a negative sense of police science. Negative 
policing power is repressive power — today we 
might equate it with Herbert Packer’s ‘crime 
control model’, or ‘zero tolerance policing’. 
Positive policing power is facilitative; it enables 
members of the public to participate as 
members of a civil society. In the 18th century, 
the regulation of weights and measures was an 
important aspect of positive policing power. In 
both its negative and positive senses the science 
of policing was part of a broader programme 
of state governance. The German word Polizei 
is redolent with connotations of fighting/
repressing. In its strongest sense Polizei is negative 
policing using law against internal enemies of 
the state as the military is used against external 
enemies. An associated German word, Politik, 
points more towards policing in its positive 
sense; fostering the health of the citizen’s life, 
the social order and thereby the state’s strength. 
Whatever else, the notions of ‘good’ policing that 
this language game implies and that emerge 
from these principles in action, is already written 
in the history books.
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Other Enlightenment age names are linked with 
the development of the modern language of 
policing. The English jurist, William Blackstone, 
thought that the power of police derived from the 
Sovereign’s obligation to maximise the welfare of 
his household and his realm. In his Lectures on 
Jurisprudence Adam Smith articulated a pretty 
straightforward understanding of the ends of 
policing, namely public peace and security, 
promoted through a blend of preventative 
action, intimidation and remedial action. Smith 
is incorrectly thought of today merely as ‘an 
economist’. His concerns were much broader 
than this term suggests. In thinking about 
political economy he was greatly concerned 
with the moral sentiments and with matters of 
jurisprudence. His thinking about the science of 
policing was typical of Enlightenment thinkers, 
as pivotal to social order and thus part of and 
partly constitutive of, something much bigger 
than itself. It is not frequently appreciated, or 
appreciated enough, how concerned were early 
modern thinkers about the relationship between 
good policing and a social order primarily 
based on free trade and exchange between 
rational actors. The language of policing was, 
in Enlightenment thought, part and parcel of a 
concern with the ‘art of government’. That is why 
policing is a synecdoche of the global system. 
As the practice of government changes, so too 
does the language of policing and undoubtedly 
both are affected by globalisation. Since, as 
David Bayley (1985) famously argued, police 
is government as the edge is to the knife, as 
character of global governance comes into 
question, the nature of its policing apparatus also 
becomes interesting.
Post Foucault, the language of police science 
has become seemingly paradoxical and also 
uncomfortable. The language of governance 
through a ‘science of policing’ justifies the 
permanent intervention of the institutions of the 
state into social life. Looking back at the history 
of the modern state from the historical vantage 
point of the 1980s, Foucault cynically observed 
that ‘since the population is nothing more than 
what the state takes care of for its own sake, 
of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, 
if necessary’ (quoted in Jaschke, et al. 2007, p. 
40). From the end of the 18th century up to the 
present our language for talking about society 
has been co-dependant on a notion of the state. 
From then until now important notions like ‘civil 
liberties’, ‘rule of law’, ‘social-contract’, etc. were 
grounded in a language based on the state-civil 
society distinction, where states were national 
ones. That modern state governance did not turn 
out as well as the thinkers of the Enlightenment 
period might have hoped gives cause for concern. 
In the electronic age, the ‘panoptic promise’ that 
surveillance power suggests, has been devolved 
(van der Vijver, 1998) into an increasingly 
comprehensive global system of disciplining. 
Under transnational conditions the synopticon 
— where the many may observe the few — has 
become as important a means of disciplining as 
the panopticon, where the few observe the many 
(Mathieson, 1997). Global policing means that 
the ‘panoptic sort’ is achieved within a ‘surveillant 
assemblage’ which transgresses state boundaries 
in multiple ways. 
POLICING THE TRANSNATIONAL 
CONDITION
Roughly about the time that the Cold War 
ended, people began to think differently 
about ‘international relations’. With the end 
of the ‘bi-polar world system’ came a host of 
technological advances with massive social 
implications. Changes in transportation, 
shipping, communications, information handling 
and logistics were part of a complex of factors 
underpinning something called ‘globalisation’. 
The global system is an interconnected bundle 
of economic, cultural, social or political ‘levels’, 
‘processes’ or institutions (Held and McGrew, 
2000; Sklair, 1995). Globalisation has resulted 
is a major re-thinking about the functioning of 
the state. Anne Marie Slaughter understands 
the global system in terms of ‘disaggregated 
rather than unitary states’ (Slaughter, 2004, 
pp. 13-14). According to her, states are not 
monolithic, homogeneous entities. Rather they 
are disaggregated concatenations of relatively 
bureaucratically autonomous institutions, any 
of which are capable of acting transnationally. 
Close watchers of the various US federal law-
enforcement agencies (the FBI, the DEA, the ATF, 
etc.) understand this point well, having observed 
the (often combative) inter-agency rivalry 
between them, which is often played out in the 
transnational realm (Andreas and Nadlemann, 
2006). Early globalisation theorists argued 
that, under the economic conditions fostered 
by global neo-liberalism, the state was being 
‘hollowed out’ (Rhodes, 1994; Sheptycki, 1995). 
Certainly after the financial crisis which began 
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in 2008, if not before, it became possible to see 
that generally speaking states’ abilities to provide 
welfare to their populations were weakened. 
States’ ability to nurture and protect populations 
have been undermined by the burdensome cost 
of maintaining and enhancing states’ power to 
punish, coerce and force (Karstedt and Nelken, 
2013) (1). 
Concomitant with globalisation has been 
‘globalisation-crisis-talk’ (Bowling and Sheptycki, 
2012). There can be little doubt that considerable 
‘ontological anxiety’, described by Jock Young 
as the ‘vertigo of late modernity’ (Young, 
2007), has been a feature of the contemporary 
period. It is difficult to say precisely what are 
the causal connections between the diffuse 
cultural, economic, social and political aspects 
of globalisation and the ‘politics of fear’ (Furedi, 
2005). What can be said is that, globally speaking 
in the early years of the 21st century, policing 
power is being increased along all dimensions 
(Deflem, 2006). There is now an impressive 
library of work that concerns policing and global 
governance (Aas, 2007; McGrew and Held, 
2002; Sheptycki, and Wardak, 2004). Despite 
the theoretical differences, there is considerable 
consensus that under transnational conditions 
policing has become dis-embedded from the 
classic Weberian nation-state. This has happened 
in three different ways:
Policing has been transformed ‘from above’, 
so to speak, by the growing importance of 
transnational platforms of governance. As various 
platforms of governance existing above the level 
of ‘the State’ have grown in importance, so too 
have police agencies been affected. For example, 
the OECD provided the institutional nexus for the 
original development of anti-money laundering 
programmes and the early League of Nations 
provided a vehicle to advance global drug 
prohibition. Both of these policy developments 
at the transnational level above the state qua 
‘State’ had tremendous implications for the 
practices of policing.
There is a second sense in which we can talk about 
the processes of change within the practices of 
policing. Policing has been transformed ‘from 
below’ as the global programme of neo-liberal 
governance gradually re-engineers the state 
sector. Neo-liberal ideology holds that market 
relations are the truest form of human interchange 
and ought to be as unfettered as possible and on 
that basis tries to limit the role of state agencies 
in the governance of everyday life. One obvious 
effect of this is that people have become what 
David Garland referred to as ‘responsibilised’ 
(1996). As individuals become responsible for 
their own security, a foundational assumption of 
modern state-police legitimacy is eroded ‘from 
below’. This process has eventuated in questions 
about the governance of ‘plural policing’ as the 
policing sector has fragmented into a host of 
security providers operating under private and/or 
public auspices (Loader, 2000; Nogala and Sack, 
1999). It can be seen that, as governance has 
taken place increasingly at the transnational level 
‘above’ the state, policing has been subsequently 
transformed and as states themselves have been 
‘hollowed out’ as a result of neo-liberal ideology, 
the balance of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ types of 
policing power have been affected. Because the 
state is being hollowed out under conditions 
of global capitalism, states become less able 
to provide positive policing interventions that 
facilitate social welfare. As social welfare declines, 
justification for ‘negative policing’, crime control 
and zero tolerance, increases.
Alongside these tendencies operating ‘above’ and 
‘below’ there is a third process taking place and it 
is transforming police organisations ‘from within’. 
The changes going on within the organisation 
of policing are the result of the continuous 
adoption of ever more advance information 
and communications systems. To a large extent 
the contemporary period is conditioned by 
continuous technological innovation and this 
means that, like every other social institution, 
the institutions that take on policing roles are in 
a continuous process of internal organisational 
transformation. But this is not new (Nogala, 
1995). New technologies perennially promise 
enhanced power and capacity, technical glitches, 
system failure and planned obsolescence in 
varying measures. Many things are uncertain. As 
policing becomes dis-embedded from the state 
qua State, under transnational conditions the 
policing sector becomes ever more complex and 
feelings about it become tinged with urgency. 
When global policing emerges as a theoretical 
possibility, its legitimacy arrives as a question. 
(2) States have also been hollowed out as a consequence of the near catastrophic and cyclical failures of a global financial 
system that is un-policed. 




With the original policing idea came a vocabulary 
for discussing its legitimacy. Democratic policing 
theory has stressed in various ways accountability 
to the rule of law and to the people through 
political representation as the means to achieve 
the appropriate balance of interests in mediating 
police legitimacy. Until relatively recently, what 
was common to all discussions on the subject of 
policing legitimacy was an assumption that the 
state was the container within which these issues 
were worked out. When police work is carried out 
transnationally, relationships to both law and the 
political structures of accountability change because 
police work overflows the organisational buffers 
that modern jurisdictional boundaries traditionally 
put up. The legitimacy of modern states depended 
in large part on a sense of patria; that is, devotion 
to one’s country. When Hume suggested that ‘we 
are to look upon the vast apparatus of government 
as having ultimately no other object or purpose 
but the distribution of justice’, it went without 
saying that such distribution happened within a 
country and the extent to which a given country 
was capable of ‘doing it’ (distributing justice) was 
a test of its government’s legitimacy (quoted in 
Pagden, 2013, p. 303). The traditional vocabulary 
for talking about the legitimacy of democratic 
governance (social contract, separation of 
powers, rule of law, etc.) has, as its scarcely 
spoken assumption, the Weberian state. Under 
transnational conditions the notion of a unified 
and coordinated ‘state’ successfully maintaining 
a monopoly claim on the use of coercive power 
in the maintenance of social order on a specified 
territory does not seem so tenable (Bayley and 
Shearing, 1996). Plenty of effort has been put into 
imagining new ways of governing governance 
under the mantle of neo-liberalism (eg. Johnson 
and Shearing, 2003; Zedner, 2010). Meanwhile, 
manifestations of global policing power are largely 
justified on functional grounds: because the 
global system is plagued with certain problems 
(drug or immigrant smuggling, for example, or 
sex tourism or cybercrime) there needs to be a 
control response. These control responses are 
largely symbolic and manifest around a number 
of folkdevils and suitable enemies, what Peter Gill 
called ‘rounding up the usual suspects’ (2000). 
Global governance is multi-leveled and highly 
complex leaving significant feelings of anomie, 
conflict and dislocation (Bauman, 2006) making 
the functional-mission rhetoric of global policing all 
the more crucial to its legitimation. Functionalism 
is accompanied by claims of a technical scientific 
nature concerning ‘what works’ in policing. 
Proponents of the new ‘crime science’ (Smith and 
Tilly, 2005), ‘experimental criminology’ (Sherman, 
2009), and ‘intelligence-led policing’ (Ratcliffe 
2004) offer a few examples of how expert claims 
about policing are being made along techno-
scientific lines. Functional-mission and scientific 
rhetoric constitute the main basis of policing 
legitimacy under transnational conditions. Police 
science in the 21st century aims to separate 
the risky from the at-risk, the threatening from 
the threatened and the undeserving from the 
deserving. Instead of legitimating policing within 
a language concerned with the social contract 
and the other concerns with early state theorists, 
global policing is legitimated on the functional 
assumption that strong ‘law enforcement’ (ie. 
policing in its negative sense) can keep the suitable 
enemies in their place because it is scientific. 
Legitimating policing this way pretends to the 
truth that humankind can be defined in black and 
white terms. 
TYPOLOGY OF THE POLICING 
FIELD
The policing field is crowded with security actors 
(Dupont, 2007). The architecture of global 
policing has been described in hierarchical terms 
(Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012, p. 25). According 
to this view, there are several tiers to global 
policing. At the global level are such institutional 
players as Interpol, the World Customs Council 
and the United Nations Police. At the regional 
level are different transnational police networks, 
for example ASEANAPOL in South East Asia and 
Europol in the European Union. Then there are 
national level agencies, the German BKA and 
the Australian Federal Police for example, and 
municipal policing agencies, for example the 
London Metropolitan Police. This tiered structure 
seems logical but it is inaccurate and incomplete 
in some respects. Firstly, since it is recognised that 
policing may be undertaken under either private 
or public auspices, and sometimes as a hybrid, 
any understanding of the architectural hierarchy 
of global policing cannot be restricted to state 
agencies (Zedner, 2006). Even if we could build 
a picture of the pyramid of global policing that 
encompassed both private and public based 
security providers there is still a difficulty with this 
view. At the supposed ‘bottom of the hierarchy’, 
where policing actually takes place, that is to say 
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in specific localities, we discover that police work 
is always already wired in to the circuits of global 
police information sharing. The architecture of 
global policing is a vast web of inter-institutional 
interconnections that are continuously changing 
and difficult to map with certainty.
Another way to describe this crowded field 
of security actors in a logical way is by taking 
account of some basic conceptual distinctions. As 
already mentioned it is now well established in 
policing scholarship that a great deal of policing 
work is undertaken by private security providers 
(Stenning, 2009). There is therefore a basic 
distinction made between policing under public 
or private auspices with roughly half the policing 
field being on either side of the fence. Another 
important distinction, already introduced, is 
between ‘high’ and ‘low policing’ (Brodeur, 
1983, 2007). This is the difference between 
political policing and community policing, it is the 
difference between policing on behalf of particular 
interests or on behalf of a more general interest. 
Making this distinction on a practical level can be 
often be fraught with difficulty, but for the sake of 
theoretical completeness, it is important to at least 
be aware that the field of policing governance 
extends to both ‘high’ and ‘low’ domains. 
Lastly, policing as a set of practices involves 
controlling both territory and population through 
watchfulness, preparedness and a variety of other 
means. This distinction, between the policing of 
territory and the policing of suspect populations, 
can also be usefully made. So, altogether we have 
three two-fold distinctions: between public and 
private, high and low, territorial and population 
based policing. These three distinctions can be 
depicted in the following typology:
The ideal types that populate this field provide 
a useful analytical point of view. Looked at this 
way it becomes very apparent just how complex 
the policing field is and, by extension, how 
difficult it is to conceive of an accountability 
schema to render all of the institutional actors 
in the policing sector democratically transparent 
and legitimate. Some major efforts to come to 
terms with the new complexities of governance 
of the policing field simply fail to map the whole 
field. Towards the end of the recent report by 
the so-called Stevens Enquiry, the Report of the 
Independent Police Commission (2013), there is 
a short mention of the development of policing 
intelligence. The report welcomes a near future 
when there will be:
… a single searchable intelligence source, saving 
officers’ time, enhancing operability as well as 
realising potential cost savings for the service as a 
whole … (p. 176).
The Report of the Independent Police Commission 
does not critically analyze what intelligence-led 
policing entails, because it does not recognise the 
basic high-low police distinction. That the report 
was released during the height of a worldwide 
media storm concerning the revelations of whistle 
blower Edward Snowden, who publically exposed 
something of the inner workings of a global high 
police surveillance apparatus, might make such an 
omission seem remarkable. We can only use the 
opportunity here to signal that global discussions 
about how to make policing better ignore the 
high-low and public-private distinctions to 
their loss. When the institutions that comprise 
the actually existing global police sector are 
understood in terms of a conceptual field, as the 
 
(Source: Sheptycki, 2000, p. 11) 
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above typology suggest, raises profound issues of 
accountability to politics and to law. It also helps 
to frame empirical enquiry about day-to-day 
global policing so that very little gets left out.
The practical complexity of the global policing 
sector means that a great deal of what goes on 
in it remains relatively under-explored, or at least 
that exploration is known only to a relatively select 
number of people (Henry and Smith, 2007). 
Given the high degree of social anxiety previously 
discussed, and the organisational complexity, it 
is clear why the simplistic functional justifications 
for global policing are required. Narratives about 
global policing and certain suitable enemies — 
‘paedophiles’, ‘terrorists’ and ‘serious organised 
criminals’, for example — provides a legitimation 
rhetoric which hides a complex set of practices 
left un-told. Ironically, the institutional nexus 
of global policing (which is intimately related to 
global governance) is ungoverned and, as things 
stand, ungovernable.
POLICING STUDIES AND 
POLICING SCIENCE
Enlightenment police science started off as an 
idea associated with the whole art of government. 
By the twentieth century, the language of police 
science had changed quite a bit. There are 
different opinions about what constitutes the 
most important historical landmark by which 
to characterise police science in the twentieth 
century. One candidate is the invention of radio-
dispatched police patrol. The later introduction 
of other new technologies into the organisation 
of police systems cascaded in on a process of 
the ‘scientification of police work’ (Ericson and 
Shearing, 1986). The history of 20th century 
policing is a history of continuous technological 
transformation. Beginning in the mid-20th 
century there began to spring up some academic 
interest in policing as an object of empirical 
enquiry. Several ethnographic studies became 
famous landmarks in a small academic cottage 
industry in the United States and the United 
Kingdom (Newburn, 2011). In the United States, 
James Q. Wilson was an early pioneer in this new 
academic industry. His Varieties of Police Behaviour 
(1968) was a landmark study in the administration 
of comparative police science management in 
eight communities. Broadly speaking, two types 
of research can be distinguished: research for 
policing and research about policing. The former 
is police science (eg. Sherman, 2009) the later is 
police studies (eg. Reiner, 2012).
It is not a case of either police science or police 
studies, it is a case of both police science and 
police studies. The demands for both training 
and education among all ranks of policing and 
security professionals are for well-rounded 
professionals capable of solving novel problems 
with innovative solutions. Too much science can 
become ‘controlology’, too much study risks the 
‘paralysis of analysis’. An appropriate balance 
must be struck. Not wanting to veer off on too 
much of a tangent into the philosophy of science, 
we would simply concur with the view of Sir 
Karl Popper that scientific claims are falsifiable; 
what makes policing scientific is some minimal 
commitment to ‘falsifiability criteria’. Police 
science need not be strapped to the procrustean 
bed of experimentalism in order to be scientific 
(cf. Sherman 2009). The descriptive case study 
can be rigorously scientific. For example, 
Darwin’s observations taken on his travels 
aboard the HMS Beagle, or the confirmation of 
the theory of continental drift by geophysicists 
in the mid-20th century are both examples of 
good science, but they are not experimental 
science. In the same way, a descriptive case study 
of Caribbean Policing (Bowling, 2011) or the 
relationship between police and public (Smith 
and Gray, 1985), or a comparative description 
of European and Australian policing (Hufnagel, 
2013) can certainly be considered empirical 
contributions to the understanding of the global 
police system that are scientific insofar as they 
are falsifiable. There is a fruitful nexus between 
police studies and police science. What we 
advocate is an interdisciplinary approach that 
promotes reflexive thinking. Because the means 
of policing are so powerful (surveillance powers, 
arrest and detention, potential use of force), 
it is important that any would be purveyors of 
those means are dissuaded from the hubris that 
holds that ‘reality is wholly knowable, and that 
knowledge and only knowledge liberates, and 
absolute knowledge liberates absolutely’ (Isaiah 
Berlin, quoted in Hitchens, 1998).
The promotion of a balanced understanding of 
policing as both ‘studies’ and ‘science’ is to look for 
a way to govern governance. The interdisciplinary 
approach we advocate aims to turn the whole 
policing field which was previously considered 
ungovernable (if it was considered at all) into an 
object of governance. 
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POLICING AND ITS 
SUBCULTURES
One of the most troublesome concepts 
associated with the governance of policing and 
security is that of ‘subculture’ (eg. Waddington, 
1999 Chan, 1997). It is troublesome, firstly 
because of the contestability of the term. 
Everybody uses the word ‘police subculture’ 
as if its’ meaning were clear and simple, but 
there are variations in meaning. The term is 
particularly troubling because it is usually used 
when referring to obviously problematic aspects 
of police behaviour: brutality, racism, sexism 
and machismo, for example. Theoretically it is 
not certain to what extent these supposed traits 
of police subculture are imported in from the 
wider culture, but surely they are not unique to 
policing institutions. Because the term is often 
vague and because it is almost invariably used 
as a shorthand label used to signal problematic 
police behaviour, the notion of police subculture 
presents slippery issues for the governance of 
policing. We would seek to stress that the idea 
of ‘police subculture’ is frequently reified but it is 
conceptually ephemeral and cannot be an object 
of governance for policy management.
As we understand and use the term it is defined in 
the conceptual language established by the classic 
subcultural theorists (eg. Bittner, Brodeur, 2007b; 
Downes, 1966; van Mannen and Manning, 1978; 
Skolnick 1966). Subculture is a set of collectively 
learned problem-solutions and an occupational 
subculture is a set of learned problem-solutions 
specific to a particular workplace routine. For 
example, nurses and doctors working in Accident 
and Emergency Wards have a predominant set of 
worries concerning the management of disease, 
pain, dying and death experienced within the 
context of a modern bureaucratic institutional 
work environment. Decisions about resuscitating, 
the administration of CPR routines, defibrillation 
and other life-saving interventions offer highly 
dramatic circumstances in which workplace 
decisions are made. In these circumstances 
expert knowledge may run counter to the 
emotional desires of on-lookers and bureaucratic 
routines may not offer the flexibility to cater to 
unforeseen circumstances. The structural context 
of the A&E ward, with its different system of 
expert knowledge classification, often concerned 
with life and death choices and undertaken in 
the context of bureaucratic surveillance, offers 
conditions where subcultural understandings, 
which ease the flow of action by the provision 
of ‘recipe knowledge’, flourish. An example of 
this is the so-called ‘slow code’ or ‘code blue’. 
Sometimes in cases of cardiopulmonary failure, 
Accident and Emergency Ward personnel are 
faced with a situation where they effectively 
know that resuscitation will probably have 
harmful outcomes: the cardiovascular system 
may be revived, but higher cortical function may 
be impaired or disabled. Expectant family on-
lookers may be of divided opinion, knowledge 
and understanding and likely desirous of a 
‘Hollywood ending’, hospital procedures can 
offer varying forms of bureaucratic restriction, 
and emergency professionals have discretion to 
act. Calling a ‘code blue’ may signal the team 
to act out the procedures of life-saving, while 
going through the motions in slower manner or 
otherwise not performing in an optimal fashion. 
This allows the patient to die, while providing 
the on-lookers with a sense that measures that 
conform to expectations as seen in mass media 
portrayals are being taken. It will come as no 
surprise to learn that the practice of the slow 
code has ignited an ethical debate within the 
occupational world of the healing professions, 
but nobody is these discussions, at least to our 
knowledge, is talking about public accountability 
measures aimed at controlling the subculture of 
the medical profession (Lantos and Meadow, 
2011). The ethics of life and death decisions in 
the healing professions continue to be largely 
a matter of an internalised ethical standpoint 
as summarised in, for example, the Hippocratic 
Oath.
Mutatis mutandis so is it with the police occupation, 
except that policing subculture is frequently 
on public trial. For working police agents there 
are problems associated with ‘the job’ that are 
collectively experienced. It is a ‘tainted occupation’, 
involved with a variety of kinds of ‘moral dirt’ from 
suicide to infanticide and much else. Insofar as 
those occupational problems generate collective 
solutions, they are learned problem-solutions, and 
these are the crux of an occupational subculture; 
from this point spins off a language of ‘the job’ 
and a subcultural universe of meaning. Just as 
the specific routines of the medical profession 
differ from place to place, depending on local 
circumstances — not least the technological 
backdrop for doing the work — so too does 
policing differ between jurisdictions. There are 
obvious differences in policing Montreal and 
Mumbai, Toronto and Tokyo, Regina and Rio 
de Janeiro. However, there are commonalities 
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since policing in all those places involves 
intervention in situations that ‘ought-not-to-
be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-
better-so-something-now’ (Bittner, 1974, p. 17). 
Furthermore, policing agents have the capacity 
to muster coercive force, or threaten to do so, in 
order to get the job done. Additionally, so-called 
‘democratic policing’ requires that such use of 
force is proportionate and the minimum amount 
necessary to get the job done. For example, if 
members of the public will not step back from 
the scene of an accident so that ambulance 
personnel, paramedics, and other emergency 
first-responders can properly attend to the 
scene, it is the police who have the authority to 
move the crowd. These features of police work, 
shared by policing agents the world over, mean 
that there is something of a ‘family resemblance’: 
a transnational subculture of policing so to 
speak. Police agents recognise their membership 
in this subculture. For example, when police 
officers go abroad on vacation, they sometimes 
bring with them emblems and other symbolic 
representations of their own organisation that 
they exchange with police they may meet in 
the countries they are visiting. Visit any police 
headquarters building and one will usually find 
a display symbolic paraphernalia from other 
agencies around the world, displayed with pride 
— perhaps in the corridor just outside the Chief 
Officer’s office or in the reception area where 
more visitor traffic ensures a greater audience of 
appreciation. This is evidence of a transnational 
subculture of police. Subcultural theory is 
interesting because it encourages an appreciation 
of what the world looks like ‘from within’ the 
subculture, while at the same time allowing the 
subcultural theorist to place that worldview within 
a broader context. The ideology of the ‘thin blue 
line’ looks different if you are, or are not, part of 
the ‘subculture’. All the while policing subculture 
reflects important aspects of the broader culture 
of which it is a contributing part.
If we can theorise a transnational subculture of 
policing, there is also a recognisable subculture 
of transnational policing. These agents are 
described by Robert Reiner as international 
technocratic police experts who disseminate 
the latest in scientific and technological 
solutions for a constantly innovating global 
police professionalism (Reiner, 1997, p. 1007). 
Transnational technocratic police experts have 
important effects on policing at the local level, 
and that is why the transnational subculture 
of policing is becoming more homogenous, 
despite the residual variation. This interactive 
process between the transnational subculture 
of policing and the subculture of transnational 
policing contributes to and ‘makes up’ Global 
Policing. Into this occupational mix we wish to 
insert a range of concerns signaled by the idea of 
a Constabulary Ethic.
The subcultures of policing thus theorised are 
mixed up in global cultural reproduction more 
generally and a great many volumes have been 
written about this (Reiner, 1997). One facet of 
this that cannot escape particular mention is 
the tendency for the occupational subculture of 
policing to be excessively shaped by a pattern 
of political language which articulates in terms 
of a ‘war on crime’, a ‘war on drugs’, a ‘war on 
terror’ and other, slightly less martial metaphors 
such as: ‘law enforcement’, ‘crime control’, 
‘deterrence’, ‘disruption’ and ‘incapacitation’. 
The complex interplay between general culture 
and particular subcultures is conceptually 
difficult to elucidate, but one simple point can 
be made: unduly combative language in policing 
heightens the stakes for an already tainted 
occupation. Subcultural theory offers a useful 
way to approach and understand global policing 
but, saying this, we are not intending to reify the 
concept as an object of governance. It is merely 
a way to help make global policing theoretically 
visible. What remains interesting is the actual 
work of policing, but with the higher stakes that 
war rhetoric brings comes a cloak of secrecy 
behind which ethically questionable practices 
remain hidden. That is one good reason why 
truly independent academic research on policing 
maintains continuing relevance.
POLICING; IATROGENESIS 
AND THE SECURITY-CONTROL 
PARADOX
The original idea of a science of policing was 
concerned with establishing a stable set of 
arrangements between the organs of state-
government and civil society to maximise total 
welfare. Under transnational conditions the 
state is no longer the container of insecurity that 
the modern nation-state system envisaged and 
policing practice has transcended the boundaries 
of ‘the state’. Of all of the outcomes of these 
circumstances the problem of iatrogenesis is 
the greatest (Bowling, 2010). Iatrogenesis is a 
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concept borrowed from the sociology of health 
and medicine. It refers to situations where the 
proscribed cure for an illness actually makes 
matters worse. For example, the United States 
military used DDT, a highly toxic and carcinogenic 
pesticide, to ‘de-lice’ young Vietnamese children 
as a way of protecting against transmission 
of disease. The cure was effective against the 
sorts of diseases borne by lice, fleas and other 
similar infestations of the human body, but 
carried with it other, more serious health risks. 
Thalidomide is another example of iatrogenesis. 
Thalidomide was prescribed to expectant 
mothers as a morning sickness curative; during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s more than 10 
000 babies in 46 countries were born with acute 
physical deformities brought on by their mothers’ 
use of the drug. Iatrogenesis is the unwanted and 
unintended consequence of curative action and it 
is a nemesis brought about when human beings 
succumb to hubris. 
There are many effects of global policing that 
have been shown to be iatrogenic (Bowling and 
Sheptycki, 2012, pp. 101-127). The most obvious, 
and therefore classic, example is that of the war 
on drugs. Decades after President Richard Nixon 
declared this war, it has become obvious that 
drug prohibition has not delivered on its aim to 
stamp out drug use. Ethan Nadelmann (2007), 
among a host of others, has argued persuasively 
that drug prohibition has caused more harm than 
good. The paradigm example of transnational 
policing (Sheptycki, 2000), ‘drug enforcement’, is 
a notorious example of words that succeed despite 
policy failure — failure that is visible across a range 
of policy areas including health, education and 
economic development. The global war on drugs 
has helped facilitate the inculcation of martial 
metaphors across a range of policing practices. This 
further amplifies a social tendency towards an ‘us 
versus them’ mentality within policing subculture. 
Just as it may difficult to monitor the use of ‘code 
blue’ in the A & E Ward (where public visibility 
and awareness may be hampered), absent any 
effective means of making the myriad institutions 
that comprise the global architecture of policing 
transparent and accountable to the global society 
being policed means that correcting iatrogenic 
problems is difficult. This might be called the 
‘global police accountability gap’ and into it is 
poured the rhetoric of justification. The official 
categories of suitable enemies inevitably become 
amplified as folkdevils in a spiraling rhetoric of 
legitimation. The paradox is that the promise 
of security-control turns out to be a chimera, 
because the more the global institutional order is 
secured by policing and enforcement means the 
less secure people feel. The policy failure of the 
war on drugs is thus experienced across a range 
of policing functions. Experienced international 
travellers who have been flying since the 1970s 
will know that, as the security screening at 
airports has increased over the decades, so the 
experience of travel has come to feel less secure. 
This is a practical, everyday and even banal effect 
of the security-control paradox which is manifest 
in many of the other ways that transnational 
policing is performed.
The security-control paradox provides several 
senses by which to judge that the emergent edifice 
of global policing is a failure on its own terms. 
The notable increase in travellers’ experience of 
‘security theatre’ comes at great financial expense. 
Building walls to enforce security divisions retards 
total economic development because security 
costs are a drain on the economy. The total cost of 
global policing, including not only that provided 
under state auspices, but also private security 
contractors and also including the cost of state 
security services (ie. high policing) is uncounted. 
And there are massive shifts happening across 
sectors of the policing field in terms of financial 
allocations, making such calculations even more 
difficult. The security-control paradox yields one 
final sense in which global policing has been 
unsuccessful at fostering the conditions of 
democratic freedom, because the promise was 
always that people had to surrender some liberty 
in order to gain in security. As the conditions 
of insecurity have been amplified through the 
iatrogenic effects of policing, there are yet 
further calls for curtailment of civil and private 
liberties. Without some conscious effort, this 
amplification spiral can go on out of control 
thereby continuously undermining the possibility 
of fostering a global system more firmly based on 
democratic legitimacy and societal well-being.
THE CONSTABULARY ETHIC
The structural arrangements of the global system 
do not facilitate transparent, accountable, 
and democratic governance (Sklair, 2002). 
The structures of global governance and, by 
extension, global policing simply do not have 
these attributes. As the previous brief discussion 
of the conceptual field of policing indicated, the 
police sector is broad, deep and global. Keeping 
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in mind that the original sense of police science 
brought with it the intention of fostering the 
social welfare of the individual in society so as to 
increase the general health of the commonwealth, 
raises issues as to how to normatively orient 
global policing towards correspondingly similar 
ends? One answer has been represented in the 
idea of a Constabulary Ethic (Sheptycki, 2007; 
2010; O’Rourke and Sheptycki, 2011). The term 
presents difficulties. The word ‘constable’ is ill-
defined. In some jurisdictions it carries an excess 
of negative connotative meanings, in other 
jurisdictions it is incomprehensible because there 
has no traditional equivalent concept. In some 
places it is linked to a paramilitary tradition in 
policing, in others to a civilian office. The term 
entered the scholarly lexicon from the sociology 
of the military. The first usage of the word 
Constabulary Ethic came out of studies looking 
at UN peace-keeping troops sent to Cyprus in 
the early 1960s. Recognising that military troop 
trained from the ‘killing job’ were being asked to 
perform a policing function in maintaining the 
buffer zone between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, 
military sociologists began to think about ways 
of fostering a Constabulary Ethic amongst 
military troops. Arguably trying to advance the 
acceptance of such an ill-defined category is ill-
conceived. However, the preceding discussion 
has shown how global policing has tended to 
become trapped in a negative feed-back loop 
through processes that are paradoxical leading to 
unintended iatrogenic consequences and further 
amplification of (in)security. We would argue 
that this implies that decisions could be taken to 
change the policing practices leading to different 
outcomes and so, despite the terminological 
difficulties, the idea of a Constabulary Ethic is at 
least worth thinking about.
The notion of the Constabulary Ethic is aimed 
directly at those persons who inhabit the 
occupational world of global policing, at 
whatever level and in whatever capacity. The 
idea is an intellectual short-hand to indicate 
something about the need to proceed as the result 
of conscious effort and thoughtful deliberation. 
The discretion involved in policing ‘work’ (Bronitt 
and Stenning, 2011) can involve the threat or use 
of force up to and including lethal force. As we 
have stressed, policing is a tainted occupation. 
By inserting the notion of the Constabulary Ethic 
into the subcultural language of policing we are 
providing a linguistic handle on a complex set of 
normative problems. Can there be a compendium 
of police ‘ethics’; recipe knowledge that can be 
listed? That there are efforts in the occupational 
world of policing to develop such recipe 
knowledge is a hopeful sign. For example, in 
some places the JAPAN model was promoted as a 
recipe for decision-making in the context of long-
term undercover operations against serious and 
organised criminals. JAPAN was an acronym which 
stood for the following questions. Is the action 
Justifiable? Is it Accountable? Is it Proportionate? 
Is it Auditable? And, is it Necessary? The answer 
to these questions, and the questions themselves, 
are moot. There may be other more appropriate 
ways to ask ethical questions about police work. 
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to provide a 
corpus compendium of constabulary ethics. Even 
John Kleinig, whose massive attempt to do just 
that, admits that he is
‘… very conscious that every issue canvassed in 
this long book cries out for further elaboration 
both philosophically and practically. The problems 
of authority, role morality, affirmative action, 
loyalty, privacy, coercion and deception, to 
mention some of them, have generated large 
and sophisticated literatures whose complexities 
have been barely touched upon … the concrete 
decisions that first line police officers and police 
managers must make on a day-to-day basis are 
more diverse and finely nuanced than the various 
situational circumstances to which I have alluded 
in the text’ (Kleinig, 1996, p. 2)
The Constabulary Ethic is not the same as trying 
to list constabulary ethics; it is a normative 
position. How do we understand or describe this 
position? Accepting that ‘the police job’ is, in 
the final instance, one which involves the ability 
to muster coercive force in the maintenance of 
social order, in taking on board the notion of a 
Constabulary Ethic the person who takes up the 
policing role remains a human being first and 
as a human being governed by the categorical 
imperative can only act in a way that he or she 
would expect of any other human being. This 
is longwinded Kantianism — act by the maxim 
whereby you can, at the same time, will that it 
become a universal law. It is also a reaffirmation 
of the Peelian notion of the constable as a ‘citizen 
in uniform’, perhaps updated for global times. 
The police are the public and the public are the 
police. The constable is a mere pivot of social 
order. All that is policing does not lie with the 
police, and the constable is but one part of a vast 
social system of order. The normative position 
that the Constabulary Ethic recommends is that 
of philosopher, guide and friend, accustomed 
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to holistic thinking whose first question when 
coming upon a scene requiring policework is: 
‘how can I help?’. It is also a position of individual 
responsibility. The would-be Constable is always 
individually responsible for his or her actions 
in terms of human rights norms. For example, 
if a police action results a person’s detention, 
then police assume responsibility for the health 
and well-being of that person for the duration. 
Individual responsibility to human rights norms 
sets a high normative bar for the Constabulary 
Ethic. But the capacity for reflexive thought that 
the concept of the Constabulary Ethic points 
toward goes even further by virtue of the fact that 
we are conceiving of an ethic for global policing. 
It has been some while since ‘green criminology’ 
has shown the possibility that Mother Earth 
could be a victim of crime (Beirne and South, 
2012) and so positioning oneself with regard to 
a Constabulary Ethic concerned with the general 
welfare, would also involve the revolutionary act 
of incorporating environmental thinking about 
the global policing mission. 
CONCLUSION
The science of policing as it was articulated at 
the beginning of the Enlightenment period 
was part of what the sociologist Norbert Elias 
termed the ‘civilising process’ (Elias, 1982). 
Civilisation can be defined as a process whereby 
one gradually increases the number of people 
included in the term ‘we’ or ‘us’ and at the same 
time decreases those labelled ‘you’ or ‘them’ 
until that latter has no one left in it. Policing was 
central to the art of governance, which was about 
consolidating the patria — the national ‘social 
body’. The policing idea lives on in enormously 
changed circumstances in the 21st century. It is 
no longer quite right to think of the state system 
as a container of social order, indeed we argue 
that the existing transnational-state-system seems 
more often to equate with social disorder (Bowling 
and Sheptycki, 2012). Policing under transnational 
conditions presents enormous challenges. This 
essay draws attention to the complexity of the 
system of global governance, especially with 
regard to the conceptual field of policing. It argues 
that, globally speaking, police legitimacy has been 
largely sought through a functionalist rhetoric, a 
system of meaning figuratively spinning between 
the subcultural world of policing and the broader 
culture of which it is a part, predicated on the 
existence of certain folkdevils and suitable enemies, 
to which strong police measures are said to be 
the only answer. We further argue that, globally, 
policing practice tends to exhibit features of a 
security-control paradox in which, ironically, the 
pursuit of social order through law enforcement 
means has resulted in increased insecurity. A 
central focus of this essay has been to draw an 
historical line from the early manifestations of 
the modern science of police up to today. The 
original science of police was deeply imbued with 
normative thinking, since it was concerned with 
notions of the general welfare of society and state. 
In present times, police science is being reduced to 
experimental criminology and crime science and 
notions about what is good policing have been 
reduced to the measurable inputs and outputs of 
efficiency and effectiveness. This paper aims to 
affect thinking within the occupational world of 
policing by pointing to the idea of a Constabulary 
Ethic as an appropriate short-hand term for a 
broader normative standpoint for global policing. 
Empirical research is a necessary part of doing 
good police work, but it is not sufficient. Good 
science, like good governance, is possible only in an 
open society that fosters a dialogue that includes 
all its members. This essay has sought to show the 
imperative of developing an ethical standpoint for 
the system of subcultural meanings that inscribe 
the lifeworld of global policing and called in the 
Constabulary Ethic. 
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POLICING AND CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS:  
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND RIGIDITY
Christian Mouhanna
France
Keywords: Policing, police discretion, law, ethics, law enforcement, control of the police
Abstract: This paper deals with the tension that appears between on the one hand laws and rules 
which try to control police activities, police efficiency and police fairness, and on the other hand police 
discretion, regarded as essential by police officers on the beat. It also underlines the need for flexibility 
that every police officer has to use in order to preserve or to improve his relationship with the citizens. 
Because people have complex demands, because they don’t want the police officer to apply the rules 
without any discretion, what would be unbearable, negotiation has to be part of the police officer’s job. 
But the piling up of new rules is restraining this flexibility.
More and more, if we hear police discourses 
during interviews or meeting with police officers, 
police work appears to be a controlled work. In 
a civilised society, a police force that could be 
out of control would be an unbearable idea. In 
our democratic countries, the main current view 
is not only that the State has the monopoly of 
legal physical violence (Weber, 1919), but also 
that the police force, who is the one of the 
armed wings of this State, has to stay under the 
control of its authority. That means not only to 
obey the elected authorities, but also to respect 
the limits set by the other official rules.
But this legal-rational view itself crashes into 
some realities. Among practitioners and 
scientists working in this field of policing, it is 
well known that even in the most centralised, 
hierarchical and controlled police organisations, 
there is still room for the police officer on the 
ground to put a construction on the orders that 
they receive. But many tools, including GPS, 
cameras on police cars or on police officers’ 
shoulders, or CCTV, are used to strengthen the 
control over the police and to reduce what is 
know as ‘police discretion’. There is a permanent 
tension between control and autonomy.
The second great obstacle to a full respect of 
official rules is the need for efficiency. Sometimes, 
this requirement leads to discrepancies between 
compliance with the legal standards and the 
outcomes that are expected from police forces.
Many fictional police stories or movies are 
based on the dilemmas set by this tremendous 
question police officers have to face: is it 
preferable to catch a shoplifter — or a burglar, a 
serial rapist or a terrorist — without compliance 
to all the rules, or to let him go because it is not 
possible to ‘build’ a case without cheating the 
law? The distinction between on the one hand 
purposive/instrumental rationality and on the 
other hand value/belief-oriented rationality is 
classic for social scientists (Weber, 1922): police 
officers on the beat are practically dealing with 
this distinction quite often. The ‘art’ of policing 
in the street refers to this ability to combine laws 
and action. But until what limits is it possible to 
do it?
Among all the consequences of this gap between 
law in the books and practices, we want to shine 
light on a third issue, linked to the question of 
relationships between the population and police 
officers: the tension that could emerge between 
law enforcement and the need for flexibility in 
applying the rules.
A majority of police forces in developed countries 
have been involved in a strategy of community 
policing, or in a process of improving accountability. 
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In order to improve such strategies, police officers 
have to be more tolerant with and more open 
minded to citizens’ behaviour. Sometimes the 
search for better interactions with people could 
lead police officers not to apply all rules. This 
issue is particularly relevant when these police 
officers are in contact with youngster from 
ethnic minorities and poor areas, who could 
have cultures or habits which are not accepted 
by official rules. But it could also be the case in 
richer neighbourhood where the citizens have 
enough social capital (Bourdieu, 1980) in order 
to force police officers to be less harsh when 
they misbehave and commit relatively petty 
offences. Therefore, our second main concern 
in this paper will be to understand how police 
officers may find a good balance between law 
enforcement and comprehension (discretion), 
and how some public policies could disrupt this 
balance.
HOW TO IMPROVE THE 
FUNCTIONING OF POLICE 
FORCES: LEGAL AND 
THEORETICAL ANSWERS
In the vast majority of the developed countries, 
the problem of racism and unfairness inside 
police forces has been a concern, with concrete 
results or not. For years, governments have 
increased the number of laws and rules that set 
limits to police officers’ power. Many NGO have 
used these laws in order to fight against police 
violence or abuse of power, and more generally 
to put the pressure on police officers who were 
not respecting people from ethnic minorities, 
working classes or social minorities — all those 
who could carry a negative reputation within 
the police forces. Police chiefs at the highest 
level have introduced internal rules to increase 
the level of nonviolent attitudes within their 
staff. More and more police forces have their 
own code of ethics, adding new constraints to 
police work, even if it provides more guarantees 
for the citizens.
In order to improve the relationship with the 
citizens, many police organisation have also 
developed internal documents, which have 
created a new kind of rules: quality and/or 
service charters can be found in places, where 
the police officers receive the public. They 
are included in police training. Through these 
charters, police organisations recognise that the 
citizen, as a customer, has a right of control over 
police officers’ work. Accountability has become 
more concrete for many citizens, especially those 
from upper or middle classes
At local level, cooperation with partners, such 
as social services, public housing, city offices; 
schools or other public organisations, has led 
to the production of another kind of rules: 
contracts or agreements stipulate how and when 
the police forces must intervene. These police 
partners have high expectations that police 
officers will respect the terms of the contract.
And above all, New Public Management (NPM), 
with a set of tools measuring and controlling the 
work, has put a new pressure both on chiefs’ 
shoulders but also on police officers on the beat. 
From now on, the police officers have to achieve 
measurable goals, and they have to report to 
their authorities. Almost all police actions have 
to be justified and registered. Even if the NPM 
is not defined as a tool which is used to address 
wrong behaviours and attitudes in the police 
work, it is obvious that a heavy control over the 
work will also be considered as a mean to prevent 
all excesses, which is obviously a good thing.
But all these laws and rules have simultaneously 
reduced police officers’ autonomy, which has 
been called ‘police discretion’ by police scientists’ 
classic works (Goldstein, 1963, Waddington, 
1999). Law and rules have brought on a real 
change in the police culture. It is nowadays 
difficult to meet police officers who are prone to 
break the rules because they would harm their 
effectiveness. The ‘Dirty Harry’s’ style is likely 
to disappear, because the risks to be prosecuted 
are high. And for the same reasons, it is less easy 
to refuse the service due to the citizen. People 
who want to file complaints are better treated in 
the police stations. It is also admitted that there 
is less police violence, less racism within police 
forces, and less prejudices of all kind.
But it would be naive to consider that there is no 
problem any more and that police organisations 
have reached a level of efficiency, strong enough 
to keep all the citizens satisfied with the service 
provided by the police. Theoretical answers 
that have been presented above offered us 
a good opportunity to communicate on the 
progress done inside police forces. But many 
problems remain as far as concrete police work 
is concerned





CRITICISM AND LIMITS OF 
IMPROVEMENT
Observers in charge of the evaluation of the 
image of police forces can notice that criticisms 
against police still remain, especially among 
people who feel unsecure or among people, 
like youngsters from ethnic minorities, who feel 
‘targeted’ by police actions. These reproaches are 
of different nature. They regard both complaints 
against the lack of effectiveness, the lack of 
effective policing, and the abuse of power and 
authority — too much policing.
As far as the first point is concerned, the need for 
a ‘better’ police service seems to be a Danaids’ 
jar. The more people suffer from insecurity 
or need help, the more they claim for a more 
present and more efficient police forces in their 
district. Because it is hard to work in these areas, 
and because the police officers don’t have 
the tools to answer to all local demands, they 
prefer to avoid these areas as much as possible. 
But all citizens don’t accept this fact. Even 
elected authorities have to face arguments with 
citizens who demand a more visible presence of 
police patrols, swifter reaction of the police to 
emergency calls, or for a more efficient control 
of potential offenders — whether they are real or 
not. All these claims lead police chiefs to create 
new rules, like the ones underlined above, in 
order to force their staff to better integrate the 
public demands in their policing duties.
With respect to the second point, abuse of 
power, people would consider that the police are 
unfair, racist or targeting specific groups, such as 
youngsters and adolescents, ethnic minorities or 
inhabitants of poor areas. Even if these people 
often lack of social capital, they have organised 
themselves to thwart this targeted strategies. 
Here and there are emerging cop-watch-style 
movements who gain influence on the public 
scene. Politicians and police chiefs are bound to 
react to these calls by strengthening the rules. 
Codes of ethics, internal controls or long-life 
education are the most frequently-used tools to 
answer to the requirement of a democratic and 
citizen-friendly police force.
The different expectations could be contradictory, 
because older people who feel afraid of juveniles 
may require police action against them, which 
lead to targeting and control considered by the 
latter as inacceptable. But practically speaking, 
the police have to face these two demands. 
Therefore the increasing number of rules which 
are set up to meet all problems lures the police 
officer into a trap. Whatever they choose as a top 
priority, they would be accused not to address 
other requirement. When a police officer failed 
into applying one rule, the easiest answer is to 
censure, because they are to be considered as 
accountable. Of course, it is logical to act this 
way, but in some situations, considering one 
police officer being the only one accountable 
for a problem, is also a too convenient way for 
the management staff, not be involved in the 
challenge.
If it is not acceptable to deny the need for rules 
and for a control over police officers, it is still 
important to have a look on the consequences of 
this multi-fold layer of rules and laws regulating 
the police work. Many police officers complain 
about the threat of a permanent control over their 
activity. Our point is not to agree or disagree with 
their complaints, but to analyse the impact of 
the increasing tendency to establish a formalised 
response — rules — to complex problems in 
the field of policing. This phenomenon is not an 
isolated one: it is one example of the growing 
judicialisation of human relationships in our 
societies (Shapiro & Stone Sweet, 2002).
As far as the police forces are concerned, and 
beyond the traditional opposition between 
effectiveness and compliance with the law, we 
would argue that the mushrooming legal system 
could produce a pernicious effect: it could create 
or increase a gap between the police and the 
population and play a part in destroying the 
confidence of citizens in the police officers which 
is essential to do a ‘good policing’ and is going 
awry (Manning, 2010).
THE DILEMMAS OF POLICE WORK
Contradictions are ‘natural’ components of police 
work (Manning, 1977). With the development of 
accountability, the managerial approach of New 
Public Management, and, more recently, budget 
cuts, these contradictions have lead to dilemmas 
that police officers on the beat have to live with. 
Most of these contradictions are well known 
inside police units, even if they widely remain 
unknown outside.
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Amongst all, they have to deal with budget and 
human resources cuts and are simultaneously 
required to increase the quality of the service for 
the citizens. This doesn’t mean that a better police 
activity is always linked to more expenses and 
more staff, but the current need for an optimal 
use of public resources leads to crucial difficult 
choices and therefore it may lead to withdraw 
from some activities and priorities. All public 
demands cannot obviously be fulfilled under the 
given restrictive conditions.
This structural lack of means makes us question 
the relevance of this notion of ‘accountability’ 
(Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993, Walker, 2005). With fewer 
‘troops’, some demands have to be ignored, and 
citizens, or some of them will be disappointed or 
dissatisfied with the service offered by the police. 
Moreover, the concept of accountability has to 
be challenged in a centralised and hierarchical 
organisation. Who has decided where the cuts 
have to be done? It is very rare that the citizens 
are associated to this kind of decision. Whatever 
the budgets are, the leaders of the organisations 
are always reluctant to share their power with 
customers or citizens. Even if authorities promote 
accountability, it is hard for them to bring it 
into effect. Internal logics are more absorbing 
than citizens’ demands. And their plurality and 
diversity make them less coherent than clear top 
down style orders (Monjardet, 1996).
As far as fairness is concerned, one could note 
that the pressure being put on police officers to 
be more efficient and more productive has led to 
limit the time available to listen to protagonists 
and resolve disputes. Patrols units have to go 
as quickly as possible from one intervention to 
the next one. Lacking the time needed to listen 
to all involved parties, the police do have less 
opportunity to find a suitable answer. In many 
police organisations oriented to efficiency, 
such an attitude, i.e. taking time for discussion, 
could be interpreted as a waste of time and 
energy. Zero tolerance policies have increased 
this trend to avoid the development of robust 
relationships with the public: because the police 
must address each incident as a problem and 
not as an occasion to interact with somebody, 
the police enter into a system of confrontation 
rather than cooperation. Therefore, fairness is 
hard to maintain.
In many police organisations, all these 
contradictions would not be tackled Police 
officers on the beat are too much often the only 
who have to make choices. They have to take 
into account all constraints. But the worst thing 
is that police authorities are adding their own 
pressure over police officers in the street. As it was 
underlined above, the management produces 
regularly new rules in order to impose their view 
and their priorities. This phenomenon is not a 
new one: it is well known as the vicious circle 
of bureaucracy (Merton, 1940, Crozier, 1963). 
The procedures have to be followed by the civil 
servants. If they do, the social system becomes 
too rigid. It is impervious to external inputs. It 
they don’t, the organisation reacts in creating 
new rules and procedures. It has to be recognised 
that police organisation are often involved in such 
administrative mechanism. Many police officers 
complain about the pile of rules that they have 
to adhere to and apply. And at the same time, 
many others ask for more rules because they 
feel more comfortable with prescribed attitudes, 
which prevent them from taking too much 
responsibility.
By adding internal rules on top of, or besides, the 
criminal code of procedure and other criminal 
laws, the police organisation is about to paralyze 
the whole system of policing. Of course, this 
paper is not defending non-ruled organisation 
of police forces. Relationships between policing 
and rules are quite a complex issue. Following 
Brodeur’s argument (Brodeur, 1984), one could 
argue that laws are anyway submitted to police 
organisations’ requirements. But with the piling 
up of new rules issued by diverse pressure groups, 
citizens, NGO’s, local elected authorities, it seems 
that police forces are no more able to cope with 
all rules, let alone to control them. And above 
all, there is a gap inside police forces themselves 
between backstage officers and street-level 
troops (see in detail Reuss-Ianni 1982). The latter 
are in favour of more rules in order to better 
control the former.
THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF 
JUDICIALISATION
Police forces are both a part of the judicialisation 
process and a victim of it. In our democratic 
societies, embedded in a customs’ pacification 
and civilisation process (Elias, 1974), conflicts 
and disputes are more and more solved through 
legal ways, with at least three impacts on police 
officers:
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Firstly, they are called for a growing number of 
cases that could have been solved without their 
intervention, including a lot of disputes inside 
families or among neighbours;
Secondly, nowadays more people are better 
qualified. Citizens are able to use the existing 
rules and regulations in order to criticise the 
police work. They know their rights and can 
use legality in order to oppose to police officers 
orders if they don’t agree with them;
Thirdly, as it was already underlined, there are 
more and more rules restricting the freedom 
of police officer in their job. It has become for 
them a real challenge to apply these rules in a 
complex world, while fellow citizens are denying 
their legitimacy. And they are also accused of not 
respecting the law.
As a result, many officers consider law and rules 
as a permanent constraint and impediment, 
which leads to attitudes of rigidity. They restrain 
them from developing negotiation strategies. 
They tend to follow the prescriptions and to 
avoid every risky initiative that could have legal 
consequences prejudicial to their career. In a 
micro-society like a police force where rules, laws, 
and New Public Management tools are applied, 
the police officer on the beat is the only one who 
has to face the real gulf between theory and 
practice, and the lowest level of the hierarchy 
is the one responsible in case of excess or non-
respect of the rules. It is a very easy situation 
for the authorities that can always argue that 
they cannot be guilty of anything because they 
have produced rules that were not respected. It 
is better to put the blame on one single person 
rather than questioning one organisation or one 
policy.
But police officer’s rigidness could be a source of 
incomprehension in the citizens’ view. Of course, 
many of the citizens call for more severity. But 
same people are also claiming for tolerance 
when they commit an offence or on the occasion 
of traffic check. People who are calling for police 
interventions in case of petty incivilities often 
prefer mediation rather than punishment. If 
police discretion is a problem for the hierarchy, 
it is often the expression of this room for 
negotiation that both the police officer and the 
citizen need in order to build up a relationship 
based on mutual understanding.
A police officer on the beat is trapped within 
a police organisation too much bound on 
regulations, because whatever they would do, 
they are at risk of being punishable. If they are 
too tolerant, the hierarchy could put the blame 
on them, they are seen as not enough efficient, or 
by a judge, they do not apply the law. If they are 
too severe, it would generate tensions, conflicts, 
hate and a spirit of revenge among parts of the 
public. It is no more possible to build a relation 
where the police officer gets information and 
may solve problems without engaging into a 
judicial case. As a consequence, their legitimacy 
is threatened.
Of course, misdemeanour, or racism, especially 
when they come from police officers, has to be 
sanctioned, and rules, regulations and laws are 
appropriate tools to fight against these excesses. 
But excess of rules is not a good solution either, 
even if it could be sometimes an easy one. It 
is hard to precisely define the good balance 
between top-down orders and local police 
officer’s discretion, but addressing all problems 
with more and more rules could place the 
officers in a too fragile situation, with the risk 
of reaction out of all proportion. Some police 
officers’ excesses are also the result of this feeling 
of weakness.
To avoid such situations, politicians and authorities 
have to be careful in using new laws and new 
rules as answers to all problems. They have to 
take into account the specific consequences 
of their decisions. The best thing is to make a 
global diagnosis of the organisation instead of 
putting the pressure only on the police officer in 
the street. A first priority here must be to analyse 
the effects of the ‘culture of performance’ and 
its measurement on the relationships between 
police officers and the public.
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FROM ‘IRON FISTS’ TO ‘BUNCHES OF FIVES’: 
A CRITICAL REFLECTION ON DIALOGUE 




Keywords: Police liaison, dialogue policing, political protest
Abstract: This article focuses on the recent academic assertion that police attempts to engage in 
dialogue before and during protest events (ostensibly to facilitate the participants’ preferred means of 
political expression) are perhaps more realistically concerned with collecting useful intelligence about 
demonstrators’ likely motives and activities, and preparing advance justification for possible police 
interventions. A case study is presented of the work carried out by a 15-person South Yorkshire Police 
‘Police Liaison Team’ (PLT) in relation to the ‘anti-Lib Dem’ political protest occurring in the major 
English city of Sheffield in March 2011. Using a combination of participant observation and interviews 
with police and demonstrators, the study highlights compelling similarities between the tactical 
approach and underlying objectives of the PLT and those subscribed to by public order specialists in the 
Metropolitan Police Service in the early 1990s. In common with their ‘Met’ counterparts, the PLT used 
carefully cultivated exchange relationships with protest organisers as means of gathering intelligence, 
securing compliance with police preferences for the routes of marches and establishing parameters 
of ‘acceptable’ behaviour. However, by using the relatively new tactic of immersing themselves in the 
crowd, PLT members were also able to maintain ‘open’ lines of communication with protesters and 
provide a stream of unerringly accurate ‘dynamic risk assessments’ to remote senior commanders. This 
tactic helped to ensure that there were few unsettling ‘surprises’ on both sides, that there were no 
unnecessary, indiscriminate or over-punitive police interventions, and that the police operation was 
ultimately regarded by protest organisers as having been exceptionally tolerant and ‘facilitating’. 
INTRODUCTION
A recent article by Baker (2013) considers the 
extent to which the growing use of ‘dialogue 
policing’ (with its accent on liaising and 
negotiating with demonstrators before and during 
political protests) represents a bona fide means 
of promoting the ‘right’ to protest, or actually 
constitutes little more than a disingenuous form 
of ‘symbolic theatre’ — a ‘ritualistic sham’. The 
latter perspective is alluded to in Baker’s article 
by the co-organiser of an Australian climate 
camp protest (‘Switch off Hazelwood, Switch 
off Coal, Switch off Renewable’) who likens 
negotiations with the police to a ‘smoke and 
mirrors chess game’, involving both sides vying 
for relevant information, and also establishing a 
moral position of ‘we’ve spoken to you, you’ve 
spoken to us, we’ve played friendly. On the day, 
how much of what you’ve committed to will you 
stand by?’ (quoted in ibid., pp. 94-95).
While such evidence leads Baker to conclude that 
‘ritualistic games’ of this nature are undoubtedly 
replete with ulterior motives on all sides, he insists 
that they tend also to be mutually beneficial, 
not least by helping to legitimise and facilitate 
peaceful dissent while allowing the police to 
‘maintain control by conveying expectations for 
crowd behaviour and remaining in control of 
public space’ (ibid., p. 100). All of this may well 
entail ‘lingering suspicion on both sides’, allied 
to police contingency planning (‘a dual mode of 
policing’) in cases where uncooperative groups 
of protesters spurn the invitation to negotiate 
(ibid., p. 100); but even in situations where it fails 
to become all-encompassing, dialogue remains a 
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
31
vitally important mechanism insofar as it ‘creates 
the context for a better understanding, a greater 
chance of negotiated outcomes and protester 
compliance, and enhanced predictability for the 
parties involved’ (ibid.).
These views chime with those of UK academics 
who, like the present author, have generally 
approved of recent attempts by British police 
forces to help ‘facilitate the right to protest’ by 
adopting communication-based tactics and 
strategies, based on seminal Swedish Dialogue 
Policing approaches (Gorringe et al., 2012; 
Gorringe and Rosie, 2013; Stott et al., 2013; D. 
Waddington, 2013). Such methods are consistent 
with official recommendations appearing in the 
wake of the controversial policing of the 2009 
G20 protest in central London (HMCIC, 2009a, 
2009b). On that occasion, the Metropolitan 
Police Service (MPS) were heavily criticised for 
using over-zealous tactics which saw hundreds 
of protesters ‘kettled’ (contained and detained) 
for several hours, and an innocent bystander 
(Ian Tomlinson) die of injuries sustained during 
an unwarranted assault by a police officer which 
only reached public attention when a ‘citizen 
journalist’ disclosed relevant video footage to The 
Guardian newspaper (Greer and McGlaughlin, 
2010; Rosie and Gorringe, 2009).
This strong commitment to using effective 
communication and dialogue also underpins 
the GODIAC project (e.g. GODIAC, 2013), a 
European Union-funded initiative involving 
case studies of protest policing in nine separate 
nations, whose recommendations for a common 
European approach to policing ‘political 
manifestations’ firmly endorse the four key 
‘principles of conflict reduction’ identified by 
Reicher and his co-workers — namely: education 
(understanding the various ‘social identities’, 
values, beliefs and objectives of the different 
sections of the crowd); facilitation (striving to 
help protesters achieve their legitimate goals); 
communication (employing negotiation, prior 
to and during the event, with the intention 
of reaching agreements, and avoiding any 
misunderstandings or unpleasant surprises); and 
differentiation (resisting the inclination to treat 
all members of the crowd in uniform manner, 
irrespective of whether they are ‘guilty’ or 
‘innocent’) (Reicher et al. 2007).
7What UK commentators in particular have not 
sufficiently emphasised is the degree to which 
this ‘new’ dialogue approach shares compelling 
similarities with the negotiation-oriented public 
order policing methods observed more than 
two decades ago by PAJ Waddington (1994) in 
his two-year study of the MPS. Waddington’s 
basic revelation that senior MPS public order 
commanders were apt to use various forms of 
‘guile’ and ‘interactional ploys’ in order to induce 
(or even outfox) protest organisers into staging 
their marches and demonstrations more in 
accordance with police interests and objectives 
than those of the protest participants is certainly 
of relevance to the issues raised by Baker. The 
following article seeks to addresses this important 
oversight by reopening discussion, first set out in 
D. Waddington (2013) and D. Waddington and 
McSeveny (2012), of the recent police operation 
implemented by South Yorkshire Police (SYP) in 
response to the anti-Lib Dem protest, staged in 
Sheffield city centre in March 2011.
The first section of the article not only outlines 
the underlying principles and objectives of the 
Dialogue Policing approach, but also alludes to 
some of the possible difficulties associated with 
its practical application. The second section 
then summarises the main findings from PAJ 
Waddington’s important study of negotiation-
based policing in the MPS. These initial sections 
will provide the context for a case study, spanning 
four further sections, of the composition, ethos, 
activities and ‘effectiveness’ of the Police Liaison 
Team employed by SYP at the anti-Lib Dem 
protest, of any problems the team encountered, 
and of its relations both with protesters and 
‘more conventional’ public order Police Support 
Units (PSU). This case study will form the basis of 
a concluding section, focusing on the extent to 
which the type of methods implemented by SYP 
represent a novel, safer and more enlightened 
form of protest policing, and constitute a genuine 




The Swedish Dialogue Policing approach has 
been comprehensively outlined by Holgersson 
and Knutsson (2011). According to these 
authors, it involves an overall commitment to: 
(i) ensuring the facilitation of the demonstrators’ 
legitimate goals, via self-policing if possible; (ii) 
using a ‘counterpart perspective’ to anticipate 
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the likely reactions of sections of the crowd to 
possible police interventions; and (iii) employing 
sufficient tactical differentiation to tailor police 
activities to the diversity of crowd. Its overriding 
objective is to ‘facilitate expressions of freedom 
of speech and the right to demonstrate’ in the 
hope of minimising confrontation, injury and 
destruction of property.
The majority of a dialogue officer’s work involves 
building up trusting relationships with organisers 
and protest groups, perhaps stretching over a 
period of several months, which can then serve 
as the basis for pre-event negotiation. Typically, 
such negotiation will involve determining agreed 
routes of marches and whether (and, if so, how 
close) they will be allowed to come in reach of 
sensitive buildings or locations. This process will 
inevitably result in compromise, or even give rise 
to partially or entirely novel sets of arrangements.
When on duty, dialogue officers operate in pairs. 
They are usually decked out in civilian clothes, 
but are distinguishable by yellow vests bearing 
the inscription ‘Dialogue Police’.
During the protest per se, the dialogue officers 
strive to ensure that prior agreements are 
upheld, work to sustain two-way communication 
between the police and demonstrators, attempt 
to de-escalate potentially conflictual incidents, 
and transmit regular readings of the changing 
moods of the crowd:
‘The aim of dialogue police officers is to be 
near critical places, enabling vital information, 
assessments, and feedback about problems and the 
police way of acting to be continuously passed on to 
the commanders. Police actions and interventions 
can also be explained to demonstrators. An 
important function is to try to influence a plan or 
ongoing activity by the police that may be perceived 
as provocative by the demonstrators’. (ibid., p. 204)
Holgersson and Knutsson (2011) concede that 
this inherent role dichotomy has resulted in 
dialogue police being looked upon as ‘traitors’ 
by their police colleagues and as ‘devious 
intelligence gatherers’ by protesters. Pressure 
exerted on them by commanders to simply gather 
intelligence and/or convey police directives to the 
crowd may conflict with their need to exercise 
discretion and avoid being seen as a police 
‘message boy’. Commanding officers sometimes 
accuse dialogue police of having become too 
sympathetic toward the demonstrators (having 
‘gone native’), and are apt to dismiss or overrule 
their observations and advice. Police of all 
ranks often feel frustrated by exhortations from 
dialogue officers to exercise more patience, 
restraint and compromise. Injunctions of this 
nature rob them of the customary satisfaction 
that comes from accomplishing things by force. 
To ask them to ‘stand back and do nothing’ in 
the presence of an ‘unruly’ crowd constitutes an 
insulting waste of their time and expertise, and 
involves a perceived dereliction of duty.
Wahlströhm (2007) points to similar attitudes 
among Swedish trainee public order 
commanders who resented the prospect of using 
communication as part of a process of give and 
take, rather than a means of insisting on outright 
public compliance. Certainly, Wahlströhm is far 
more explicit than Holgersson and Knuttsson 
in acknowledging the obvious tension existing 
between the Swedish police’s commitment 
to dialogue with protesters and the ‘purely 
instrumental dimension embedded in such 
interaction’ (Wahlströhm 2007, p. 400). He is 
clearly agnostic in asserting that
‘In sum, what is distinctive about the contemporary 
Swedish case is the (temporarily) high level of 
critical reflection among police regarding their 
interaction with protesters. Whether this will open 
up possibilities for genuinely more democratic forms 
of protest policing, or merely lead to nothing but 
more subtle forms of coercion, is still too early to 
say’. (ibid.)
NEGOTIATING PROTEST IN THE 
EARLY 1990S
Wahlströhm’s agnosticism echoes scepticism 
expressed by British academics in relation to 
more the ‘negotiated’ style of public order 
management introduced in the wake of high-
profile confrontations of the 1980s and early 
1990s around such issues as pit closures, 
the introduction of new technology and the 
inception of the poll tax. These commentators 
identified the new police methods as constituting 
arguably more subtle ways (‘the iron fist in the 
velvet glove’) of containing or repressing political 
dissent and of restoring some much-needed 
legitimacy to the police (King and Brearley, 
1996; D. Waddington, 1996, 1998). Ironically, 
evidence in favour of this view was contained in 
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
33
empirical work undertaken by PAJ Waddington 
(1994, 1998), someone not customarily critical 
of the police. Waddington’s two-year participant 
observation study of public order policing in the 
MPS demonstrated the means by which senior 
officers were able successfully to achieve their 
objectives by using pre-event negotiation to 
ensure that protesters march peacefully along 
the police’s preferred route while causing a 
minimum of disruption and inconvenience to 
ongoing city life. In short, ‘Negotiation was 
less a process of “give and take” and more that 
of the organiser giving and the police taking. The 
police were enormously successful at ensuring that 
protest took place on their terms’ (Waddington, 
1994, p. 101).
Outcomes of this type were invariably secured 
via the police usage of a range of communicative 
‘ploys’ in the build-up to the protest, such as 
displays of spurious friendship towards organisers, 
donating helpful guidance and advice, or 
extending apparently unconditional favours.
‘Thus, negotiations are conducted with the 
amicability and good humor [sic] that would 
seem more appropriate to arranging a loan from 
a bank…Such amicability is not the product of 
genuine liking for or agreement with the organisers, 
the campaigns they represent, or their cause. It is a 
studied performance designed to dispel any tension, 
hostility or antagonism that the organiser might 
harbor [sic]. Once negotiation begins, the police 
stance is one of proffering help and advice — "How 
can we help you?" — "help you," that is, to "do it 
our way." Many organisers are inexperienced and so 
the police "organise it for them." They recommend 
routes along which to march, provide the telephone 
numbers of officials in other organisations that need 
to be contacted, and suggest how difficulties might 
be resolved’. (Waddington, 1998: 120-1)
The police know that contact and benevolence 
of this nature implicitly commits the organisers 
both to upholding an exchange relationship 
and assuming a position of mutual responsibility 
for potential problems that might occur 
(Waddington, 1994, p. 84). Police and organisers 
thus have a shared interest in the outcome of the 
demonstration — hence, the greater propensity 
for relevant information and intelligence to be 
reciprocated, especially in relation to groups or 
individuals deemed likely to be ‘troublemakers’ 
(ibid.). This arguably cynical side to the police 
involvement is underlined by Waddington’s 
further disclosure that,
‘(A)lthough the police might have genuine 
affection for some organisers, the appearance 
of friendliness was often a studied performance. 
Almost unfailingly, organisers’ veracity and 
competence were subjected to withering scrutiny 
the moment they left the negotiating meeting. On 
some occasions, police officers, who a few minutes 
earlier were friendly to the point of being unctuous, 
denigrated the organisers’ personal qualities…
Indeed, all organisers tended to be regarded with 
suspicion’. (Waddington, 1994, p. 87)
Other pre-event measures are undertaken to 
offset the risk of any individual or teams of officers 
engaging in ‘ill-considered’ actions likely to spark 
off unwanted confrontation. This is typically 
achieved by: (a) determining that only the most 
capable and trusted public order commanders 
get assigned to the event; (b) engaging in pre-
event ‘strategy meetings’ in which all tactical 
contingencies are discussed’; and (c) ensuring 
that all junior ranks are thoroughly briefed 
in terms of the operational goals and ethos. 
Police interaction with organisers and other 
protesters on the day of the event will also exude 
ostentatious bonhomie; riot police (though 
heavily tooled up and at-the-ready if needed) will 
be kept well out of sight of the demonstrators 
and senior officers will jump at any opportunity 
to brief civilian stewards and their marshals in 
terms of the collaborative relationship the police 
are hoping will prevail.
It is by exercising such means that the MPS 
routinely accomplished ‘nonconfrontational 
control’ over protest demonstrations, based on 
the compliance of the organisers (Waddington, 
1998, p. 123). PAJ Waddington is adamant 
that police public order commanders pride 
themselves on their professional commitment 
to ‘recognising the unquestioned right’ of all 
citizens to protest (ibid., p. 129). Waddington 
further contends that
‘Police officers recoil from the suggestion that they 
are sometimes deceitful, but deception is a routine 
feature of social exchange. Their friendliness towards 
organisers was often ‘spurious’ but no more so 
than that displayed by a salesman to a customer’. 
(Waddington, 1994, p. 102)
He nonetheless acknowledges that, somewhere 
amidst this process of ensuring that demonstrations 
are conducted largely on police terms, the 
interests of the protesters are correspondingly 
compromised: ‘Protest is [thus] emasculated 
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
34
and induced to conform to the avoidance of 
trouble. In police argot, protest organisers are 
‘had over’ [in other words, intentionally duped]’ 
(ibid., p. 198).
RESEARCH METHODS AND 
OBJECTIVES
The remainder of this article is now devoted to 
evaluating the extent to which SYP’s decision 
to employ a police liaison approach (based on 
principles of dialogue policing) actually reflects 
a sincere and significant shift towards a more 
enlightened and facilitating contemporary 
style of public order policing, or may be more 
justifiably regarded as a merely a modern, more 
subtle manifestation of the type of cynical police 
methods being exercised some twenty years ago.
The relevant data on which the following 
discussion is based derive from an ethnographic 
study in which the author and ten volunteer 
academic colleagues acted as participant 
observers, while a full-time research assistant 
engaged in retrospective and contemporaneous 
tracking of police Twitter messages and other 
social media channels of relevance to the 
protest (e.g. Facebook, Indymedia and the local 
Sheffield Forum). Eleven in-depth interviews 
were also carried out with police personnel (the 
Gold, Assistant Gold and Silver Commanders; a 
Silver negotiator/coordinator; two Public Order 
Bronze Commanders; the Bronze, two sub-
Bronzes and a police constable forming part of 
the ‘Police Liaison Team’; and a Social Media 
Officer) and three protest organisers — the Chair 
of the Sheffield Anti-Cuts Alliance (SACA, see 
below), a SACA Steering Committee member, 
and the President of Sheffield Hallam University’s 
Students’ Union (SU).
THE SHEFFIELD ‘ANTI-LIB DEM’ 
RALLY
The Sheffield anti-Lib Dem protest of March 
2011 was called and organised by a coalition of 
local trade union groups and political activists 
calling itself the Sheffield Anti-Cuts Alliance 
(SACA). Following the formation one year 
earlier of a Coalition Government between the 
Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties, 
Nick Clegg (the newly appointed Deputy Prime 
Minister, but also Lib Dem leader and MP for 
Sheffield Hallam) had nominated Sheffield City 
Hall as the venue for his party’s Annual Spring 
Conference in what was regarded, at the time, 
as a benevolent gesture to his ‘home town’. 
Since then, however, the Lib Dems and their 
leader had become locally unpopular, having 
co-sanctioned with the Conservatives a raft 
of controversial policies (e.g. sweeping public 
sector spending cuts and the raising of university 
tuition fees) which appeared to contradict their 
pre-election promises. This apparent ‘betrayal’ 
of the electorate went down especially badly 
in Sheffield, which is the home of two major 
universities (Sheffield Hallam and the University 
of Sheffield) and is disproportionately reliant 
on public sector employment in comparison to 
most other major cities (D. Waddington, 2013).
The prospect of Mr Clegg and his party 
receiving a rowdy local reception had a major 
bearing on the strategies and tactics underlying 
SYP’s Operation Obelisk, though other factors 
were undoubtedly also influential. According 
to the Gold Commander, the recent ‘Adapting 
to Protest’ reports (HMCIC, 2009a, 2009b) 
had underlined the legal imperatives under 
the European Convention on Human Rights 
to uphold (and, indeed, facilitate) the right to 
protest, as well as ensure the safety of the Lib 
Dem delegates and the security of the venue. 
Due consideration also had to be given to making 
sure that city centre shops, cafes, hotels and 
restaurants were sufficiently unaffected by the 
protest to benefit from the influx of conference 
attendees, and that the city’s image as a ‘safe’ 
and ‘friendly’ tourist or conference centre would 
hopefully be enhanced.
To SYP’s great relief and satisfaction, the two days 
of protest were virtually trouble-free. A relatively 
small crowd of 800 protesters gathering on the 
afternoon of Friday, 11 March, in anticipation of 
the arrival of Lib Dem delegates, posed no real 
problems for the police. Then, on the following 
morning, a larger crowd of 2 000 - 3000 people 
(which subsequently grew in size to around 5 
000) set off on a two-mile march through the 
city before finally assembling on Barker’s Pool, a 
pedestrian concourse directly in front of the City 
Hall. The only noteworthy incidents occurred 
when 30 members of UK Uncut (a grass-roots 
movement employing direct action to highlight 
alternatives to the British government’s policy 
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
35
of reducing public spending) were ejected from 
a handful of stores and the branch of a well-
known High Street bank, and when a 24-year-old 
man ignited a firework flare and scaled a police 
protective barrier in what resulted in the only 
arrest of the entire event.
It is indisputable that the presence of this 
barrier, which was integral to a part-metal, part-
concrete ‘fence’, encircling the City Hall venue, 
was fundamental to the success of the police 
operation, insofar as it helped limit direct contact 
between police and protesters, while still enabling 
the latter to remain within sight and sound of 
the arriving Lib Dem delegates. Arguably of even 
more significance, however, were the activities of 
the 15-person Police Liaison Team (PLT), which 
engaged in pre-event discussion and negotiation 
with protest organisers, and then mingled with 
the crowds on the two days of the event with the 
intentions of facilitating protest and promoting 
a ‘no surprises approach’ to the policing of the 
demonstration.
THE POLICE LIAISON TEAM: 
ETHOS AND OBJECTIVES
Previous publications (e.g. D. Waddington, 2011, 
2013) have emphasised that SYP’s decision to 
adopt a deliberately ‘facilitating’ police liaison 
approach to their handling of the anti-Lib Dem 
protest reflected an enduring force commitment 
to restoring public trust and confidence in the 
wake of the their controversial roles in the 1984-
5 miners’ strike and the 1989 Hillsborough 
stadium disaster (see esp. D. Waddington [2011] 
for a fuller discussion of these cases). Interviewees 
also referred to the progressive and liberal-
minded attitudes of their more senior colleagues 
as another determinant of this novel strategic 
direction. Particular emphasis was placed on 
the fact that SYP’s Chief Constable currently 
occupied the position of ACPO (Association of 
Chief Police Officers) Lead on public order, and 
had recently signed off a document committing 
all British forces to a more communication-
oriented approach (ACPO/ACPO/NPIA, 2010).
‘I can’t speak about other areas, but I do think 
that, in this force we are very alive to and 
receptive to these types of ideas and relatively 
forward-thinking…and I do think that we’re 
extremely keen to embrace all of this stuff. I also 
think that [The Silver Commander’s] openness to 
looking at new ideas was also really encouraging 
from an operational and planning point of view’. 
(Interview, Public Order Bronze)
One main objective of the police operation was 
to provide the Silver Commander with what 
he termed an ‘information picture’ of the likely 
size and composition of the crowd, of which 
constituent sections or individuals were liable to 
prove cooperative or not, and of what policing 
measures were therefore necessary to balance 
the right to protest with the corresponding need 
to maintain public order. A second important 
goal was to cultivate a ‘no surprises’ approach 
whereby the intentions and activities of all parties 
were as well communicated, predictable and 
mutually endorsed a possible. The final, arguably 
overriding, police objective was to enhance their 
capacity to make sensible, well-informed tactical 
interventions:
‘The third bit for me was that I wanted the 
capability to build a dynamic risk assessment 
to assist actual decision-making — about the 
potential impact of police tactics, really, so we 
could have that discussion around ‘What’s the 
best approach, here, to deal with that element 
of the crowd, in your view from the vantage point 
of being down amongst the crowd?’ (Interview, 
Silver Commander)
To accomplish these objectives, the Silver 
Commander set up a 15-person Police Liaison 
Team (PLT), to be centrally coordinated on the 
day of the event by a remote ‘Silver Command’ 
team consisting of himself and an assistant 
Negotiator Co-ordinator, a female colleague of 
equal rank. This pair worked in close conjunction 
with a five-person Social Media Team (SMT), 
led by a female inspector, whose function was 
to monitor and respond to relevant messages 
appearing on Twitter, Facebook and the Sheffield 
Forum blog, and to transmit informative and 
reassuring messages to protesters and members 
of the wider general public.
While immediate overall authority over the PLT 
was assigned to a Bronze commander at Chief 
Inspector level (the ‘PLT Bronze’), during the 
protest proper the team was divided up into equal 
sub-groups of five. The first of these consisted of 
four lower-ranking officers (sergeants or police 
constables) under the direct supervision of the 
PLT Bronze, and the remaining two of similar 
groups of junior officers which each reported to 
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a ‘sub-Bronze’ commander of Inspector level. 
In addition to each having experience of public 
order leadership, the PLT Bronze, two sub-
Bronzes and Negotiator Co-ordinator were all 
highly trained ‘crisis negotiators’.
The lower ranks of the PLT were made up of 
hand-picked individuals who were already 
highly regarded (e.g. due to their work 
on Safer Neighbourhood Teams) for their 
communication skills and capacity to engage 
with the general public: ‘The type of individuals 
who, they already knew, were not quick on the 
draw, and who could handle people with some 
patience while keeping up a pleasant smile’ 
(Interview, PLT Sub-bronze). Steps were taken 
to ensure that the public was able to see the PLT 
as visibly and qualitatively ‘different’ from the 
other police present:
‘In the old days of public order, the police were 
the forbidding black line, but now people see 
fluorescent jackets and it’s ‘Look out, here come the 
police!’ So, we deliberately went for something very 
different. We went for blue tabards with ‘Liaison 
Officer’ on them, which deliberately kept us very 
separate from the other officers’. (Interview, PLT 
Sub-bronze)
This general commitment to a softer, 
communications-based approach to protest 
policing was exemplified by the attitudes 
of two strategically important commanding 
officers, the PLT Bronze and the Public Order 
Bronze commander with overall responsibility 
for deploying PSUs at the actual protest 
venue. The former had followed Silver’s 
recommendation by attending a one-day 
professional development course at Liverpool 
University, where participants were addressed 
by a specialist in Swedish Dialogue Policing 
methods and a principal legal adviser to the 
HMCIC ‘Adapting to Protest’ inquiry:
‘To be honest, one of the things that stick in my 
mind is that there was a Chief Superintendent from 
somewhere or other who asked a question along 
the lines of: “Aren’t we bending over backwards for 
the protest groups?" And [the legal adviser] gave 
him a great answer that will always stick in my 
mind. She said to him, "Your job is to uphold the 
law, and the Human Rights Act is the law. That’s 
your job and you can’t pick and choose which bits 
of the law you like.” And I must say that I came 
away and built our briefings and tactics around 
that statement’. (Interview, PLT Bronze)
His Bronze public order counterpart explained 
in interview how it was the political conviction 
resulting from a family background of trade union 
support and the insight provided by subsequent 
university education which enabled him also to 
‘buy into’ this softer policing style. Previously, 
he reckoned, the ‘British model of policing’ had 
been unfairly designed to serve the rich, and 
he therefore welcomed the progression to a 
more universal appreciation of people’s rights: 
‘These rights are there for all of us to enjoy and, 
in the past, I don’t think we’ve been sufficiently 
conscious of that. So, yes, I do buy into it’.
PRE-EVENT LIAISON
During pre-event planning for Operation Obelisk, 
the Silver Commander stated a preference for the 
march to follow a clearly prescribed route, which 
(for safety reasons) would involve protesters 
departing from tradition by not bearing down on 
the City Hall via Devonshire Street, and taking a 
more circuitous route via the lower end of town. 
Pre-event liaison with organisers was therefore 
geared to using standard sets of negotiating 
skills a la the Metropolitan police commanders 
observed by PAJ Waddington twenty years 
earlier. Such repertoires would be used, not only 
to gain the demonstrators’ compliance with 
the preferred route, but also to optimise police 
intelligence and thereby ensure that there would 
be ‘no surprises’ from any party’s perspective on 
the day.
‘We have these things called “bunches of fives” in 
negotiator terms, which are basically reasons to do 
something. If you’re negotiating with someone over 
the phone or face-to-face, it’s always good practice 
to have these bunches of fives: five reasons not to 
kill yourself; five reasons to go this way down the 
street; five reasons to let hostages go, and so on. We 
also have something else called PPAs — “Positive 
Police Actions” — where it’s a kind of reciprocity 
thing, really: “This is what we’ve done for you. 
What can you do for us?” So, we were looking round 
in terms of, ‘What can we bring from negotiating, 
from crisis and hostage intervention, into dealing 
with people who aren’t overtly hostile, but who are 
not anticipating police in their midst. It was a case 
of: “How can we sell what we want to happen on 
that day, rather than enforcing it?” So, we’d got 
rehearsed bunches of fives as to why they should 
take that route’. (Interview, PLT Sub-bronze)
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The police modus operandi involved contacting 
key organisers, such as SACA personnel and the 
presidents of the Sheffield Hallam University and 
University of Sheffield student unions. The SACA 
representative was personally escorted round the 
proposed route of the march, and the perceived 
merits similarly explained (in bunches of five) to 
student union officers during visits by the trained 
negotiators:
‘But that’s undoubtedly where the skill and the craft 
of the liaison team came to the fore, because it was 
about them saying: “Well, actually, if we take you 
down Fitzwilliam Street, you go along Charter Row, 
down onto Pinstone Street, you’re going past the 
seat of democracy in Sheffield, the Town Hall; you’ve 
got a longer march route, so you’re going to get more 
people seeing and hearing what you’re protesting 
about and guarantee prime locations for the media to 
be able to pick up and monitor what you’re doing”’. 
(Interview, Negotiator Co-ordinator)
The ‘guided tour’ accorded to the SACA 
representative also provided an opportunity 
for police intelligence-gathering and for the 
two parties to learn of each other’s intentions: 
‘All through the route, we were just chatting 
about the policing, what they expected of us, 
what we expected of them, and basically he 
was picking my brain for how many numbers 
we expected, and quite reasonable things such 
as what we expected might happen’ (Interview, 
SACA Representative). The police also used 
existing communication channels between Safer 
Neighbourhood officers and the students’ union 
to accumulate similar intelligence and insight:
‘We agreed to this, and he came and asked us: 
one, what we had planned for the event; and 
two, whether we had any idea what other groups 
might be planning for it. I’m signed up to a lot of 
databases with various cuts movements and things, 
so we made a point of relaying to the police any 
information arising from emails, and that sort of 
thing, that we thought might be relevant. We have 
an open line with the police all year round and we 
always feel that we can talk to them in confidence, 
and vice-versa, so it was all about keeping that 
dialogue open with them’. (Interview, Sheffield 
Hallam University SU President)
Equivalent questions were asked of the University 
of Sheffield SU President, who was able to 
provide some helpful observations, based on 
the appearance of graffiti, leaflets and online 
communication, of the intentions of participating 
groups which had chosen not to liaise with the 
police. The content and tone of such discussions 
helped reassure the police that the students 
unions were out to avoid and, indeed, distance 
themselves from the type of violent protest 
that had been witnessed during the London 
demonstration:
‘We certainly had groups who weren’t that open 
in their communication and were quite covert in 
their ambitions, so there was always that element 
of the unknown. But overall, we felt pretty secure 
from meeting their representatives that we knew 
just how 80 per cent of the people wanted the 
protest to turn out…. The brief was to come up with 
a way to communicate more effectively with the 
protest groups… to show that, as a police service, 
we’d made a measured approach and been sort of 
proportionate. If people then chose not to listen to 
what we were asking them to do to work together 
with us in what we were trying to achieve, then we’d 
at least have some legitimacy for any more robust 
police action that might eventually prove necessary’. 
(Interview, Negotiator Co-ordinator)
As part of their ‘no surprises’ approach, PLT officers 
asked organisers whether any of the proposed 
police tactics made them feel uncomfortable 
or might risk worrying or aggravating their 
constituents. The police emphasised how 
they wanted to avoid kettling at all costs, but 
maintained that, should the need ever arise, 
liaison officers would immediately appear to set 
the innocent free. The PLT Bronze presented each 
organiser with his card and maintained regular 
contact in the days leading up to the protest. A 
further example of this strong ‘personal touch’ 
was his assurance to the Hallam union president 
that, ‘If I ever found myself in a kettle, I could 
give him a ring and he’d personally come and let 
me out’ (Interview, Sheffield Hallam University 
SU President).
The Hallam SU branch had recently received a 
statement by a group which threatened to smash 
up the union building because they had been 
refused permission to stage a conference there 
on the day of the protest. The moment the police 
became aware of this they assigned officers to 
guard the building. This underlying commitment 
to building rapport and establishing the basis of 
an exchange relationship was further evident in 
the PLT’s undertaking to set up a sound system for 
one group of protesters which would otherwise 
have been banned from the protest.
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‘I’ve no doubt that, had they gone to the police line, 
the bobbies’ response would have been: “My briefing 
is you can’t bring that down here, so therefore the 
answer is no.” Because they’d heard this approach, 
the Police Liaison Team, who was already identifiable 
as the resolvers of these sorts of issues, said, “Yes, 
we can do that for you. Some of the [PLT] will go 
down and we’ll get that set up for you, no problem”. 
So straight away you’re starting to build up a 
relationship, and it starts to provide a principle for 
trading’. (Interview, Silver Commander)
On the day of the march, the PLT exchanged 
first names and phone numbers with any 
organisers and stewards they had previously 
had no contact with. Thereafter, both parties 
maintained an amicable working relationship 
whereby, according to the Chair of SACA, the 
police ‘worked with us on the march and joked 
with us constantly’.
THE PLT IN PRACTICE
Police respondents maintain that this kind of 
preparatory work yielded extremely important 
dividends. One such benefit occurred on the 
first day of the protest when a Lib Dem delegate 
who was due to stand in the forthcoming 
election for Lord Mayor of London suddenly, 
and without warning, entered the growing 
crowd of protesters as they awaited the arrival 
of conference participants. Once there, he rather 
heatedly explained to the encircling crowd 
members why their political views were so 
misguided. According to the Silver Commander, 
the ‘highly volatile situation’ created by this 
unanticipated manoeuvre was rendered 
potentially more combustible by the unhelpful 
activities of one particular member of the crowd 
who was a ‘known troublemaker’:
‘I can’t name this guy, but we had a student 
leader, for example, who we know was desperate 
to get people motivated, but we neutered him: he 
was completely ineffective because of the PLT’s 
intervention and the way they went to work. He 
just didn’t get the support he needed’. (Interview, 
Silver Commander)
Silver conceded that, had he been forced to 
respond to this incident on the evidence of CCTV 
footage alone, he would not have hesitated from 
sending in a Police Support Unit (of up to 22 
officers with specialist training in public order). 
However, the feedback he received from the 
PLT Bronze, who was positioned a mere two 
metres away from the actual incident, provided 
an altogether more accurate dynamic risk 
assessment on which to gauge his response:
‘All of the time, I was sending messages on my radio 
to [The Negotiator Co-ordinator], saying “Tell Silver 
not to do anything. Tell Silver not to react and send 
any resources in because, in actual fact, this crowd 
is self-policing”. As he was saying, “Can I be allowed 
the floor?” there were other protesters trying to 
shout him down, but there were others still who 
were insisting: “No, quiet! He’s come into speak, so 
let him have his say”. And I found it fascinating to 
watch, and it was the first time it struck me that 
we had ended up directly influencing police tactics’. 
(Interview, PLT Bronze)
Several similar instances arose on the second day 
of the protest. For example, a series of timely 
observations by the PLT team ensured that Silver 
Command rightly regarded such activities as 
youths repeatedly beating the perimeter fence 
with wooden placard handles or daubing graffiti 
on a statue (with chalk, rather than paint, as 
it had initially been assumed) as considerably 
more innocuous than they had seemed on first 
appearances. When the only arrest of the entire 
event was made, and PLT officers insisted that a 
pair of firework flares also be extinguished, Silver 
Command resisted the urge to deploy a PSU in 
favour of allowing his officers’ relationship with 
the protesters to peacefully prevail:
‘If you remember, they lit up the flare and that lad 
jumped over the barrier. It was the only arrest and, 
ironically, he brought it on himself by jumping over. 
If he’d just stayed where he were, flare or no flare, 
he’d have been fine. But then they lit the second 
one and [the PLT Bronze] went in, and there was 
a small minority that started chanting to ‘kettle’ 
us. In fact, they were some of the people who’d 
been telling me: “You stand for everything that I’m 
against”. Even then, although I put my flame-proof 
gloves on, because I was thinking “I might have to 
grab that flare”, there wasn’t one moment when 
I felt threatened or really afraid for Scott, because 
I thought “We’ve got most of these people on our 
side’’‘. (Interview, Police Constable/PLT Member)
This heavy application of police patience and 
discretion was perhaps most starkly emphasised 
by their decision not to restrict the movements of 
members of UK Uncut — a strategy that apparently 
backfired in light of the damage inflicted on shops 
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and High Street banks. The Silver Commander 
regarded this as a small and ultimately necessary 
price to pay: ‘I mean, it’s regrettable that Top 
Shop was done but the trouble we’ve got now 
in terms of facilitating protest is that you can’t 
have a system that’s so restrictive from the off 
that it guarantees the protection of every single 
property in town’. Among the resulting plaudits 
was a tribute paid by the SACA representative, 
a very seasoned demonstrator who maintained 
that the policing of this event was ‘completely 
different from’ anything he had previously 
experienced, and represented, for example, ‘an 
astonishing contrast with what happened at 
Bolton [in Lancashire]’ where, he alleged, the 
police had been far too rough and over-zealous 
in their handling of anti-English Defence League 
protesters who had gathered to show their 
disapproval of an ongoing EDL rally.
It is equally indisputable, however, that the speed 
with which the police responded to the activities 
of UK Uncut protesters was a testament to the 
strength of the back-up they had ready and 
waiting to deal with this and, should the need 
have arisen, even more serious developments. As 
the Public Order Bronze explained, SYP had set 
up a ‘forward holding point’ on nearby Trippett 
Lane, enabling him, to ‘get three PSUs at the 
drop of a hat’. Moreover, notwithstanding its 
undoubtedly sincere underlying commitment 
to facilitating protest, the work of the PLTs was 
seen, by senior commanders at least, as a tool 
for establishing and ensuring strict adherence to 
a set of ground rules ultimately determined by 
the police:
‘Part of the whole idea about protest liaison is that 
it’s actually at the heart of a “no surprises” policing 
approach, so that people were able to understand 
where those parameters were. In truth, if you’d 
have climbed over that second set of barriers, you’d 
have not gone any further! There was this phased 
approach from a very light initial contact, to quite 
a hard sort of policing tactic if that was required’. 
(Interview, Silver Commander)
EXPLORING TACTICAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Police respondents were unanimous in 
considering it necessary to preserve a clear 
distinction between the operational functions 
of the PLT and ‘conventional’ public order units. 
The latter officers were perfectly content to let 
their PLT counterparts do any ‘engaging’ with the 
public:
‘Traditionally, there’s always been that wariness that, 
if you start talking to protesters, they might take it as 
an invitation to get on your back with, “Don’t you 
feel guilty standing there and suppressing our right 
to protest?”…Invariably, somebody would get pulled 
into a conversation and get quoted and have their 
photo put up on Indymedia…I think that, whilst 
most police officers are happy with the introduction 
of liaison teams, I think they’re also content to leave 
the talking to them while they just stand back and 
say nothing’. (Interview, Public Order Bronze)
Another perceived benefit of the liaison process 
was that it greatly reduced the potential both for 
direct confrontation and any ensuing political 
controversy:
‘The whole purpose of it for me is that, if I don’t have 
to ask one of my officers to get their baton out and 
hit somebody with it, I’ll sleep a lot better at night. 
Alright, we all have these off adrenaline rushes 
from time to time — we’re only human — but you 
really don’t want to be scrapping with anybody: (a) 
because one or both of you might get hurt, and (b) 
do a ‘Tomlinson’ where, one push, and the man goes 
down and doesn’t get up. It doesn’t bear thinking 
about, really’. (Interview, Public Order Bronze)
Respondents of all ranks were satisfied that the 
use of PLTs was destined to become a permanent 
part of what Silver Command termed the ‘public 
order toolkit’:
‘It’s the question of how far that toolkit extends that’s 
really the challenge for me. Having seen both sides 
as a public order commander as well, there is a limit 
to how quickly you can get involved and there will 
always be groups who don’t liaise, however much 
you try, so there will be times when that conventional 
policing will — probably rightly — come to the 
fore. For this to work, it’s almost as if there’s got 
to be a segregation in the minds of the protesters 
between the ‘good’ cops and the potentially ‘bad’‘. 
(Interview, Negotiator Co-ordinator)
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These senior officers unanimously maintained that, 
in situations where there is no Silver to direct them, 
overall decision-making responsibility should rest 
with the Public Order Bronze Commander, rather 
than his PLT counterpart:
‘It’s got to be his or her decision whether to let 
the Police Liaison Team go in or not, because he’s 
the one with the ultimate responsibility for getting 
them out. It should always be his call. The other 
important point is that, whilst we managed this 
mainly with unprotected staff and the primary tactic 
of negotiation did work, the ability to move quickly 
from state of engagement to another with a higher 
level of force and wider capability is essential for 
the balancing of rights to be achieved’. (Interview, 
Public Order Bronze)
PLT members were acutely aware that rank-and-file 
colleagues in conventional public order PSUs had 
developed slightly cynical and resentful attitudes 
towards them as a result of their liaison work. 
One PLT Sub-bronze recalled how he ‘actually 
got deadpanned’ by junior colleagues who would 
have been more friendly and deferential on any 
other day. This reflected a common rank-and-file 
perception that the PLT had ceded far too much 
authority to the protesters and appeared to have 
forgotten their true allegiance in the process. The 
PLT conceded that there was an element of truth 
in this latter accusation:
‘You almost get sucked in: it isn’t true Stockholm 
Syndrome, but you do start to get pulled into 
another way of thinking. There comes a point 
when you look across the lines of fluorescents and 
do start thinking, “Well actually, these guys do 
look quite oppressive. Why are we doing that?’’’ 
(Interview, PLT Sub-bronze)
In the immediate wake of the protest, an ostensibly 
playful but pointedly meaningful form of ‘ribbing’ 
occurred whereby the PLT were variously derided 
by PSU colleagues as ‘pink fluffies’ or ‘PCSOs’ [part-
time civilian Police Community Support Officers].
Similar forms of teasing were used to remind PLT 
members that the PSUs had been stood around all 
day doing ‘real police work’ while liaison officers 
were hob-nobbing with protesters and reaping 
all the glory. Such sentiments could not erase 
the sense of pride and satisfaction PLT members 
derived from having made such a singular and 
telling contribution:
‘I thought it was something new and challenging, 
and refreshingly experimental. I thought we were 
doing something that was really worthwhile and had 
already received that endorsement from our senior 
ranks…Afterwards, the camaraderie among the 
team and desire to take it further was paramount, 
just as the desire to be re-utilised in that role was very, 
very strong’. (Interview, PLT Sub-bronze)
CONCLUSION
It is evident that SYP’s deployment of police 
liaison officers as part of Operation Obelisk was 
extremely redolent of the strategic approach 
being used by the MPS to manage demonstrations 
occurring in London over twenty years ago. The 
modern, European emphasis on using various 
negotiating skills and communicative devices in 
order to develop rapport with protest organisers 
and set up an ‘exchange relationship’ therefore 
represents a continuation of methods employed 
in a bygone era. Moreover, the objectives of this 
approach remain essentially familiar, in that they 
are primarily designed to maximise intelligence 
(relating to the likely size, composition, 
intentions and willingness to cooperate of the 
crowd), set police parameters regarding what 
sort of behaviours will and will not be tolerated, 
establish the legitimacy of the police operation, 
and therefore provide advance justification for 
any potentially contentious police interventions.
What is undoubtedly novel about the introduction 
of PLTs is the way in which they are being used 
during demonstrations, both to ensure that police 
and protesters alike experience no unsettling 
or provocative ‘surprises’, and to provide 
remotely based command teams with accurate 
‘dynamic risk assessments’ from which to avoid 
unnecessarily over-reactive or indiscriminating 
police interventions. The Sheffield case study 
is therefore consistent with related research on 
the MPS and Sussex Constabulary (Stott et al., 
2013) which shows how similar police liaison 
initiatives have contributed to more effective 
police decision-making and made it much easier 
for the police to defuse potential conflict.
Thus, on the one hand, there was a universal 
recognition among interview respondents of 
the immense instrumental value of liaison-
based policing. The present case study further 
suggests that, certainly at the levels of Gold and 
Silver command, and among the various ranks of 
PLT officers, there was a correspondingly unified 
acceptance of and commitment to facilitating the 
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rights and goals of law-abiding protesters. Like 
these officers, the Public Order Bronze embraced 
the view that a communication-based ‘dialogue’ 
approach was best suited to this purpose. This 
was a view less wholeheartedly subscribed to by 
members of more ‘conventional’ public order 
police support units, who strongly criticised 
the ‘over-appeasing’ attitudes seemingly being 
extended to protesters, accused their PLT 
colleagues of implicit disloyalty, and objected to 
being asked to stand around while sections of 
the public were allowed to behave in what was 
perceived as an unlawful and/or unacceptable 
manner. The extent to which frustrations of this 
nature might have well been vented had the PSUs 
been called on to intervene was a possibility not 
tested in the present example.
There is no evidence that liaison policing has 
now become regarded as utopian — a panacea 
in itself. Even those respondents counting 
themselves among the foremost advocates 
of liaison policing would see such methods as 
merely complementary (‘another part of the 
toolkit’), and by no means a substitute for, more 
conventional forms of public order policing. 
None of our respondents would object to the 
presence of adequately equipped riot-trained 
colleagues, available on stand-by. Nor would 
they contest the right of conventional public 
order commanders to assume ultimate authority 
in the context of political protests. Indeed, PLT 
officers accept that a large part of their function 
is to initially help determine, and subsequently 
keep reminding protesters of, the existence 
of ‘lines in the sand’ which may be used to 
legitimise and politically justify uncompromising 
police interventions.
There is some resonance here with PAJ 
Waddington’s important observation that
‘…styles of public order policing are contingent on 
the institutional context in which they take place. 
In liberal democracies, there is a preference for 
nonconfrontational methods and a trend towards 
institutionalisation because this is relatively trouble-
free. The police are also competent in achieving 
their goals by nonconfrontational means. On the 
other hand, when the established social, political, 
and economic institutions are perceived to be under 
threat, institutional pressures will encourage more 
confrontational methods of public order policing, 
as happened in Britain during the miners’ strike of 
1984-85’. (1998, p. 139)
It has been argued both here and elsewhere 
(D. Waddington, 2011, 2013) that SYP’s 
contemporary policing mission is underpinned 
by a commitment to purging lingering 
animosities originating from the miners’ strike 
and Hillsborough stadium tragedy. The force’s 
keen determination to facilitate the ‘right’ to 
protest has been reinforced in light of recent 
political influence associated with the ‘Adapting 
to Protest’ reports and enhanced accountability 
stemming from the growth of social media and 
citizen journalism. Such tolerance may even run, 
as in the present example, to allowing potentially 
recalcitrant groups like UK Uncut the temporary 
freedom to roam the streets ‘unsupervised’. 
However, without wishing to doubt the 
earnestness of the officers involved, it appears 
likely that SYP’s publicly-stated determination 
to facilitate the right to protest would be hard 
pressed to survive the occurrence of conflict as 
politically contentious and threatening to the 
state as ‘another miners’ strike’.
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 FUNCTIONS AND IMPACT OF THE ‘VIOLENCE 
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Abstract: The background of the violence against the police debate is an estrangement between police 
and society. Furthermore the police have not enough professional knowledge on how to deal with 
people in exhausted conditions respectively in social and/or economic poverty apart from using force. 
Though, since they are not familiar with the sub-cultural rules of live and communication, it makes it 
difficult for them to handle the part of the population which is troubled. The second important effect of 
this development is that, in the shadow of the ‘violence-against-police’ debate, violent acts committed 
by police officers apparently seem to grow.
There are currently two different debates dealing 
with ‘violence and the police’ in Germany: the 
leading debate is put forward by the police 
themselves and is mostly present in the public 
discourse. It focuses exclusively on violence 
against the police and emphasises the role 
of police officers as victims. This debate is 
predominantly highlighted by the police unions. 
The other, much less noticed perspective, e.g. 
the Amnesty International campaign in 2010, 
is becoming increasingly critical towards police 
misconduct, especially in relation to the use of 
force and violence by the police.
From my point of view, the debate on ‘violence and 
the police’ is not really about violence. It is about 
the uncertainty regarding the interpretation of 
and knowledge about police action.
My general hypothesis, which I am going to look 
at here, deals with the background of the debate 
on violence. I believe that it is not about an 
increase in physical violence against the police, 
but about an estrangement between police and 
society; especially with regard to the difficulties 
of the police to work ‘on the edges of society’ 
(or, to say it more frankly, to control the ‘lower 
classes’). Furthermore, a significant part of the 
discourse on violence originates from the fact 
that the police do not have enough professional 
knowledge on how to deal with people in socially 
disadvantaged conditions, respectively in social 
and/or economic poverty, apart from using force. 
As they are not familiar with the sub-cultural rules 
of life and communication, it makes it more and 
more difficult for them to handle the part of the 
population that is troubled. The second important 
effect of this development is that in the shadow 
of the ‘violence against police’ debate, violent 
acts committed by police officers seem to grow. 
At least the reports on excessive use of force by 
police officers, as well as the numbers of victims of 
police violence are rising. There is still a high ratio 
of dark figures in both areas. This means that we 
actually know nothing or at least only very little 
about the actual development of violence within 
the society. All we know is that violence against 
the state authorities is registered in official police 
crime statistics in increasing numbers and is 
reported to the public correspondingly.
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1. SOME REMARKS CONCERNING 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
VIOLENCE AND FORCE  — OR 
— HOW TO LEARN THE USE OF 
COERCIVE POWER
The nomenclature of official police culture, that 
embodies policing role models (amongst others), 
does not mention the relationship between 
‘violence and force’ in daily police-work. One 
consequence of banishing violence from the 
‘upper ranks’ of the police is that many police 
officers perceive that a significant part of their 
daily professional reality is not being mentioned. 
They, the ‘lower ranks’, need to secure their 
professional identity elsewhere, e.g. through 
creating their very own cop culture.
Police education aims to avoid the use of physical 
power and ‘force’ as long as possible. This is what 
the major part of the training and education 
focuses on. On the other hand, recruits also 
need to develop a certain routine for inflicting 
injuries on somebody during training, i.e. 
practicing inflicting pain on people under certain 
circumstances without losing themselves in an 
emotional state of emergency (violent frenzy). 
However, the awareness of the complexity of 
such situations is only learned through direct 
experience when dealing with violent incidents 
and is hence not yet habituated by many young 
police officers when starting service. They 
need practical guidance through supervisors or 
experienced colleagues. The appropriate use 
of coercive power can be learnt by technical 
training; however, the actual experience of 
violence can only be found in real life situations. 
While police students learn on the one hand to 
use their coercive power very reluctantly, on the 
other, they perceive an increasing amount of 
violence being directed against them.
2. VIOLENCE OF THE OTHERS
An internal study on the prevalence of violence 
against officers of the Hamburg police in 2010 
(and also in 2011) came to the conclusion that 
there is neither a quantitative nor a qualitative 
increase in violent incidents encountered in 
everyday police work. Taken as a whole, neither 
the severity, nor the amount of incidents has 
increased dramatically. It is only the surrounding 
conditions that have changed (e.g. it is mentioned 
that there is an increase in the use of mobile 
phone cameras which leads to police actions 
immediately being accessible via the Internet and 
hence resulting in a general feeling of insecurity 
by police officers).
Hence, even though an increase of violent 
incidents is not supported by statistics, it is an 
almost unchallenged public opinion that violence 
is on the rise. I believe that today’s complaints 
regarding the increase in violence are the 
result of an estrangement between the police 
and civil society. This divergence is connected 
to a loss of mutual appreciation, respect and 
communication between the so-called ‘problem-
groups’ and the police. The discourse on violence 
is merely a linguistic expression to call attention 
to the needs of police officers, but it has nothing 
to do with the actual experience of violence. I 
therefore also assume, that it is related to a 
policy that can roughly be summarised as an 
era of smart policing, starting in the late 1980s 
up to the very late 1990s (Behr 2006: 26-39). As 
different as these strategies may be, they all have 
in common that they are trying to improve the 
relationship between the police and the public 
(‘Bürgerpolizei’). This initiative reaches its climax 
with the reception and partial adoption of the 
Anglo-Saxon strategy of ‘community policing’ 
which has led to multiple community crime 
prevention schemes and the increasing number 
of women in the police.
Regarding the level of police culture, most 
national police forces and the formal federal 
border patrol are developing a new ‘Police 
Philosophy’ or ‘Police Guidelines’ (‘Polizeiliches 
Leitbild’) (Behr 2008: 242-249).
A second major shift of police work can be found 
in the contact with victims. Approximately from 
the late 1980s onwards, the victim is no longer 
seen as soul-less piece of evidence used by the 
prosecution. Rather, victims are perceived as a 
subject with own interests, demanding police 
and judicial attention. Swiss criminologist Karl-
Ludwig Kunz (2011: 361) already speaks of a 
trend leading towards a ‘victim-oriented society’ 
(‘viktimäre Gesellschaft’) in which the victim or 
‘the loser’ instead of the winner becomes the new 
object of reference. Police departments, which 
operate crime prevention and victim protection 
schemes, have been extended or established. The 
newly introduced German Victim Protection Act 
from 2001 has had an important impact on the 
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police law. Especially in cases of domestic violence 
the police no longer just generally monitor public 
security and order, but get actively involved in 
conflicts. For example, they protect victims by 
banishing the offender from the scene. So, in 
addition to observing public justice and peace, 
now there is also the thought of a police mandate 
for taking actual care of victims.
Amongst others, these three key elements 
influenced the police culture of the 1990s: firstly, 
the significant increase in the number of women 
in the police and new gender-related policing 
strategies, secondly, the guideline debate and 
thirdly, the strategy of caring for the victim (there 
may be more but I believe that these are the most 
modifying elements for the culture of policing). 
Together, they have strongly changed the self-
image of the police: the abandoning of the 
dominant repressive function (law enforcement) 
has changed the identity of young police officers. 
Today, they are being much better and earlier 
prepared for the fact that prevention can also 
mean taking care of people at a stage in which the 
police did not used to be responsible. Working 
with victims requires more empathy and social 
skills (communication, mediation, procedural 
and comprehensive thinking).
Thus, I conclude so far: the use of force within 
the ‘official’ police culture in the decade of the 
1990s was replaced by the thought of ‘caring’ 
and ‘social functions’. Of course, violence, as well 
as the use of force, was still present in the culture 
of police officers. But there was no dominant 
discourse about it.
On the other hand, there was a shift towards 
‘violence against the police’ as the hegemonic 
topic within the police, especially within the 
police unions, which started about five to eight 
years ago. Since then, the predominant talk is not 
of the officer as a professional trouble-shooter 
taking pride in his profession and enjoying high 
social recognition, but rather of ‘the officer, who 
is heavily insulted, spat on, beaten and threatened 
every day’ (Diehl 2010).
Conflicting with the fact that there is an actual 
decrease in physical violence, other incidents 
like insults, contempt, ridicule, disobedience, 
naughty laughter, spitting, demonstratively 
walking away, shouting, bullying, bossing around 
or stalking, are all of a sudden mutating into 
violent acts. There is no question that all these 
offences have a severe impact on the victims, 
but this nevertheless leads to an inflationary use 
of the term ‘violence’. Much more than in the 
past, certain behaviours are nowadays tagged as 
violent behaviours.
3. POLICE VIOLENCE IN 
THE LIGHT OF THE VICTIM 
DISCOURSE
As we could recently witness, the police unions 
are able to promote the topic of ‘police as a victim 
of violence’ even though the incident in question 
was really about ‘police brutality’. This reversal 
in discourse is approaching very fast. After an 
obviously failed attempt of the police to settle an 
incident, a severely confused man was seriously 
injured by police officers. Yet, he was carrying 
a knife until the end of the incident. Bernhard 
Witthaut, then national chairman of the most 
important German police union ‘Gewerkschaft 
der Polizei’, defended the officers working in this 
situation. According to him, they had responded 
correctly: ‘The officers couldn’t have waited for a 
SWAT-Team. What if the man had bled to death 
in the meantime?’ In fact, it was soon turned 
the other way around: ‘It is not the police in 
Berlin that has a problem with violence but that 
violent attacks against police officers are rapidly 
increasing’ (cited in Ahr & Kotynek 2012).
With regard to excessive use of force or police 
brutality by the police, the police unions a) 
don’t comment at all; b) instinctively protect the 
officers by trivialising what happened or c) take 
advantage of the situation in order to disqualify 
the critics, pointing out that the police officers 
are the real victims. Since the officers become 
increasingly aware that they are backed up by 
their unions, they can act tougher than they used 
to. Thus, they develop a self-awareness that does 
not consist of a ‘professional calmness’ but of a 
‘defensive solidarity’.
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4. MORE EVIDENCE ON 
POLICING IS NEEDED
So far, it is difficult to present empirical evidence 
for my assessment of the situation, as there is 
no extensive research on the topic in Germany 
to date. It depends on permissions of police 
authorities who seem to have little interest in 
putting the discourse on violence as promoted by 
the police unions into perspective. At least this is 
the signal I recently received from my own board 
of administration. They were not even able or 
willing to present data in order to refute the claim 
of a dramatic increase in violence. As you can see, 
we are currently facing a peculiar state of affairs. 
The police unions are practicing dramatised 
politics. Most of the media and the ‘political’ 
public remain silent and endure the dramatisation 
strategy without an attempt to throw light on the 
situation. This is, however, also the result of a lack 
of access to the operational fields of the police 
and the authorities. I am talking about a working 
alliance or at least a division of labour between 
the police authorities and the lobbyist groups 
(police unions). A profound evaluation gets lost 
and a social and public debate which could focus 
on violence against as well as violence committed 
by the police is inhibited. Research alone cannot 
ensure democratic policing; however, it is needed 
in order to develop policing strategies and to 
calm down the debate about violence committed 
by and against the police. I believe as scientists 
we are required to bring more reliable evidence 
into this field of action.
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POLICE COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND: WHY ARE 
THE REFORMS NOT WORKING?
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Abstract: An independent element in the investigation of complaints against police officers was first 
introduced in the United Kingdom in 1964. It first appeared in Ireland in 1986. Over the following 
years the independent element has been strengthened on several occasions in response in response to 
persistent concerns that it was not delivering effective accountability. In this paper I consider why the 
latest round of reforms is continuing to disappoint. Key factors would appear to be: continued reliance on 
internal police investigators and technical expertise; lack of rigour in investigations; regulatory capture; 
police obstructionism; and lack of resources. Further reforms are suggested.
INTRODUCTION
Organised police forces first appeared in the 
British and Irish islands in Dublin in 1786 
(Walsh, 1998). It was 1964, however, before any 
concession was made to independent oversight of 
how complaints against the police were handled 
on a regular basis (Smith, 2005). Until then such 
complaints were a matter for the relevant chief 
of police, subject always to the possibility of a 
complainant pursuing a civil action through the 
courts.
Over the past 50 years all four jurisdictions 
(Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, England 
and Wales, and Scotland) have advanced towards 
the independent investigation of complaints, 
albeit in a piecemeal and, to some extent, cyclical 
manner (Smith, 2005). Typically the reforms in 
each jurisdiction have been driven by periodic 
crises of confidence in policing practices and/or the 
compensatory flip side of government proposals 
to expand police powers. Despite some significant 
jurisdictional differences in police structures, the 
reforms have all converged around a common 
model which, at least superficially, espouses the 
independent investigation of complaints. Yet the 
problem of public confidence in how complaints 
against the police are handled still persists in at 
least three of the four jurisdictions. In the fourth, 
Scotland, the reforms are too recent to make any 
definitive judgement on their efficacy.
In this paper I attempt to identify why independent 
investigation has not succeeded in rendering 
police officers accountable for corrupt and/or 
abusive conduct, and to offer some suggestions 
for the next cycle of reforms. By way of setting the 
context, I will begin with an outline of the historical 
landmarks in the development of independent 
investigation, the essential substance and shape 
of the current procedures and examples of the 
ongoing concerns.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
INDEPENDENT ELEMENT
For much of their existence, British and Irish police 
forces have jealously guarded their exclusive 
power to deal with criminal and disciplinary 
complaints against the conduct of their officers. 
The first chink into their domain was the very 
modest provision in the Police Act 1964 which 
imposed a duty on the independent Inspectorate 
of Constabulary (HMIC) and the democratically 
elected Police Authorities to keep themselves 
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informed of the manner in which Chief Constables 
in England and Wales and in Scotland handled 
complaints against their officers from members 
of the public (1). Similar, although not identical, 
provision was made for Northern Ireland in 
1970 (2). While Chief Constables were subject to 
a statutory obligation to record and investigate 
individual complaints, the actual investigation 
and disposal remained under their control.
The next and most critical development occurred 
in the mid-1970s when an independent Police 
Complaints Board was established for England 
and Wales (3), followed one year later by a 
similar development in Northern Ireland (4). 
This was the first time in the history of policing 
in Britain and Ireland that provision was made 
for an independent element in the handling of 
individual complaints against the police. Staunch 
police resistance to the basic principle, however, 
ensured that the balance of power remained 
firmly in police hands. (Mark, 1979; Cohen, 1985; 
Humphry, 1979) The role of the independent 
Board was confined largely to ex post facto review 
of how an individual investigation was carried 
out by the police themselves. However, if it was 
unhappy with a police decision not to proceed 
with disciplinary charges in a case, it could direct 
the police chief in question to refer the case to 
a disciplinary tribunal which included Board 
members.
Not surprisingly, the Boards had little impact on 
the outcome of complaints or on the confidence 
of complainants or the public generally in the 
new procedure. (Lustgarten, 1986; Humphry, 
1979; Cohen, 1985; Bennett, 1979) The Boards 
rarely directed a Chief Constable to refer cases 
to a tribunal, and the annual success rate for 
complaints averaged around five percent. 
While there will always be a proportion of false, 
exaggerated or inadmissible complaints, that still 
leaves a very large number of genuine complaints 
which did not succeed.
The next cycle of reforms was triggered in the 
1980s. The Board in England and Wales was 
reformed and renamed the Police Complaints 
Authority (5). Similar changes were effected 
in Northern Ireland where the Board was 
renamed the Independent Commission for 
Police Complaints (6). The reforms reflected 
a further tentative step towards independent 
investigation. As well as conducting ex post facto 
reviews of how complaints were handled, they 
could now supervise the police investigation of 
some complaints, as well as direct the relevant 
police chief to prefer disciplinary charges in any 
appropriate case where it disagreed with his 
decision not to prefer such charges. The Republic 
of Ireland also entered the field at this point with 
the establishment of an independent Complaints 
Board and procedure similar to the remodelled 
versions in England and Wales and Northern 
Ireland (7). Indeed, it went further by including 
provision for the Board to: investigate without 
the need for a prior complaint; investigate 
systemic issues triggering complaints; and, most 
significantly, conduct its own investigations 
independently of the police in exceptional cases 
(Walsh, 1998).
Once again, the reforms disappointed. Even the 
ridiculously low success rates remained a feature 
in each of the three jurisdictions (Smith, 2005; 
Dickson, 1990; Committee on the Administration 
of Justice, 1993; Walsh, 2009). In the Republic of 
Ireland, the Complaints Board’s unprecedented 
power to conduct wholly independent 
investigations was used only once in its lifetime 
which spanned the processing of over 22 000 
complaints (Walsh, 2009). The single case 
involved the extensive use of police violence in 
dealing with a ‘Reclaim the Streets’ rally in Dublin 
on May Day 2002. The events were caught on 
camera and widely publicised through media 
broadcasts. The Board’s unprecedented move 
to conduct an independent investigation was 
heavily prompted by the public outcry. The 
results, however, were deeply disappointing, as 
the progress of the investigation was impeded 
by a lack of cooperation from police officers on 
the ground during the protest. (GSCB, 2003, and 
Walsh, 2009).
(1) Police Act 1964, s.50.
(2) Police Act (Northern Ireland) 1970, s.12. There was provision for the establishment of an independent tribunal to determine 
a complaint in any individual case, but it was only ever used once (Walsh, 1983).
(3) Police Act 1976.
(4) Police (Northern Ireland) Order 1977.
(5) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Part IX.
(6) Police (Northern Ireland) Order 1987.
(7) Garda Síochána (Complaints) Act 1986.
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The latest advances in the direction of independent 
investigation were born largely out of the need 
to address the deep alienation from the police 
of one section of the divided community in 
Northern Ireland. In a penetrating and persuasive 
report commissioned by the Northern Ireland 
government in 1995, Maurice Hayes proposed the 
establishment of an Office of Police Ombudsman 
(OPONI) with radical powers of independent 
investigation (Hayes, 1997). In many substantial 
aspects the Hayes proposals were ahead of the 
curve. It was not until 2009 that the European 
Commissioner for Human Rights produced an 
opinion on human rights based best practice in 
the independent and effective determination 
of complaints against the police (Hammerburg, 
2009). Based largely on the evolving jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights since the 
late 1990’s, the opinion is heavily reflective of the 
principles underpinning the Hayes report.
The OPONI was provided for by the Police 
(Northern Ireland) Act 1998 and was established 
in 2000. Prompted partly by the ECtHR 
jurisprudence, England and Wales introduced 
reforms in the same direction in 2002 with a 
multi-member Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC) (8). A combination of the 
European Court’s jurisprudence and a crisis of 
public confidence in the police and in the police 
complaints system, compelled the Republic of 
Ireland to provide for a similar multi-member 
Ombudsman Commission in the Garda Síochána 
Act 2005 (Conway, 2009; Walsh, 2004a; 2004b). 
It opened for business in 2007. Finally, Scotland 
came later to the independent investigation of 
complaints, outside of criminal allegations. To 
some extent this can be attributed to significant 
differences in criminal procedure between 
Scotland and the other jurisdictions. Outside of 
the role of the independent Procurator Fiscal in 
criminal matters, provision for an independent 
review mechanism was first made in Scotland 
in the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act 2006. The Police Complaints 
Commissioner for Scotland, established pursuant 
to that Act, was renamed the Police Investigations 
and Review Commissioner (PIRC) in 2013, pursuant 
to the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012. 
The PIRC has independent powers of investigation 
in respect of certain serious complaints; similar 
in some respects to those of the other police 
complaints bodies.
THE LATEST REFORMS
The latest reforms differ in some detail across 
the four jurisdictions, but they are similar in 
most of the essential aspects. Broadly they all 
purport to offer the prospect of complaints 
being investigated entirely independently of the 
police. The Ombudsman in Northern Ireland, 
for example, is appointed by the Prime Minister 
following an open competition. He or she cannot 
be a former police officer, and the independence 
of the office is statutorily guaranteed. Similar 
arrangements apply to the members of the 
Commissions in the other jurisdictions, with 
the notable exception of the Republic of Ireland 
where the process lacks transparency. The 
members of the Garda Síochána Ombudsman 
Commission are appointed by the President on 
the nomination of the government and with the 
approval of the House of Parliament. In practice, 
however, the nominations are chosen secretly by 
the Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence (the 
same Minister with responsibility for policing) 
with no independent interviews or open 
competition. It is also worth noting that none of 
the appointments procedures are fully compliant 
with the best human rights based practice, as 
set out in the opinion of the European Human 
Rights Commissioner. This stipulates that the 
Ombudsman or Commission members should be 
appointed by, and accountable to, the relevant 
legislative assembly (Hammerburg, 2009).
Critically, the Ombudsman and Commissions 
recruit and train their own investigative staff. 
Equally important and unprecedented is the 
fact that they can exercise the same powers of 
arrest, detention, interrogation, entry, search and 
seizure etc. as police officers. In effect they are 
the equivalent of police officers whose function is 
confined to investigating the alleged infractions 
of conventional police officers. In those cases 
actually investigated by the independent 
investigators, the investigation reports are 
submitted directly to the Ombudsman or 
Commission which generally can decide whether 
to: refer the file on to the independent public 
prosecutor; recommend disciplinary charges to 
the relevant police chief; trigger a local or informal 
resolution procedure; or take no further action. 
The powers of the Scottish PIRC are more limited 
in these matters than those of the other bodies. 
It is also worth noting that the Ombudsman 
and Commissions have the power to initiate 
(8) Police Reform Act 2002, Part 2.
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investigations into alleged incidents in certain 
circumstances, even where no formal complaint 
has been lodged. Equally, they can be authorised 
to investigate systemic issues that are generating 
complaints. On the other hand, their role does 
not extend beyond investigation and report, 
even with respect to individual complaints. In 
those cases where they uphold a complaint, it 
is a matter for the independent prosecutor to 
decide whether to prefer criminal charges, and/
or for the chief of police to decide whether to 
prefer disciplinary charges. If criminal charges 
are preferred, they will be determined through 
the independent courts in the same manner as 
any other criminal charge. If disciplinary charges 
are preferred they are determined through 
the internal police disciplinary process. The 
Ombudsman or Commissions have no direct role 
in these matters or their outcome.
It should be noted that these powers of 
independent investigation, where applicable, 
are generally in addition to the role of the 
Commissions in reviewing, supervising and 
managing the investigation of complaints which 
are not handled in this manner.
Superficially, the current arrangements satisfy 
the ECHR standards, although there may be 
some doubt over the lack of independence in 
the final determination of criminal or disciplinary 
charges arising out of deaths or serious injuries. 
The opinion of the European Commissioner on 
Human Rights acknowledges that the established 
working relationship between the police and 
the independent public prosecutor may give 
rise to the appearance of bias in favour of the 
police in complaints cases. Accordingly, the 
opinion recommends an arrangement whereby 
the independent ombudsman/commission can 
prefer criminal charges (Hammerburg, 2009). 
Surprisingly, no mention is made in the opinion 
of the more obvious lack of independence in the 
decision whether to prefer disciplinary charges 
(which remains with the police). However, it 
does state that the independent prosecutor, 
police and/or ombudsman commission should 
give reasons for all decisions on criminal or 
disciplinary matters (Hammerburg, 2009). Each 
of the four jurisdictions remains particularly weak 
on this aspect.
ONGOING CONCERNS
In the historical context of police complaints 
procedures in Britain and Ireland, the latest 
reforms appear quite radical. In practice, 
however, they have continued to disappoint. The 
rate of successful complaints remains pitifully and 
unrealistically low. In the Republic of Ireland, less 
than 3 % of complaints result in a recommendation 
for some form of criminal or disciplinary action. 
In Northern Ireland, the figure is 5 %. In England 
and Wales, the figure is 12 %, while in Scotland 
it is 13 %. It should be noted that these figures 
only represent recommendations. The actual 
number of complaints that result in some form 
of criminal or disciplinary sanction is much lower. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the capacity of the 
independent procedures to deliver confidence 
in the investigation of complaints has been the 
subject of recent and sustained criticism in at least 
three of the four jurisdictions. In some instances 
the criticisms are led by the independent bodies 
themselves.
In 2012, for example, the Home Affairs Committee 
(HAC) of the United Kingdom Parliament 
conducted hearings into the operation of the 
independent Commission in response to sustained 
expressions of public concern. In a highly critical 
report published in 2013, it concluded that the 
Commission ‘is not yet capable of delivering 
the kind of powerful, objective scrutiny that is 
needed to inspire [public] confidence’ that police 
powers will not be abused (HAC 2013, para. 4). 
Earlier, in 2008, over 100 lawyers with expertise 
in police complaints resigned from the IPCC’s 
advisory body citing a range of criticisms of 
the IPCC, including bias in favour of the police 
(Davies, 2008). In the 10 years up to the death 
of Ian Tomlinson, an innocent newspaper vendor 
who died of a heart attack after being struck by 
a police officer at the scene of the ‘G20 Summit 
protest’ in London in 2009, there had been 
400 deaths following police contact. The IPCC 
is obliged to investigate such cases (Economist, 
2009). Nevertheless, not one of them has ever 
resulted in the conviction of a police officer for 
murder or manslaughter; including in the Ian 
Tomlinson case itself where the inquest jury 
returned a verdict of unlawful killing.
In the Republic of Ireland in 2013, frustration 
within the independent Ombudsman 
Commission, over its failure to investigate 
certain complaints expeditiously, boiled over in 
the form of a public row between it and senior 
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police management. The Commission took the 
unprecedented step of submitting a special 
report to the Minister arising out of its public 
interest investigation of Garda compliance with 
informant handling procedures (GSOC, 2013a). 
In it the Commission referred repeatedly to its 
dependence on Garda information and to the 
difficulties it has in accessing vital information for 
the effective discharge of its functions. It stated 
explicitly that ‘this reflected a serious weakness 
in the independent investigation of complaints’ 
(GSOC, 2013a, para. 10.3) and called into 
question ‘the effectiveness of the Ombudsman 
Commission’s oversight investigative function’ 
(GSOC, 2013a, para. 10.4). The Commission 
returned to the same subject two months 
later, expressing similar concerns arising out of 
its investigation of the Garda’s use of force in 
policing a student process (GSOC, 2013b).
Even the Police Ombudsman in Northern Ireland, 
generally considered to be the most advanced of 
the independent systems, has also been rocked 
by concerns from diverse quarters over its alleged 
lack of independence in practice. Its own chief 
executive resigned in 2011 citing frustration over 
its diminishing operational independence from 
the police. Ultimately this led to an inspection 
of the operational independence of the 
Ombudsman’s Office from the police force by the 
Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, and 
the early retirement of the Ombudsman (CJINI, 
2011). His successor was the Chief Inspector of 
the Criminal Justice Inspectorate at the time the 
inspection was carried out. The report found 
a lack of confidence within the Ombudsman’s 
office and among key stakeholders over the 
flawed nature of the investigation process used 
in a number of major cases (CJINI, 2011).
STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES
LACK OF INDEPENDENT PERSONNEL
A primary weakness affecting all of the procedures 
is that they are not as independent of the police 
as they purport to be. This is reflected at several 
levels. They all rely heavily on the recruitment of 
former and seconded police officers, often from 
the same police forces that they are investigating. 
In his research on the IPCC, OPONI and GSOC, 
Savage found that between one quarter and one 
third of investigators came from the force under 
investigation or another force (Savage, 2013a). 
The UK parliament’s Home Affairs Committee 
identified this as one of the three main causes 
of distrust in the complaints system (HAC, 2013, 
para. 13). It strongly urged the IPCC to increase 
the level of its non-police investigative resources 
(HAC, 2013, ch.5). The IPCC is currently 
implementing a recruitment training programme 
to do that.
There is no doubt that former police officers 
bring valuable skills and experience not 
otherwise readily available to the complaints 
bodies on their establishment. Equally, however, 
they will bring baggage of a tendency to see 
events and issues through the eyes of the 
officer under investigation, rather than those 
of the complainant. Even were that not to be 
the case, they suffer from the inevitable risk of 
appearing to the complainant and the public 
of being biased in favour of the police. That is 
sufficient in itself to render reliance on former 
police officers as counter-productive. Reliance 
on former police officers is also contrary to best 
human rights practice (Hammerburg, 2009). It is 
disappointing, therefore, that the Commissions 
have not managed to do more to increase the 
proportion of their investigative staff who have 
no police or police related background.
CONTINUING RELIANCE ON POLICE 
INVESTIGATION
The lack of independence is even more marked 
in the operation of the complaints process. 
Incredibly, a very large number of complaints 
continue to be investigated by serving police 
officers in the same force as the officers 
who are the subject of complaint. With the 
exception of OPONI, the legislation establishing 
the Commissions leaves large categories of 
complaints to be investigated by the police 
themselves, at least in the first instance. Moreover, 
even where the Commissions are competent 
to investigate complaints directly, they (apart 
from OPONI) frequently rely on the police to 
conduct the investigations. In the Republic of 
Ireland, the GSOC referred back to the police for 
investigation more than twice as many complaints 
as it investigated itself. Under its legislation GSOC 
must investigate all complaints concerning death 
or serious injury and complaints that, if proved, 
would constitute criminal offence. Any other 
complaint can be left to be investigated by the 
police, subject always to the possibility of the 
GSOC taking it over. Due to resource constraints, 
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however, the GSOC are actually advocating 
amending legislation to enable it, refers the 
offence cases back to the Garda for investigation 
(GSOC, 2012, para.3.6). Interestingly, the Garda 
is stoutly resisting that proposal.
Similarly, in England and Wales the IPCC directly 
investigates less than 1 % of complaints (HAC, 
2010). The remainder is referred back to the 
police for investigation, with options for the IPCC 
to supervise or manage the investigation and of 
the complainant to complain to the IPCC about 
the manner of the police investigation. That, 
however, cannot be described as an independent 
complaints system in any meaningful sense. The 
HAC was deeply critical of this operation. It was 
strongly of the view that:
‘Most cases should be investigated independently 
by the Commission, instead of referred back to 
the original force on a complaints roundabout. 
“Supervised investigations” do not offer rigorous 
oversight of a police investigation, nor do they 
necessarily give the public a convincing assurance 
that the investigation will be conducted 
objectively. This kind of “oversight-lite” is no 
better than a placebo.’ (HAC 2013, para.23)
Significantly, a relatively high number of 
complaints against the police investigation are 
upheld by the Commission (HAC, 2013, para.60.
RELIANCE ON POLICE RESOURCES
Even where complaints are investigated directly 
by the independent Commissions, it does not 
follow that the investigations are independent 
of the police. The reality on the grounds is that 
the independent investigators are often heavily 
dependent on police or police related expertise 
in the conduct of their investigations (Savage, 
2013a; HAC, 2013). This is especially true in 
cases involving fatalities or serious injury to the 
person; the very cases in which the European 
Court of Human Rights has emphasised the 
importance of the investigation being conduct 
independently of the police (Hammerburg, 
2009). The problem starts at the point where 
the incident is alleged to have occurred. The 
fact is that the Commissions do not have the 
personnel or the resources spread across the 
country to ensure that they get to the scene as 
quickly as police investigators. Almost invariably, 
therefore, they must rely on the police colleagues 
of the officers being investigated to secure the 
scene and preserve evidence. If the investigation 
requires the application of specialised skills such 
as traffic accident reconstruction, ballistics and 
even fingerprint analysis, the Commissions will 
almost invariably have to rely on the police to 
provide them as they will not normally have them 
in house. Similarly, for forensic and DNA analyses 
they normally have to rely on agencies that 
work closely with the police force in question. 
Even at a more basic level, as will be seen 
later in the context of regulatory capture, the 
independent investigators are usually dependant 
on the cooperation of the police for the supply 
of documentary, video, electronic, and/or oral 
evidence central to the investigation.
It would almost be perverse to describe 
investigations conducted in such circumstances 
as independent of the police. This is tacitly 
acknowledged by the report of the HAC inquiry 
which explicitly linked the IPCC’s capacity to 
take control of a potential crime scene with the 
quality of its investigations:
‘When the IPCC does investigate it often comes 
too late and takes too long. The trail is left to 
go cold. IPCC should be able to take immediate 
control of a potential crime scene during the 
crucial “golden hours” and early days of an 
investigation into deaths and serious injury 
involving police officers.’ (HAC, 2013, para.24)
It went on to assert that the IPCC’s involvement in 
death and serious injury cases was far too remote 
as it lacked access to independent specialists 
who could analyse a possible crime scene. This, 
in turn, meant that important cases were under 
investigated (HAC, 2013, para.33). Similarly, 
GSOC has explicitly and publicly linked its 
capacity to deliver its investigative function with 
access to the Garda PULSE and computerised 
information bases. (GSOC, 2013a, para.10.4) The 
PULSE system incorporates a central information 
database to which operational gardai input data 
on crime incidents etc. in the course of their 
duties. Garda have direct electronic access to it, 
and it is a vital resource in any investigation into 
a complaint or criminal matter. The Commission, 
however, has no independent access. It must 
depend on Garda cooperation to extract 
information from PULSE on a case by case basis. 
In a special report to the Minister in 2013, it 
tersely recommended, inter alia, that it should be 
given independent access immediately (GSOC, 
2013a, rec.21)
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LACK OF RIGOUR IN INVESTIGATIONS
Independent investigation does not always 
mean a rigorous investigation. In respect of 
serious criminal allegations, for example, it 
would appear that the police officer or officers 
concerned are not subjected to the same robust 
arrest, detention and interrogation methods that 
would apply typically to civilian counterparts. 
Instead the standard practice appears to be to 
take a statement from the officer, usually by 
appointment. One of the three causes of distrust 
in the complaints system identified by the HAC 
was that the police often do not interview officers 
after cases involving death and serious injury, 
although they would routinely do so for ordinary 
members of the public (HAC, 2013, para.13). In 
its interim report on the Hillsborough disaster, it 
found that police officers are rarely interviewed 
under caution in circumstances in which an 
ordinary member of the public would be (HAC, 
2012). In its 2013 report, it stated:
‘The issue of interviewing officers in cases 
involving death and serious injury is indicative 
of a culture of treating officers differently from 
members of the public. Where officers are not 
interviewed promptly under caution, this can 
lead to weaker evidence and loss of confidence in 
the process of investigating serious matters such 
as deaths in custody.’ (HAC, 2013, para.85)
It went on to recommend, inter alia, that officers 
should be ‘routinely interviewed under caution 
in the most serious cases, exactly as a member of 
the public would be.’ (HAC, 2013, para.85)
Savage’s research on the procedures in three 
of the jurisdictions also found evidence that 
the influence of former police investigators was 
undermining the rigour and independence of 
the procedure. They had a propensity to close 
investigations too quickly and to take a narrow 
criminal investigation approach, rather than a 
broader contextual approach which is open to 
the issues raised (Savage, 2013b). They were 
not inclined to challenge police narratives. One 
telling example cited in the research is where a 
former police officer investigator was happy to 
accept CCTV evidence provided by the police, 
while a fellow investigator from a non-police 
background wanted to check local businesses 
independently to see if there was video evidence 
that the police had not discovered or that they 
were concealing (Savage, 2013b). His fears may 
have been well founded as the GSOC has felt 
compelled recently to criticise the Garda publicly 
for impeding its investigations by suppressing 
relevant evidence and denying the existence 
of statements given by gardai who had taken 
part in the policing of a student protest that 
had generated numerous complaints (GSOC, 
2013b). In its inquiry into IPCC investigations, 
the HAC also heard extensive criticisms of, inter 
alia: a failure by investigators to locate evidence; 
a propensity to accept police explanations for 
missing evidence; failure to analyse competing 
accounts, even with inconsistencies between 
officers’ accounts or a compelling account from 
a complainant; a lack of investigative rigour; and 
delay (HAC, 2013, para.11).
REGULATORY CAPTURE
Regulatory capture is an established and common 
phenomenon in the relationship between a 
regulatory agency and the body or bodies being 
regulated (Ayre & Braithwaite, 1991). It can arise 
on at least two levels. Typically, it emerges and 
develops over time as the agency and body 
become more familiar with each other’s methods 
and practices. As agency personnel engage 
exclusively with the work of the persons they 
are regulating, there is a tendency to acquire 
the perspectives and even the language of those 
persons. This is especially so where the persons 
being regulated are experienced and hardened 
professionals in a specialist field and the 
regulators are ‘outsiders’ who have not acquired 
that direct experience. In this environment, the 
persons being regulated are in a strong position 
not just to evade the efforts of the regulators to 
control them or call them to account, but also 
to steer those efforts in ways and directions that 
will serve their interests, usually at the expense 
of the regulatory objectives. At another level, 
the regulated body might ‘capture’ the regulator 
at the outset by shaping its form, function and 
powers and/or by negotiating how it will perform 
its function.
Arguably, the police complaints systems in 
Britain and Ireland have always been the subject 
of regulatory capture at both levels from their 
inception and right through the successive 
waves of reforms. Even today, with the fully 
‘independent’ models there is evidence that 
their efficacy continues to be undermined 
by regulatory capture at both levels. This is 
reflected in a tendency for investigators to be 
unnecessarily deferential to the police. Savage 
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found that investigators tended to be ‘over-
cautious’ in their dealing with the police in 
order to avoid giving offence (Savage, 2013a). 
So, for example, they were reluctant to seize 
officers’ notebooks. Similarly, in criminal cases, 
police suspects are rarely arrested, detained and 
interrogated under caution in custody. The first 
arrest by the GSOC did not occur until December 
2012, more than five years after it commenced 
operations. Typically, an investigator will simply 
take a statement by appointment from the officer 
or officers and check it against the complainant’s 
statement and other independent evidence. 
Inconsistencies are not normally pursued through 
robust questioning. Documentary or material 
evidence supplied by the police is usually accepted 
at face value, even to the extent that investigators 
do not check independently if that is the sum total 
of evidence available. Savage also found evidence 
of ‘independent’ investigators ‘going native’, 
as reflected in their tendency to adopt police 
terminology and mindsets (Savage, 2013b).
The regulatory capture is institutionalised through 
the contents of Protocols agreed between the 
independent Commissions and the police. Typically, 
they will regulate matters such as how and the 
extent to which Commission investigators can get 
access to police records, information, intelligence 
and stations. They will also address arrangements 
for interviewing police officers. In theory they are 
aimed at facilitating smooth cooperation between 
the police and the Commissions in investigations. 
In practice, they tend to blunt the independent 
powers of the Commissions and cede excessive 
control over investigations to the police (Savage, 
2013a); sometimes to the detriment of effective 
investigation.
Instead of enhancing the smoothness and efficacy 
of investigations, the Protocols agreed between 
the Commissions and the police can actually prove 
counterproductive. The GSOC, for example, has 
voiced concerns about the capacity of the Protocols 
to blunt the independence of its oversight role. In 
a 2013 report on an investigation into the police 
handling of an informant, it complained candidly 
that ‘.. under the present Protocols, [it] is wholly 
reliant upon assurances from the [police] that 
the evidence and information they have supplied 
represents the totality of such information held. 
This leaves scope to question the completeness 
and independence of oversight.’ (GSOC, 2013a 
para. 10.2).
POLICE OBSTRUCTIONISM
Police obstructionism is also proving an enduring 
obstacle to the capacity of the independent 
Commissions to deliver effective investigations. 
Once again there is a link with the Protocols. In 
2013, for example, the GSOC took the highly 
unusual step of going public in its criticisms of 
police delay in supplying relevant information 
concerning their policing of a student protest 
that had generated multiple complaints (GSOC, 
2013b). Instead of exercising its own powers to 
seize the information directly, the Commission 
complied with the Protocols and requested its 
production from the police. The Protocols specify 
a time limit of 30 days for compliance. In the 
event it took 224 days and numerous requests 
before the police supplied any documents, and 
634 days for the Commission to get a copy of the 
parallel police investigation file on the protest.
In some situations the police actually supply false 
or misleading information. In the student protest 
investigation, for example, the police claimed 
falsely that there were no statements from 
officers who used batons on the day (GSOC, 
2013b). Similarly, police management attempted 
to conceal the availability of video evidence taken 
by police officers (GSOC, 2013b).
SHORTAGE OF RESOURCES
Underlying some of these problems is a shortage 
of resources available to the independent 
Commissions. The UK parliamentary committee, 
for example, pointed out that the resources 
available to the independent Commission for 
investigations are dwarfed by the comparable 
resources available to the police (HAC, 2013, 
para.33). Inevitably, this leaves the Commissions 
excessively dependant on the police to advance 
their investigations, and even to carry out 
the investigations. The Commission itself told 
the inquiry that it does not currently have 
sufficient resources to enable it to meet its 
statutory responsibility or the public’s growing 
expectations of its role (HAC, 2013, para.30).




When these features of the ‘independent’ 
procedures are viewed in the light of the 
outcome of complaints, it is apparent that the 
latest reforms are not working. Indeed it might 
even be questioned whether truly independent 
investigation of complaints against the police 
is a realistic prospect. Before settling for such a 
negative conclusion, however, it might be worth 
considering another cycle of reforms aimed at 
closing the gap between the appearance and 
the substance of independent investigation. 
At least for the more serious, non-service type 
complaints, the Commissions must be given the 
powers and resources to conduct investigations 
as independently of the police as is practicably 
possible. At the very least, that will require: the 
recruitment and training of more independent 
investigators; the phasing out of former police 
officers; the employment and training of personnel 
with the necessary range of specialist skills; powers 
to investigate all complaints independently; the 
renegotiation of the protocols; and the adoption 
of an institutional policy favouring direct use of 
coercive powers when police cooperation is not 
immediately forthcoming.
Ultimately, it will never be possible, or even 
desirable, to divorce the police entirely from the 
investigation of complaints against themselves. 
So, for example, there is a need for close 
cooperation between the Commissions and the 
police in the handling of service type complaints 
in a swift and non-bureaucratic manner that 
strikes a reasonable balance between the interests 
of police, public and complainants. It is unlikely, 
however, that that will be possible without public 
confidence in the manner in which the more 
serious complaints are handled.




Ayres, I., & Braithwaite, J. (1991). Tripartism: Regulatory capture and empowerment. Law and Social 
Inquiry, 16(3), 435–496.
Cohen, B. (1985). Police complaints procedure: Why and for whom? In J. Baxter, & L. Koffmann (Eds.), 
Police: the constitution and the community (pp. 246-267). Abingdon: Professional Books.
Conway, V. (2009). A sheep in wolf’s clothing? Evaluating the impact of the Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman Commission. Irish Jurist, 43, 109-130.
Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland (2011). An inspection into the independence of the 
Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. Belfast: CJINI.
Davies, N. (2008, February 24).Crisis at police watchdog as lawyers resign. The Guardian
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (2012). Five Year Report. Dublin.
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (2013a). Special report by the Garda Ombudsman to the 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence: Issued pursuant to section 80(5) of the Garda Síochána Act 
2005. Dublin: www.gardaombudsman.ie.
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (2013b). Report in accordance with section 103 of the 
Garda Síochána Act, 2005 (‘the Act’) relating to the policing of the Union of Students in Ireland 
Protest March on 3 November 2010. Dublin: www.gardaombudsman.ie.
Hammerburg, T. (2009). Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights concerning independent 
and effective determination of complaints against the police. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
Hayes, M. (1997). A police ombudsman for Northern Ireland? Belfast: Northern Ireland Office.
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2012. Powers to investigate the Hillsborough disaster: 
Interim Report on the Independent Police Complaints Commission. London: Stationery Office, HC 
793.
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2013). Independent Police Complaints Commission. 
London: Stationery Office, HC 494.
Humphry, D. (1979). The complaints system. In P. Hain, D. Humphry, & B. Rose-Smith (Eds.), Policing 
the police, Vol.1 (pp. 43-63). London: John Calder.
Lustgarten, L. (1986). The governance of the police. London: Sweet & Maxwell.
Mark, Sir R. (1979). In the office of constable. London: Fontana.
Poppins, M. (2009, April 16). The camera is mightier than the sword. The Economist
Savage, S. (2013a). Thinking independence: Calling the police to account through the independent 
investigation of police complaints, British Journal of Criminology, 53, 94-112.
Savage, S. (2013b). Seeking ‘civilianness’: Police complaints and the civilian control model of oversight. 
British Journal of Criminology, 53, 886-904.
Smith, G. (2005). A most enduring problem: Police complaints reform in England and Wales Journal 
of Social Policy, 35(1), 121-141.
Walsh, D.P.J. (1998). The Irish police: a legal and constitutional perspective. Dublin: Round Hall Sweet 
& Maxwell.
Walsh, D.P.J. (2004a). The proposed Garda complaints procedure: a critique. Irish Criminal Law 
Journal, 14(4), 2-26.
Walsh, D.P.J. (2004b). The proposed Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission’ Irish Criminal Law 
Journal, 14(1), 2-12.
Walsh, D.P.J. (2009). Twenty years of police complaints in Ireland: a critical assessment of the review 
board model. Legal Studies, 29, 306-337.
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
58
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND THE 
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Abstract: The article provides an overview over the evolution of the relationship and dialogue between 
Amnesty International and police agencies. Amnesty International — being an international human 
rights organisation whose endeavour is primarily to end violations of human rights — finds itself easily 
and almost naturally at an opposing side to law enforcement officials. However, departing from a rather 
antagonistic relationship at the very beginning there is now much more constructive dialogue taking 
place in many countries of the world. 
This evolution is due to two aspects: 
1. An increased recognition within police 
agencies that compliance with and protection 
of human rights is not an impediment to, but 
an integral part of good policing. 
2. An iproved understanding of the challenges 
and difficulties of the policing work within 
Amnesty International, recognising also the 
role of the police as a protector of human 
rights, and not just looking at the police as a 
potential violator of human rights. 
As a result, today, constructive dialogue takes 
place and can take different formats such as 
bilateral talks, workshops, conferences etc. 
Difficulties and challenges, however, remain 
when subjects are sensitive (e.g. ethnic profiling, 
identification tags for police officers) or where 
Amnesty International is asked to assume 
responsibilities of the police (substituting in 
training activities or giving advice for operational 
choices) — which it cannot and will not do. Still, 
experience shows that constructive dialogue 
towards better respect and protection of human 
rights is possible between Amnesty International 
and the police and this article illustrates this with 
some concrete examples.
Amnesty International was created to mobilise 
civil society against human rights abuses by 
State authorities. Its mission statement (Amnesty 
International, n.d.) is as follows:
‘Amnesty International is a global movement of 
more than 3 million supporters, members and 
activists in over 150 countries and territories 
who campaign to end grave abuses of human 
rights. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all 
the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and other international human 
rights standards. ‘We are independent of any 
government, political ideology, economic 
interest or religion, and are funded mainly by our 
membership and public donations.’
This statement and self-understanding of 
Amnesty International explains to a large extent 
what has shaped the relationship between law 
enforcement agencies and Amnesty International 
over a long period of time.





Human rights protect the individual against abuse 
of power by the State and its representatives. An 
organisation that speaks out against violations of 
human rights — thus by nature acts committed 
(or omitted) by State agents — finds itself 
therefore easily in an antagonistic relationship 
with the State. This is in particular the case 
with regards to those who have specific powers 
that can easily be abused, such as the powers 
invested in law enforcement agencies to arrest, 
to detain, to use force and firearms, and to carry 
out searches and seizure.
Furthermore, the endeavour to work for the 
respect of human rights of all persons, including 
those who have committed breaches of the 
law (or are suspected thereof) easily leads to 
a perception among police that Amnesty 
International would seek to ‘defend criminals’ or 
people who otherwise disturb public order in the 
course of demonstrations.
Starting from that point of view the relationship is 
‘naturally’ antagonistic. Amnesty International’s 
view of the police will first of all look at where the 
police violate or otherwise do not respect human 
rights — and will criticise them. The focus is thus 
on the ‘dark side’ of policing. With this specific 
focus, police perceives AI to be biased, and 
not understanding the role and the challenges 
of police. This was aggravated by the fact that 
police in many countries of the world considered 
(and in some countries still considers) human 
rights as an impediment to ‘good’ and efficient 
policing. This antagonistic relationship easily 
leads to a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ where neither 
side is listening to the other side.
ONLY HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMPLIANT POLICING IS GOOD 
POLICING
Fortunately, over the years the relationship has 
evolved. Universally, respect for and protection of 
human rights became more and more recognised 
as the overarching element and principle of 
policing. The 1979 UN Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials and the 1990 UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Officials are significant steps 
in that regard. These international standards 
highlight the active role police should play in 
upholding and protecting human rights, and 
today it is recognised that only human rights 
compliant policing can be considered ‘good’ and 
efficient policing.
Recognising this important role of the police 
as protectors of human rights, Amnesty 
International realised more and more the need 
to engage in a constructive dialogue with law 
enforcement officials on how best to ensure 
human rights compliance in police work.
THE POLICE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS PROGRAMME OF THE 
DUTCH SECTION OF AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL
An illustration of this evolution on both sides 
is the creation of the Police and Human Rights 
Programme at the Dutch section of Amnesty 
International (1). It started with an initiative 
of a group of Dutch police officers, who were 
members of Amnesty International and who 
wanted to organise themselves with a view to 
contributing to change and better human rights 
compliance of the police in the Netherlands. 
They did so through the creation of an informal 
police network. Their discussions and reflections 
very much nurtured the thinking process of the 
Dutch Section of Amnesty International about 
the police and triggered the decision to get 
more competence and expertise on policing 
in order to change the focus from the classical 
‘blame game’ to constructive dialogue. This 
led to the creation of the Police and Human 
Rights Programme, whose main task is to advise 
Amnesty International staff members and other 
human rights activists on police work, improve 
the understanding of the role and operational 
challenges of the police, including the high risk 
of police to become victims themselves and the 
need to give due consideration to the rights of 
police officers. The book ‘Understanding Policing’ 
(Osse, 2006) today is a particularly important 
(1) See the website of the Programme: http://www.amnesty.nl/policeandhumanrights.
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tool in that regard as it seeks to foster among 
human rights activists a better understanding for 
the difficult, complex and often even dangerous 
character of the police work.
CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE
In addition, in many countries police have 
realised that they cannot escape public scrutiny. 
If they try to do so the public will not trust them 
and will be hostile toward them. However, police 
are highly dependent on trust of all parts of the 
population and their willingness to cooperate 
with the police; in the end distrust and hostility are 
counterproductive to good and efficient policing. 
Thus police have to make the best out of it and use 
public scrutiny to gain the trust of the population 
and as a means of self-evaluation. Openness to 
public scrutiny then also provides room for a 
more constructive dialogue with human rights 
organisations such as Amnesty International.
Today, constructive dialogue is taking place 
in many countries; this can be in public round 
tables where specific issues are discussed, or in 
bilateral talks that are publicly known, but whose 
content may sometimes remain confidential 
depending on the agreements made. Amnesty 
International also often organises public events, 
demonstrations etc. where it is necessary to 
engage in dialogue with the police in order 
to balance interests of public order and safety 
with the right to peaceful assembly and protest. 
An example how this took place successfully (2) 
demonstrates how apparently opposing interests, 
i.e. legitimate security concerns in relation to a 
high level State visit (Russian President Vladimir 
Putin’s visit to Amsterdam in April 2013) on the one 
hand and the right to freedom of expression on 
the other — can be successfully reconciled. Open 
and trustful discussions about the feasible and the 
unfeasible led to a modus operandi where it was 
possible for Amnesty International to express its 
human rights concerns and that this reached the 
addressee of the message, while at the same time 
not jeopardising security with demonstrators not 
getting too close to the State visit.
REMAINING CHALLENGES
With all these improvements in mutual respect 
and understanding, problems still persist.
SENSITIVE SUBJECTS: ETHNIC PROFILING
Some subjects are particularly sensitive and 
difficult to address in a constructive dialogue. 
Ethnic profiling is such an example. While 
Amnesty International fully accepts profiling as a 
legitimate and necessary policing technique; it is 
opposed to profiling if the underlying assumptions 
are exclusively based on ethnicity, race or other 
parameters of visual appearance. Amnesty 
International considers such an approach as per 
se discriminatory. It is sometimes quite surprising 
how passionately many police officers react in 
that regard. They seem to perceive this as an 
accusation of racism.
However, the intention of Amnesty International 
when criticising ethnic profiling is rather to create 
an understanding of the impact of this approach 
on those who are repeatedly affected by stop and 
search practices exclusively motivated by criteria of 
appearance. Furthermore, Amnesty International 
strongly believes that this technique is also 
inefficient and counterproductive. The affected 
groups start to feel harassed and discriminated 
against as potential criminals and they will lose 
trust and confidence in the police. There is thus a 
risk of alienating an entire group, and police run 
the risk of depriving themselves of an important 
source of information when members of these 
groups are no longer willing to talk to the police. 
Too often, stop and search activities based on 
optical parameters without additional objective 
criteria will also bind resources for relatively 
unsuccessful activities, while more sophisticated, 
focused and tested objective criteria might lead 
to greater efficiency (higher ‘hit rates’) with less 
input of resources (3); this would also contrast 
the problematic consequence of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, in which police will receive ‘evidence’ 
of their own assumptions of the ‘criminal 
character’ of a specific group compared to other 
people who will be considered less involved in 
criminal activity, only by the fact that they are not 
stopped, and consequently never identified as 
suspects. And finally, where policing parameters 
(2) Available on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xH3BNo85Ixo.
(3) See for instance examples presented in Open Society Justice Initiative (2012).
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are so relatively simple, those individuals and 
groups with criminal intentions can easily take 
measures to avoid such criteria.
Amnesty International would like to have a 
constructive discussion with police on that 
subject, but in many situations the sensitivity of 
the subject still prevents this from happening.
SENSITIVE SUBJECTS: POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND IDENTIFICATION 
OF POLICE OFFICERS
A subject of similar sensitivity is Amnesty 
International’s call in many countries to ascertain 
that police officers can be identified — either 
through name tags or number tags — including 
in the context of public assemblies. Here again, 
it seems that this request is perceived by many 
police officers as a personal accusation that 
treats them as potential ‘criminals’ and puts 
their personal security at risk, while Amnesty 
International considers this as an indispensable 
measure of transparency and public scrutiny.
GETTING TO CHANGE
Achieving and measuring effective change is 
sometimes another difficulty: even though a 
dialogue may be very open and trustful and 
human rights related problems are identified 
and acknowledged by the police themselves, this 
does not necessarily lead to effective change in 
the way policing is done — or — at least it is very 
difficult to get to know the precise improvement 
measures taken by the police. This, however, is 
essential to judge whether the dialogue is indeed 
as open, trustful and constructive as it may be 
described by those involved.
KEEPING THE DISTANCE
An important limitation to constructive dialogue 
also deserves to be mentioned: Amnesty 
International cannot assume responsibilities of 
the police; operational choices of how to do 
policing in a given context are the exclusive 
responsibility of the police. Thus, while it will 
always be possible to comment on the human 
rights consequences of specific policing 
approaches, Amnesty International cannot and 
will not discharge the police of their duty to 
make the appropriate operational choices and 
of the obligation to assume full responsibility for 
these choices.
A similar consideration applies for training and 
human rights education of police officers. Too 
often, Amnesty International receives requests 
from law enforcement agencies to provide for 
large scale human rights education of police 
officers. However, in the first place, it is the 
responsibility of the police institutions themselves 
to ensure that all members of the agency know 
and understand human rights and are able 
to carry out their work in compliance with 
human rights. But even more importantly, it is 
Amnesty International’s strong belief that human 
rights education as a standalone activity is not 
conducive to better respect of and for human 
rights. It must be embedded in an overall culture 
of human rights respect within the institution, as 
demonstrated through human rights compliant 
policies and procedures as well the indispensable 
measures to enforce them, leaving no space for 
impunity in relation to violations of human rights.
And finally, even where constructive dialogue 
takes place, it must always be clear from the 
onset that Amnesty International cannot and will 
not give up its watchdog function. When things 
go wrong, Amnesty International will still speak 
out and call for all necessary corrective measures 
in relation to human rights violations, including 
bringing those to justice who have committed 
serious human rights violations. Constructive 
dialogue cannot and will not go as far as putting 
Amnesty International’s independence and 
impartiality at risk.
CONCLUSION
As a conclusion, constructive dialogue between 
Amnesty International and the police:
• is possible;
• requires that both sides understand and 
respect each other’s function;
• remains difficult on certain subjects; and
• will not and may not affect Amnesty 
International’s watchdog function when it 
comes to human rights violations.
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Abstract: Policing multicultural communities presents challenges for contemporary policing. Historically 
and currently, the interactions between police and multicultural communities are often strained due to 
language barriers, cultural misperceptions on both sides, fear of outside authority figures on the part of 
marginalised groups etc. 
The Roma population, Europe’s largest minority, 
is a target of persistent persecution from each and 
every power in history and even in the present 
times, not only in countries that lack democratic 
tradition, but also in countries which consider 
themselves cradles of democracy. The first record 
of the Roma people in Slovenia goes back to the 
14th century. Statistics show that approximately 
3 200 Roma people live in Slovenia, but the actual 
number varies between 11 000 and 12 000. In 
Slovenia, the Roma community is a minority 
community recognised by the Constitution as 
a special community or minority with particular 
ethnic and cultural characteristics (its own 
language, culture and history). The constitutional 
provision was realised by the adoption of the 
Roma Community in the Republic of Slovenia 
Act (2007). Slovenia is among those European 
countries that include Roma in the management 
of public affairs at the local level (as Roma 
councillors). The relation between the police 
and Roma communities is crucial in many ways. 
Roma are often the target of racially motivated 
discrimination and violence. Being one of the 
most exposed pieces of the state apparatus, the 
police are implicated in Roma issue. Locally, they 
deal with security issues involving Roma people 
being lawbreakers as well as victims on a daily 
basis. As in other countries, in Slovenia too, police 
have adopted community policing philosophies 
and practices. It is important to prepare and train 
those public servants who have regular contact 
with members of the Roma community. In this 
context, training of police officers focuses on 
understanding and overcoming discrimination, 
prejudice and stereotypes. In 2003 in the Policy 
Academy started the project ‘Policing in a multi-
ethnic community’. The objectives of such 
training courses were to make police officers 
aware of their own prejudices, to introduce them 
Roma culture and traditions, (to understand the 
importance of a comprehensive approach, to 
evaluate ways of managing security events and 
to understand the importance of dialogue. The 
aim of the project was also to inform inhabitants 
of certain Roma settlements about legislative 
provisions concerning typical offences in certain 
areas and thus non-criminal incidents, causing 
discomfort to the neighbouring population. In 
the past years, more than 1950 police officers have 
participated in this training. Roma councillors and 
other representatives of the Roma population 
also participate actively in such training events. 
The results are manifold: fewer offences, fewer 
occasions when policemen were unable to carry 
out relevant procedures, more offences and 
crimes reported by Roma themselves, and joint 
management (within individual competencies) 
of complex security events that might, were they 
not resolved in a timely manner, become serious 
crimes.
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
64
INTRODUCTION — ROMA 
COMMUNITIES IN SLOVENIA
Policing in diverse, multicultural communities 
presents challenges for contemporary policing. 
Historically and currently, the interactions 
between police and multicultural communities 
are often tense due to language barriers, cultural 
misperceptions on both sides, fear of outside 
authority figures on the part of marginalised 
groups etc. This is the case also with the Roma, 
Europe’s largest minority. Roma were and are a 
target of persistent persecution from each and 
every power in history and even in the present 
times, not only in countries that lack democratic 
tradition, but also in countries which consider 
themselves cradles of democracy. Brearley 
(2001) excellently summarises the position of 
Roma in Europe in recent centuries:
‘Roma/Gypsies, nomads newly arrived in Europe 
in the 1400s, endured expulsions, forcible 
removal of children, servitude in galleys or 
mines, death sentences for being Gypsy, and 
absolute slavery in the Balkans from the 16th 
century onward. Persecution stemmed from 
the highest authorities in State and Church. 
Following the murder of 200 000 to 500 000 
Roma in the Holocaust, persecution persists, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe where 
Roma form up to 10 % of the population 
(Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania). Discriminated 
against under communism, their plight has 
dramatically worsened since 1989. Endemic 
problems (low life expectancy, high illiteracy, 
dire poverty, poor housing) are now heightened 
by massive, disproportionate unemployment. 
Unprecedented persecution has been 
unleashed by new state nationalism and easing 
of censorship. Roma are the new scapegoat 
for post-Communist society’s ills. The media 
commonly stigmatise Roma.’ (Lobnikar, Hozjan, 
Šuklje & Banutai, 2013).
The Roma population originally comes from India. 
They started leaving India in 1192 (Djurić & Horvat 
Muc, 2010). Their nomadic lifestyle brought them 
through Afghanistan and Iran, to Turkey, Greece 
and toward Central Europe, while another part 
of the Roma population went through Egypt 
all the way to Spain (Horvat Muc, 2011; Novak, 
2012a). The first record of the Roma people in 
Slovenia goes back to the 14th century. The fact 
that the official number of Roma living in Slovenia 
is different than the actual number is one of the 
many challenges of current Roma issues. Statistics 
show that approximately 3 200 Roma people live 
in Slovenia. But the actual number varies between 
11 000 and 12 000 (Banutai, Strobl, Haberfeld 
& Duque, 2011). These discrepancies occur 
due to many different factors, one of which 
is the disarray of the Roma settlements. Few 
settlements are legalised and houses are often 
not numbered; therefore, many Roma people 
can share a household with other Roma families.
There are four groups within the Roma 
population in Slovenia (Štrukelj, 2004): the Roma 
community in the Dolenjska region, Maribor, 
Gorenjska region, and Prekmurje region. Roma 
primarily live in one of the 130 settlements in 
the country, one-third of which are illegal by 
virtue of resting on private or municipal land. 
The Roma community in the Dolenjska region 
came from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. 
By occupation they were mainly horse breeders 
and blacksmiths (Štrukelj, 2004). This group 
of the Roma community is probably the least 
integrated into the majority population. Thus 
general security issues as well as differences and 
disagreements exist between the Roma and 
the larger community. The Roma community 
in Maribor came from Kosovo and the Republic 
of Macedonia and their religious orientation 
is Muslim. By occupation they were mainly 
tradesmen in different areas and they are very 
adaptable and competitive (Novak, 2012a). 
They are almost completely integrated into the 
population — the reason being that they did not 
have a chance to move together and create a so 
called ’ghetto’ as the Roma in the Dolenjska and 
Prekmurje regions did (Novak, 2012a) — local 
authorities in Maribor always wanted them to 
live within city limits. The Roma in Gorenjska 
region — also called Sinti — came from the 
North, the territory of the former Habsburg 
monarchy. They are completely integrated into 
the population and do not live in closed societies 
and settlements (Novak, 2012a).
The Roma population in Prekmurje arrived from 
Hungary and Austria. By occupation they were 
mainly musicians and farmers and were also 
very keen horsemen (Štrukelj, 2004; Horvat 
Muc, 2011). They speak a different Romani 
dialect than the Roma people in Dolenjska and 
Maribor (sometimes these groups do not even 
understand each other).
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LEGAL STATUS OF ROMA IN 
SLOVENIA
In Slovenia, the Roma community is a minority 
community recognised by the Constitution. It 
does not have the status of a national minority, 
but is a minority community specially mentioned 
in the Constitution and granted special 
protection by the law. It is recognised as a special 
community or minority with particular ethnic 
and cultural characteristics (its own language, 
culture and history) that may be preserved 
in accordance with constitutional provisions, 
taking into consideration the needs that the 
community itself expressly puts forward. The 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia 
considers the Roma as a special Romani ethnic 
community living in Slovenia, while the Slovenian 
Constitution (2) employs the expression ‘Romani 
community’. The legal basis for regulating their 
status is Article 65 of the Constitution, which 
specifies that the status and special rights of the 
Roma community living in Slovenia are governed 
by the law. This constitutional provision was 
realised by the adoption of the Roma Community 
in the Republic of Slovenia Act (2007). The 
protection of the Roma community is also 
provided for in other laws. Aside from legislation, 
care for the realisation of special rights of the 
Roma community and the improvement of its 
status is incorporated in numerous programmes, 
strategies and resolutions in different social areas 
(e.g. National Programme of Measures for Roma 
of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia 
for the period 2010–2015).
As mentioned, on 30 March 2007, the 
Slovenian National Assembly adopted the 
Picture 1: Roma community diversity in Slovenia (15)  Source: Geodetic institute of Slovenia
(1) The map is part of the Thematic Atlas of Roma settlements in Slovenia, which was constructed in the project aimed at 
increasing social and cultural capital in environments with Roma communities. The operation was partially funded by 
the European Union through the European Social Fund and the Ministry of Education and Sports under the Operational 
Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013.
(2) Official Gazette of the RS, Nos. 33I/1991-I, 42/97, 66/00, 24/03, 69/04, 69/04, 69/04, 68/06.
Legend
Roma settlements
Communities with traditional Roma 
settlements 
Other communities with Roma settlements
Sinti
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Roma Community in the Republic of Slovenia 
Act (2007; hereinafter: ZRomS-1), which came 
into force on 28 April 2007. ZRomS-1 regulates 
the competences of national authorities and 
authorities of self-governing local communities 
concerning the implementation of special rights 
of the Roma community, the organisation of the 
Roma community at national and local levels, 
and funds for financing these activities. The Act 
provides that the Government, in cooperation 
with the self-governing local communities and 
the Roma Community Council of the Republic of 
Slovenia, shall adopt a programme of measures. 
This programme of measures shall include 
relevant regulations, the obligations and tasks 
to be carried out by competent ministries, other 
national authorities, and authorities of self-
governing local communities. With ZRomS-1, 
Slovenia is committed to ensure special rights of 
the Roma community in the fields of education, 
culture, employment, territorial management 
and environmental protection, health and 
social care, information and co-decision in 
public matters that concern members of the 
Roma community, implementing regulations 
and regulations adopted by self-managed local 
communities, as well as special programmes and 
measures adopted by national authorities and 
organs of self-managed local communities.
Slovenia is among those European countries 
that include Roma in the management of public 
affairs at the local level. In the 20 municipalities 
where they have been present throughout 
history, members of the Roma community enjoy, 
in addition to the general right to vote, a special 
right to elect a representative to the municipal 
council (in 20 out of all 212 municipalities in 
Slovenia), to be exercised in local elections. 
In compliance with the legislation in force on 
the protection of personal data, ministries and 
other government bodies may not keep special 
records of persons based on national or ethnic 
affiliation, so the only demographics available 
are those gathered in official censuses under the 
auspices of the Statistical Office of the Republic 
of Slovenia. As the last official census in Slovenia 
was carried out back in 2002, the statistical 
data are somewhat out-dated. Due to this, we 
can expect some new municipalities with Roma 
council representatives to appear in the future 
(e.g. Škocjan, Brežice, Maribor).
PUBLIC OPINION ON ROMA
The best description of an average Slovenian’s 
attitude about Roma in Slovenia came recently 
from Tanja Fajon, European Parliament MP from 
Slovenia. She introduced her essay on the issue 
with a statement:
‘We used to call Roma people ‘Gypsies’, but to 
my knowledge as a teenager they were nomads 
or were living in little ghettos; they had their 
own traditional culture and we did not have any 
close encounters with them, except that we had 
a great Roma singer, Oto Pesner, who conquered 
our hearts and the world stage. Therefore, I 
believed that ‘gypsies’ had a great sense for 
music’ (Fajon, 2011).
However, as in any other place, there are many 
prejudices and stereotypes among the majority 
population about the Roma. They became 
even stronger in recent times of economic crisis 
with beliefs among non-Roma population that 
unemployed Roma have a better income than 
others who have to work hard to make a decent 
living. The media often add fuel to the fire; they 
portray Roma as being deviant and a threat to the 
majority population, they represent the cultural 
differences in a negative way, make generalisations 
and perpetuate stereotypes about the Roma 
population (Erjavec, Hrvatin & Kelbl, 2000).
Roma people are also aware of the negative 
prejudices of the majority population. That is 
what is driving assimilation — the process in 
which a great number of the Roma people are 
taking the first and last names of the non-Roma 
people who live in the same area. A survey in 
Slovenia (Šuklje & Banutai, 2012) showed that 
many Roma change their surname due to the 
stigmatisation of local community, making it 
difficult to find the accurate statistical data on 
this ethnic minority. In the Prekmurje region 
there are scarcely any changes, as opposed to 
the Dolenjska region where these name changes 
are very common (Novak, 2012a). Reasons for 
these circumstances can be found in the actual 
state and conditions of the Roma population 
and its relationship to the non-Roma population. 
According to overall estimations, the situation 
is much worse in the Dolenjska and Posavska 
regions than in the Prekmurje region.
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The general public often wonders why there are 
such differences between status, relationship 
to the majority, and behaviour of the Roma 
in different Slovenian regions, for example in 
the Prekmurje vs. Dolenjska regions (Šuklje & 
Banutai, 2012). Novak (personal interview, 20. 
4. 2012) explains that the main reason for such 
difference is that most Roma from the Prekmurje 
region own the land and farms they live on, 
Roma in the Dolenjska region, on the other hand, 
are in most cases still not rightful owners of the 
land they live on. Novak adds that the situation 
depends on local politics and local inhabitants’ 
will to deal with these shifts. Of course we 
should not forget the historical background of 
the area. People living by the Mura River have 
become accustomed to the constant shifting of 
rulers and authorities, which was accompanied 
by mass migrations. The main reasons for the 
differences between various ‘Roma groups’ are 
the (in)ability to legally own property, interests 
of local community, politics and the functioning 
of the government. Other reasons relate to 
the attitude of the majority — acceptance of 
fellow inhabitants that are different and higher 
tolerance thresholds (Šuklje & Banutai, 2012).
Fajon (2011) suggests that activities that empower 
Roma communities produce results, stressing 
the example of city of Murska Sobota, the 
administrative centre of Pomurje region, where 
the Roma are better integrated into society then 
elsewhere. Murska Sobota had the first ever Roma 
representative in a Slovene city council and has a 
Commission for Roma questions to deal with their 
actual problems. Several programmes have been 
put in place providing social and pedagogical 
assistance to families, supporting integration into 
society, and organising sport and cultural activities. 
The Pušča settlement nearby the Murska Sobota 
is the best example of cooperation and co-
habitation of Roma and non-Roma communities 
in Europe today (Fajon, 2011: 114). In Fajon’s view, 
the small village is important for Slovenia and 
for the European Union in that it demonstrates 
that the cooperation and integration of Roma 
into society is possible and models the way to 
accomplish it. In Pušča there is a kindergarten, 
Roma have their own fire brigade and they are 
involved in many associations that promote their 
interests. They also plan to open a music school 
for Roma and non-Roma kids.
POLICING THE ROMA 
COMMUNITIES IN SLOVENIA
The relation between the police and Roma 
communities is crucial in many ways. As we 
have seen, Roma are often the target of racially 
motivated discrimination and violence. They 
need to be able to fully rely on the police for 
protection against, and the full investigation of, 
hate-motivated crimes. At the same time, the 
police face the challenge of effectively policing 
Roma and Sinti communities that often view 
such efforts with suspicion and mistrust, due 
to a long history of abuse and discrimination 
at the hands of various state authorities (OSCE, 
2010). Being one of the most exposed pieces of 
the state apparatus, the police are implicated in 
the previously mentioned Roma issue. Locally, 
they deal with security issues involving Roma 
people being lawbreakers as well as victims 
on a daily basis. Unofficial estimates suggest 
that patterns of law violation vary according to 
ethnic category in some parts of Slovenia (Strobl, 
Haberfeld, Banutai & Duque, 2012). The role 
of police in security issues related to the Roma 
population can be limited to the tasks that are 
regulated by law. On the other hand, it can be 
understood more broadly as providing versatile 
help to other organisations and partnerships 
among Roma people and the local community 
(Ogulin, Brodarič, Ribič & Gorenak, 2005).
As in other countries, in Slovenia police have 
adopted community policing philosophies and 
practices. The key figure of community policing 
within the framework of the Slovenian police is 
the community policing officer (hereinafter: CPO) 
(Police, 2012). Police officers with long-standing 
experience and communication abilities are 
usually appointed for CPOs. The official web page 
of the Slovenian police (Police, 2012) includes the 
names of all 317 CPOs in Slovenia as well as basic 
information about the tasks of CPOs, instructions 
on when to call for a CPO and an appeal to help 
create favourable security conditions (Lobnikar & 
Meško, 2010). CPOs’ tasks are defined in Police 
rules, Strategy for community-oriented policing, 
Guidelines for prevention work and Measures 
for the improvement of community-oriented 
policing (Meško & Lobnikar, 2005; Virtič & 
Lobnikar, 2004) and the late one form 2013 
Community Policing (Police, 2013). Community 
policing is a subject covered during basic police 
training at the Police Academy and later at 
CPO trainings. CPOs as well as heads of police 
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stations participates in these trainings. Novak 
emphasised that it is important to prepare and 
train those public servants who have regular 
contact with members of the Roma community. 
A fine example of good practice is the police 
training for work in a multicultural community 
(Novak, 2012a, 2012b).
TRAINING PROGRAMME ON 
POLICING IN A MULTI-ETHNIC 
COMMUNITY
In 2003 the Policy Academy began the project 
‘Policing in a multi-ethnic community’, an 
intensive training programme for staff from 
police directorates of Ljubljana, Krško, Novo 
mesto, Maribor and Murska Sobota. Training 
focused on issues linked to working with Roma. 
The objectives of such training courses were (a) 
to make policemen aware of their own prejudices 
against a certain group or individual and the 
negative impact such prejudices have on their 
professionalism, (b) to introduce them to Roma 
culture and traditions, (c) to understand the 
importance of a comprehensive approach, (d) to 
evaluate ways of managing security events, and 
(e) to understand the importance of dialogue 
(Novak, 2012b). Then the programmeme was 
upgraded, aiming to bring the police and the 
Roma community together. So the joint-training 
programme was designed. The programme 
involves the coming together of police with local 
and national Roma leaders, aiming to address 
the public safety and policing needs of the Roma 
minority in the country (ibidem).
Objectives of this programme include educating 
officers on human rights and working with ethnic 
differences in order to better cooperate with 
local Roma populations through educating them 
about police powers and responding to their 
needs. The programme also aims to train officers 
in learning the basics of the Roma language. 
Participation of non-governmental organisations 
and Roma community leaders is an integral 
part of the training, as well as a decentralised 
approach which aims to directly introduce the 
police to the local Roma communities they will 
work with in the future. The training dialogues’ 
goals are to help police officers understand the 
globalised environment in which they operate, 
the importance of being aware of their own 
image and personality, the societal effects of 
negative ethnic stereotypes, the precepts of 
human rights, and the importance of using 
dialogue to resolve conflicts. Officers then learn 
the means of implementing police practices in 
light of these dimensions (Strobl, Banutai, Duque 
& Haberfeld, 2013; Novak, 2012b).
Before the training begins, the trainers from the 
Police Academy in Ljubljana connect with police 
supervisors and community police officers in 
the local police stations where the training will 
occur. The purpose of reaching out is to obtain 
information as to the criminal offences that some 
members of the Roma community are believed 
to be engaged in, the degree that community 
police have routine contact with Roma not in 
connection with a specific investigation or inquiry, 
and the policies and procedures the local police 
have in place to handle complaints filed by Roma 
inhabitants. In addition, the trainers contact a 
local Roma leader to ask for their participation 
and any other members of their community 
who may be interested. The trainers explain 
the nature of the programme, the importance 
of Roma participation, and the benefits that 
a developing a relationship with the police 
might have for them, for example, giving them 
personal contacts in the event their community 
needs police assistance. Once the participating 
police and Roma leaders have been organised, 
the parties come together in dialogue to plan the 
2-day training seminar (up to 16 hours) which 
will include rank-and-file officers, and additional 
members of the Roma community in some cases 
(Strobl, Banutai, Duque & Haberfeld, 2013).
When evaluating the seminar, Strobl and 
colleagues (2013: 9-10) described the training 
details. The training of the police officers, who 
are selected based on the extent to which they 
have routine contact with Roma, takes place in a 
conference room at a police station. 
The first day the police training occurs without 
the Roma participants. The police officers wear 
plain clothes and sit in a circle. Fifteen to twenty 
officers are trained at a time in order to foster 
a cohesive unit of those trained and aware of 
Roma-related issues. The group is intended to 
be heterogeneous with reference to their years 
of employment. After a brief introduction, the 
trainer introduces a self-reflective exercise in 
which the police describe and analyse their own 
individual social and economic position within 
Slovenian society. Participants are then given 
a lecture on the United Nations’ and European 
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
69
Declarations of Human Rights and Slovenian 
documents related to the protection of minorities 
in the country, and a module on the importance 
of non-violent conflict resolution skills. In this 
module, participants describe a perceived 
dilemma about policing in relation to the Roma 
minority, followed by a separation of those 
things which can be dealt with but the police 
and those which cannot, according to Slovenian 
law. For example, the problem of Roma driving 
without a licence, would be a situation that the 
police would be empowered by law to handle 
directly. However, infrastructural problems, such 
as a settlement which lacks proper sanitation, 
could be assisted by the police, but not without 
the cooperation of other government agencies. 
During the first day of training, there is also a 
role-playing exercise in which the police officers 
pretend to be a member of the Roma minority 
and the trainers act as Slovenian police so that 
the police officers can experience the limitations 
the Roma may have in getting in contact with 
the Slovenian police (Strobl et al., 2013).
The Roma participants are brought into the 
training on the second day. Because the training 
is joint in nature, Roma leaders, whether from 
the Roma Union of Slovenia (for more see www.
zveza-roma.si) or the Forum of Roma Councillors 
(for more see www.romsvet.si), are brought 
into this stage of the seminar in order to initiate 
cooperation between the local police and Roma 
in a direct way. On this day, another role-playing 
occurs during which two teams debate each other 
over a local issue, with one team representing the 
Slovenian majority and the other representing 
the Roma community. The actual make-up of the 
groups is heterogeneous as to whether they are 
police and Roma, but the groups are instructed 
to represent one or the other community. Then, 
the police officers learn basic communication 
in a local Romani dialect from members of 
that community directly. The Roma leaders, 
along with the one self-identified female Roma 
police officer in the national force, provide basic 
language training, usually in a dialect that is 
spoken widely in the Dolenjska region. The two 
groups together also discuss Roma culture and 
what police can expect when visiting a Roma 
settlement or home. A PowerPoint presentation 
has been jointly developed by participants which 
explains such Roma customs as how Roma read 
individuals’ auras when they meet them and what 
it means in their culture, the customs related to 
the birth of a new child, and information about 
and examples of music and dance traditions. 
In turn, the police explain their legal powers to 
the Roma participants and give them a sense of 
what to expect from a police encounter, how to 
get assistance from the police at a local station, 
contact information for the community policing 
officers who cover their particular geographic 
areas, and other helpful information (Strobl et 
al., 2013: 10). In the past years, more than 1 950 
police officers have participated in this training 
(Novak, 2012a; 2012b).
One of the follow-up steps of the above training 
courses was an introductory course in the Roma 
language (40 lessons) and a project to inform 
inhabitants of certain Roma settlements about 
legislative provisions concerning typical offences 
in certain areas and thus non-criminal incidents, 
causing discomfort to the neighbouring 
population. A total of 47 policemen voluntarily 
participated in a course in Romani, the Roma 
dialect spoken in Dolenjska, carried out jointly 
by the Police and the Roma Union of Slovenia. 
Training courses are on-going and have become 
a continuous form of work. (Novak, 2012a; 
2012b; Strobl et al., 2013).
EVALUATION OF THE TRAINING
As already mentioned, Strobl, Banutai, Duque 
and Haberfeld evaluated this programme 
in 2013. Members from Roma communities 
believe the programme fostered progress 
in reducing community tension. One Roma 
informant explained that he had for the first 
time ever felt morally comfortable with helping 
the police apprehend a violent member of his 
community because he believed that the police 
could now be trusted to handle him fairly and 
according to the law. The researchers reported 
that three Roma leaders explained that of all 
governmental agencies and officials, the police 
were the most fair and respectful in dealing 
with them (Strobl et al., 2013: 18). Overall, 
although some specific skills such as language, 
communication techniques, and cultural 
sensitivity were imparted to police through the 
training, the biggest boon, according to Strobl 
and colleagues, to policing that the training 
offered was the relationship-building between 
the police and the Roma community. Examples 
have emerged that some Roma leaders who 
participated in the programme have engaged in 
mediation-like activity with the police in order 
to respond to a variety of community tensions, 
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
70
from disputes over housing to intra-ethnic rivalry 
(ibidem). To summarise, the results of described 
training are manifold: fewer offences, fewer 
occasions when policemen were unable to carry 
out relevant procedures, more offences and 
crimes reported by Roma themselves, and joint 
management (within individual competencies) 
of complex security events that might, were they 
not resolved in a timely manner, become serious 
crimes (Novak, 2012b).
DISCUSSION
In 2013, Lobnikar, Hozjan, Šuklje and Banutai 
(2013) conducted a survey on community 
policing implementation in a municipality of 
Lendava. Lendava was one of the places where 
described multi-ethnic training was conducted. 
The aim of the survey was to analyse the quality 
of police work in a multi-ethnic community in 
the municipality of Lendava (municipality is 
located in the north-eastern part of Slovenia 
near Murska Sobota). Policing responsibilities 
in Lendava are delegated to police officers from 
Lendava Police Station Lendava differs from other 
towns in Murska Sobota region in that Lendava 
is a more diverse multicultural environment with 
four autochthonous communities: Slovenes, 
Hungarians, Roma and Croats. This presents an 
even greater challenge for day to day policing 
and local governance. Authors hypothesised that 
if community policing programmes, including 
the described programme on policing in multi-
ethnic environment, are effective, they should be 
perceived as such also by the Roma community 
in Lendava. In the analysis (Lobnikar et al., 
2013), researchers started from substantively 
interdependent areas associated with the 
community policing paradigm: (a) quality of 
contact between the police and local residents, 
(b) the perception of the level of crime and 
disorder, (c) fear of victimisation, and (d) level of 
community cohesion.
These factors are connected. The level of crime 
and disorder, as perceived by the population, has 
a direct and strong impact on the quality of life 
in a community. Contacts between the police 
and local residents are important as well. What 
the local residents think of the police has a direct 
impact on the possibility of a partner relationship 
between the police and the community and 
can influence the willingness of the population 
to act in conformity with the law. Fear of 
victimisation weakens community cohesion, 
which consequently loosens and annuls informal 
mechanisms of social control. One of the main 
premises of community policing is that informal 
control mechanisms, and not police, assure order 
in the neighbourhood/community. If community 
cohesion is weak, the community as such cannot 
act as a control agent. Therefore, if we seriously 
want to study the possibility of community 
policing, we also have to focus some attention 
on community cohesion (McKee, 2001).
Data was collected among the citizens of the 
municipality of Lendava and members of the Roma 
population living in the area of the municipality 
(in the Roma settlement in Dolga vas and in the 
Lendava area). The statistical analysis included 
212 citizens of the municipality of Lendava, of 
which 51 were members of the Roma population. 
The results (for more see Lobnikar, Hozjan, Šuklje 
and Banutai, 2013) show that there are hardly 
any considerable differences between the local 
Roma and non-Roma community regarding the 
perception of police work in the community. In 
the case of the Roma community, this is a good 
result — the gap between the Roma community 
and the majority is narrowing in all areas 
traditionally associated with community policing: 
attitudes toward police, fear of being victimised, 
and the perception of crime and disorder. The 
result is important for local police organisation 
in particular, but in it we can also find a more 
generalised lesson. With planning, effort, and 
time, and appropriate training, policing Roma 
communities gives the anticipated results. In 
Pomurje (the north-eastern part of Slovenia) at 
least, police training on the Roma issue coupled 
with empowering projects introduced by local 
governments bring the Roma community out 
of societal margins. This lesson could be used 
in other parts of Slovenia, especially in the 
Dolenjska region, where police are facing larger 
problems with policing Roma communities. The 
lesson is simple: the police cannot do the work 
by themselves; support by local authorities and 
especially by the Roma communities, is of utmost 
importance.
One of the finding of the survey in Lendava 
was also that the Roma community is not as 
integrated into the local community as non-
Roma residents are. Sure, this discrepancy 
virtually cannot be directly influenced by the 
police as an institution, but it has an influence on 
the quality of the police work. We should know 
that one of the basic premises of community 
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policing is that informal control mechanisms, 
and not the police, guarantee order in the 
community. If community cohesion is weak, the 
community as such cannot implement control 
mechanisms. Therefore, if we want to study the 
possibility of implementing community policing 
seriously, some attention must also be devoted 
to strengthening community cohesion. This is 
above all a task for local authorities.
Conditions for efficient policing in the Roma 
communities are multifaceted. First, the state 
is responsible for the legal protection of Roma 
communities. Under this protection, the basic 
conditions for the preservation of the particular 
ethnic and cultural characteristics of Europe’s 
largest minority on the one hand, and sufficient 
integration into society on the other, are created. 
Second, the local level involvement of Roma 
municipality councillors in decision-making 
processes provides a good connection between 
a relatively closed community and the larger 
community in which they live. If we include 
projects for the empowerment of the Roma 
community carried out by local authorities, 
we are getting closer to success. All this is a 
necessary precondition for the training of police 
officers to work in a multicultural environment 
to be effective. As we see in the case of Slovenia 
(Strobl et al. 2013) and the Municipality of 
Lendava (Lobnikar et al. 2013), such training 
gives results. This compels us to echo the opinion 
of Tanja Fajon (2011:114) that in all of this can 
be found an example for Europe — an example 
of good cooperation and co-habitation of Roma 
and non-Roma communities.
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UNDERSTANDING TRUST IN POLICE AND 
LEGITIMACY IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE 









Keywords: police, criminal justice, legitimacy, trust, Central and Eastern Europe
Abstract: Based on past studies and cognitions about legitimacy and with it related concepts the paper 
presents the law students’ perceptions of police authority and trust in policing in the eight countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, FYROM, Romania, Poland 
and Russia) analysing the data from a web-survey conducted in autumn 2012 and spring 2013. The findings 
imply that the law students in general question their willingness to comply with laws and cooperate with 
the police. Regression analysis shows that police authority and procedural justice are related to trust in the 
police in all countries and police effectiveness in Slovenia, Russia, Romania, Poland, Bosnia & Herzegovina 
and Croatia. Authors conclude that the police should primarily strive to improve their effectiveness, 
authority and procedural justice to improve trust and legitimacy of policing in the respected countries.
TRUST AND LEGITIMACY OF 
POLICE AND POLICING
We believe that legal and legitimate policing are 
the bases of democratic policing, and legality 
without legitimacy and legitimacy without legality 
can lead to a variety of problems. In this paper, 
we presented legitimacy and related concepts 
(i.e. trust in police, procedural justice, distributive 
justice, willingness to cooperate, police authority 
and police effectiveness). Inter alia, we conducted 
a survey of law students with the Faculty of 
Criminal Justice and Security research team and 
partners in autumn 2012, and spring 2013. Law 
students were selected due to the nature of their 
studies (legal orientation), and a statement that 
they would also like to work in law enforcement or 
a criminal justice agency after graduation.
EARLY STUDIES ON TRUST AND 
LEGITIMACY OF POLICE AND 
POLICING
Beetham (1993: 488) distinguished three 
criteria that contribute to the legitimacy (of 
the powerful): 1) power which is acquired and 
exercised according to established rules; 2) 
rules which are justifiable by reference to shared 
beliefs; and 3) existence of appropriate actions 
expressive of consent on the part of those 
qualified to give it (1).
(1) Beetham (1993: 488) made several analyses of the suggested components and ascertain that the third criteria may be 
dependent upon the second and explained this finding: ‘…that only makes the process of legitimation complex, rather than 
circular. And I was careful to distinguish very different ways in which the different criteria might fail to be met. Thus a 
legitimacy deficit (the second criterion) might occur because the rules no longer satisfied their justifying principles (institutional 
sclerosis), or because support for these principles had weakened (cultural change) or had never sufficiently existed (cultural 
insufficiency), or because different groups within a society disagreed fundamentally about them (societal division)’.
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Tyler (1997) attempts to answer the question 
‘‘Why people view group authorities as legitimate 
and voluntarily defer to them?’’ In doing so, 
he contrasted two theories about legitimacy: 
1) resource-based theories (instrumental 
models), and 2) identification based theories 
(relational model) (2). Tyler (1990) is convinced 
that legitimacy is very important in these relations 
because the feeling of perceived obligation as 
part of legitimacy leads to voluntary deference 
behaviour. If the authorities wish to be effective 
in maintaining order, they must be able to 
influence the behaviour of group members (Tyler 
and Lind, 1992), whereby people as members 
of groups often internalise their feelings of 
obligation to obey group rules and group leader’s 
decisions (Tyler, 1997: 323). If people within 
organised groups believe that authorities and 
rules are legitimate, they will voluntarily accept 
and obey them. Research confirms the existence 
of relational (Tyler, 1997: 323) and instrumental 
components to legitimacy (3).
Tyler and colleagues (Tyler, 1990; 2006; Lind and 
Tyler, 1988; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003) established 
that respectful treatment, neutral procedures 
and trustworthiness of the authorities in the 
criminal justice process are the most integral 
factors of procedural justice. Furthermore, trust 
in police positively relates with legitimacy and 
legal compliance (Goodman-Delahunty, 2010; 
Tyler, 2006; Reisig, Bratton, and Gertz, 2007).
RECENT STUDIES ON TRUST IN 
POLICE AND LEGITIMACY
Jackson and Bradford (2010: 1) argue that the 
legitimacy of the police is one of the crucial 
conditions for justifiable use of state power, 
whereby legitimacy represents the foundation of 
police authority (Tyler, 2006). As new approaches 
to policing focused on police legitimacy, public 
compliance with the law, acceptance of police 
authority, and cooperation with the police in 
responding to crime, began to develop, Tyler 
(2011) emphasised their value, especially the 
connection between trust and legitimacy. He 
acknowledges that professionalisation of police 
forces influenced the growth of the quality 
of policing, but public support for the police, 
known as ‘trust and confidence’ in the police, 
also must be taken into consideration, especially 
those factors that shape public views about 
police legitimacy:
‘If public trust and confidence in the police are 
not linked to objective performance, the nature 
of trust and confidence needs to be addressed as 
a distinct question in and of itself. The issue is: 
“What is the basis of perceived police legitimacy?” 
Understanding how public views about police 
legitimacy form and change can provide us with 
a new framework through which to evaluate 
policing policies and practices.’ (Tyler, 2011: 255)
Legitimacy can be described as a central concept 
in procedural justice theory (Hough, Jackson, 
Bradford, Myhill, and Quinton, 2010: 204), and 
is a composition of different elements (i.e. rules, 
appropriate beliefs, relevant actions, etc.). When 
discussing legitimacy and compliance with 
the law, procedural justice theories emphasise 
different, rather specific, relationships between 
the following subjects:
• ‘the treatment people receive at the hand of 
the police and justice officials;
• ‘the resultant trust that people have in 
institutions of justice;
• ‘the legitimacy people confer, as a 
consequence of this trust, on institutions of 
justice;
• ‘the authority that these institutions can 
then command when they are regarded as 
legitimate;
• ‘people’s consequent preparedness to 
obey the police, comply with the law, and 
cooperate with justice’ (Hough, Jackson, 
Bradford, Myhill, and Quinton, 2010: 204).
Police and criminal courts carry out different 
important functions in society. Jackson et al. (2011) 
emphasise that ‘citizens, ”outsource” deterrence 
and justice functions to these institutions, and in 
return expect them to be fair, impartial, efficient 
and effective’ (pp. 3-4). In addition, based 
on Beetham’s (1993) definition of legitimate 
(2) For more see Tyler (1997), Tyler and Fagan (2008). 
(3) Authorities draw an important part of their legitimacy from their social relationship with group members.
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authority, the authors divide it to three elements: 
1) legality, 2) shared values, and 3) consent and 
used this concept in their survey (Jackson et al., 
2011) in 20 countries to study contacts with 
the police, trust in police and legitimacy of 
justice institutions. In the case of contact with 
the police, results show that personal contacts 
with police officers is a key predictor of people’s 
trust judgements, where significant variation in 
the proportion experiencing a police-initiated 
contact was detected across the 20 countries. 
In Finland, for example, people reported the 
highest rates of police-initiated contact and, in 
Bulgaria the lowest. Respondents were asked 
to evaluate their contact(s) with the police, 
and the results show that Israelis, Russians and 
Hungarians were least satisfied, while people in 
Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Belgium 
were most satisfied. The authors conclude that 
there is no necessary connection between the 
number of the contacts people have with the 
police and levels of satisfaction with the police. 
For example, Sweden and Finland have high rates 
of contact and high levels of satisfaction; while 
in Switzerland a high level of contact but a lower 
level of satisfaction is observed (Jackson et al., 
2011: 4-5). In regards to trust in police, trust was 
studied from three perspectives: 1) trust in police 
compliance; 2) trust in police procedural fairness; 
and 3) trust in police distributive fairness. Results 
show that opinions of the procedural fairness 
of the police vary widely across Europe. Those 
in Israel, the Russian Federation and Bulgaria 
have the most negative opinions about the way 
that the police treat people, while people in 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Spain have the 
most positive opinions. Furthermore, people 
least trust the police in Russia, Israel, Bulgaria, 
Portugal and Poland (Jackson et al., 2011: 5). 
Perceived legitimacy of justice systems, was divided 
to three dimensions: 1) obligation to obey the 
police; 2) moral alignment with the police; and 
3) perceptions of the legality of the police. The 
findings suggest that ‘countries with a relatively 
strong sense that the police share a common 
moral framework with its people also tend to 
have a populace who feel a relatively strong duty 
to obey police directives’ (Jackson et al., 2011: 7). 
For example, in Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
people reported relatively low levels of moral 
alignment but higher levels of obligation. Views 
about the probity of the police and courts are 
similar within the countries. Comparison between 
the countries show that public perceptions of 
corruption in the criminal justice system is low in 
Scandinavian and Northern European countries, 
but much higher in ex-communist countries 
(Jackson et al., 2011: 7-8).
In the same study, Jackson et al. (2011: 8) 
concluded that people in the Nordic countries 
report the highest levels of trust in their police 
and courts and believe that their institutions are 
legitimate holders of power and authority. On 
the contrary, citizens in Eastern and sometimes in 
Southern European countries report lower level of 
trust of authorities.
Tyler (2011: 258) believes that the manner and 
quality of a police officer’s performance and 
attitude towards the people in legal procedures 
has an important impact on public opinion and 
feelings about the police. For this reason, the 
police have to implement policies that encourage 
an approach to communities in which public 
views are central, thus focussing on the way that 
people evaluate the police and police actions. 
Tyler (2011: 263) is certain that these public views 
shape how people behave in reaction to the 
police.
Police are powerfully linked to the law, therefore 
their unfairness ‘undermines people’s sense that 
the law defines appropriate behaviour’ (Jackson, 
Bradford, Hough, Myhill, Quinton, and Tyler, 
2012: 1062). Police abuse of power and wielding 
their authority in unfair ways can negatively 
affect a person’s sense of obligation to obey 
authority (i.e. police) directives, and as stressed 
by Hough, Jackson, Myhill, and Quinton (2010), 
to people’s perception of ‘moral authority and 
therefore the moral right of the law to dictate 
appropriate behaviour.’ Such behaviour on the 
part of the police or other authorities, breaking 
generally accepted social norms, can generate 
powerful cynicism, justified with the well-known 
saying: ‘if the police can behave however they 
please, and ignore the rules, so can I.’ On the 
other hand, if police perform their authority 
via fair procedures, they influence the sense 
of normative commitment to the police and 
enhance compliance with the law (Jackson et al., 
2012: 1063).
Legitimacy has, from the procedural justice 
aspect, been deined as ‘the belief that authorities 
do their job well and are entitled to be obeyed’; 
what means that ‘people feel that they ought to 
defer to legitimate decisions and rules, and follow 
them voluntarily out of obligation rather than out 
of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward’ 
(Murphy, Tyler and Curtis, 2009: 2).
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Tyler (2012: 356) defines justice as ‘a shared vision, 
socially created, which facilitates the ability of 
human beings to address the many complexities 
of coordinated social life’. In addition, justice is 
understood as the ability to develop and utilise 
justice-based rules and systems of authority. Tyler 
(2012: 356) emphasises that justice is nothing 
less than the ‘engine that enables cooperation’ 
that is often crucial when people need to resolve 
conflicts. Thereby, justice actually facilitates 
resolving conflicts with the provision of a set of 
rules that are interpreted and accepted by the 
immediate parties to a dispute because they 
perceive them to be fair.
In general, people fulfil the need to create shared 
principles of justice and then they use them as 
a tool for cooperation and to solve conflicts. 
Tyler (2012) is convinced that ‘these forms of 
justice encourage the resolution of interpersonal 
conflicts, support the legitimation of authorities, 
and facilitate the viability of institutions’ (p. 373).
YOUNG PEOPLE, TRUST AND 
LEGITIMACY OF POLICING
Young people’s attitudes towards legal 
institutions (e.g., police, courts) are similar to 
their attitudes towards other social institutions 
(e.g., schools, social centres) suggesting an 
‘anti-authority syndrome’ orientation during 
adolescence (Clark and Wenninger, 1964: 488). 
Easton and Dennis (1969) emphasised that 
behaviour, formed in adolescence, can have 
a lasting influence on adults’ judgements of 
police. In addition, young people usually form 
their beliefs according to direct experiences 
(Nelsen, Eisenberg, and Carroll, 1982). From the 
perspective of the relationship between youth 
and police, this means that ‘treatment received 
from police in direct contact or encounters with 
police officers, rather than more global attitudes 
formed about policing in abstract, or policing as 
an institution’ (Hinds, 2009: 12). Cunneen and 
White (1994), Loader (1996), and Hinds (2009) 
stress that contacts between young people and 
the police are anything but rare, because as noted 
by White (1994), police officers are often the 
only agents of the criminal justice system in daily 
contact with young people. Moreover, young 
people are extensive users of public spaces and 
thereby often the subjects of involuntary and 
generally negatively experienced contacts with 
police (Cunneen and White, 1995; Loader, 1996; 
White, 1994; Hinds, 2009).
Reisig, Tankebe, and Meško (2013) studied 
procedural justice, police legitimacy and public 
cooperation with the police among young 
adults in Ljubljana and Maribor in Slovenia. 
Tyler’s process-based model of policing was 
tested using regression analysis, and the results 
revealed a strong correlation between police 
legitimacy, especially police effectiveness, and 
public cooperation with the police. Furthermore, 
the authors found that trust in the police (i.e. 
fair and just interpersonal treatment by police) is 
also a significant factor influencing the process of 
the youth’s cooperation with the police. Finally, 
the study revealed that police legitimacy is not 
invariant across different forms of cooperation. 
The authors conclude that ‘in dealing with crime 
the police can rely more on area residents if they 
cultivate legitimacy by exercising their authority 
in a fair and just fashion’.
Chow (2012: 508-509) believes that police 
legitimacy represents a ‘vital component of the 
relationship between a police service and the 
community’ as he examined previous studies and 
literature on attitudes of young people towards 
the criminal justice institutions and found that:
•  younger people have more negative attitudes 
towards the police compared to older groups 
of people;
•  contextual factors and individual characteristics 
influence on perception of police by young 
people;
•  majority of past studies revealed that minorities 
(e.g., black youngsters) hold less favourable 
views of the police compared to other groups;
•  young females in general have positive 
attitudes toward the police;
• in past studies the significance of fear of 
crime and neighbourhood characteristics 
were ignored (results are indicating that 
more negative attitudes toward the police 
were held by individuals who had exhibited 
higher levels of fear of crime and who had 
experienced criminal victimisations); and
•  the quality of the contacts young people have 
had with the police is correlated with the 
attitudes towards the police.




For the purpose of this paper, we selected 
eight Central and Eastern European countries 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia, F.Y.R.O.M, Romania, Poland and Russia) 
and conducted a web-survey in the respondents’ 
native language. The administration of the 
survey was organised by criminal law lecturers 
at Faculties of Law in all eight countries, and 
explores several issues related to the legitimacy 
of policing in young democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe (post-communist countries). We 
used a survey previously used by Reisig, Tankebe, 
and Meško (2012), which was preliminarily 
tested and utilised on a sample of young adults in 
Slovenia in 2011. The survey was translated into 
the native languages of the studied countries, 
and the survey scales were preliminarily tested on 
samples of 50 students in each country. National 
research partners also presented the survey to 
students and discussed every item in the survey 
regarding their meaning and possible differences 
in the denotative and connotative meaning of 
the survey statements. After preliminary tests, 
the survey was published on the web and the 
students were given a certain period of time in 
which to complete the survey online. We also 
insured Internet access for all students in Faculties 
of Law in the respective countries. The survey 
was accessible only to law students who received 
a web address and a specific code provided by 
their criminal law lecturer.
Using a convenience sample of law students 
(n=1 848) from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, F.Y.R.O.M, Romania, Poland 
and Russia, a web survey was administered in the 
native languages of respondents in autumn 2012 
and spring 2013. Law students were selected due 
to the nature of their studies (legal orientation) 
and the assumption that they are planning 
to be future professionals in law enforcement 
or criminal justice agencies. For the purpose 
of this paper, we conducted analyses on a 
subsample of law students 18–25 years of age 
(n=1 689), consisting of male (n=514) and female 
respondents (n=1 175).
The collected data were analysed using factor 
analysis, one-way analysis of variance and 
regression analysis. We compared trust in police 
and perceived legitimacy on policing and police 
in the respective countries, and presented only 
significant variables in the regression analysis 
tables.
Factors N M SD
Legitimacy a (KMO = 0.718; α = 0.729) 1689 2.29 0.572
Trust in Police a (KMO = 0.904; α = 0.874) 1689 2.31 0.611
Cooperation b (KMO = 0.787; α = 0.752) 1689 3.19 0.635
Police Authority a (KMO = 0.738; α = 0.819) 1689 2.04 0.592
Procedural Justice a (KMO = 0.942; α = 0.906) 1689 2.24 0.546
Distributive Justice a (KMO = 0.734; α = 0.712) 1689 2.18 0.565
Police Effectiveness a (KMO = 0.847; α = 0.817) 1689 2.35 0.531
Table 1: Factor analysis
1 — Strongly disagree … 4 — Strongly agree, b. 1 — Never … 4 — Frequently;  
KMO = Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Test of sampling adequacy; α = Cronbach alpha (reliability)
Factor analysis shows that the selected factors 
meet a minimum criterion for further analysis. 
Mean values show that all results imply lower 
values in legitimacy, trust, police authority, 
procedural justice, distributive justice and police 
effectiveness. The only factor which has a higher 
mean value is willingness to cooperate with the 
police (3.19); all other means are lower that 
2.35 on a four point-scale. For the purpose of 
this paper, a comparison of trust in police and 
perceived legitimacy of police and policing are 
compared in the studied countries (Table 2).
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All mean values are below 2.62 which means that 
trust and perceived legitimacy of policing are 
quite low, and statistical differences are significant 
for both variables. Nevertheless, trust is highest 
in Slovenia despite the fact that the data were 
collected in times of socio-economic crisis, and 
public protests against the government and 
those politicians perceived as corrupt. The results 
for legitimacy also imply the highest perceived 
legitimacy in the region.
In the following section, results of regression 
analysis for a dependent variable trust in police 
are presented because we wanted to learn what 
(4) Multicollinearity is a statistical phenomenon in which two or more predictor variables in a multiple regression model are 
highly correlated. In this case levels of multicollinearity are low which means that we have ‘clear variables’.
Trust in police Legitimacy of policing
M SD M SD
Slovenia 2.62 (highest) 0.62 2.52 (highest) 0.54
Russia 2.04 (lowest) 0.51 2.18 0.47
Romania 2.24 0.52 2.20 0.48
Poland 2.51 0.60 2.38 0.56
F.Y.R.O.M 2.21 0.58 2.31 0.69
Serbia 2.12 0.59 2.17 (lowest) 0.53
B&H 2.14 0.58 2.17 (lowest) 0.54
Croatia 2.22 0.67 2.28 0.50
P 0.000 0.000
F 26.218 9.905
Table 2: Trust in police and perceived legitimacy — One-way analysis of variance
1 = Strongly disagree, 4 = Strongly agree
Betas
Slovenia Russia Romania Poland F.Y.R.O.M Serbia B&H Croatia
Cooperation 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.10* -0.03 0.03
Police 
Authority
0.32** 0.26** 0.28** 0.26** 0.24** 0.24** 0.30** 0.25**
Procedural 
Justice 
0.27** 0.32** 0.33** 0.42** 0.38** 0.62** 0.39** 0.58**
Distributive 
Justice
0.17* 0.05 0.02 0.08* 0.1** 0.01 0.01 0.02
Police 
Effectiveness
0.22** 0.27** 0.29** 0.20** 0.03 0.06 0.23** 0.17*
R2 adj. 0.72 0.66 0.64  0.70  0.53  0.81 0.63 0.83
Table 3: Trust in police — regression analysis
Non-signi ficant factors are not presented in the table. VIF multicollinearity coefficients (4) are lower 
than 2.5 for all independent variables. Levels of significance: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
79
independent variables correlate with the dependent 
variable in a sense of prediction. We included only 
significant variables (factors) (see Table 3).
Regression analysis shows that police authority and 
procedural justice are related to trust in police in 
all countries, and police effectiveness in Slovenia, 
Russia, Romania, Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Croatia. Willingness to cooperate with 
the police was found significant only in Serbia. 
Distributive justice is significantly related to trust 
in police in Slovenia, Poland and F.Y.R.O.M. 
In addition to regression analysis of trust in 
police variable we wanted to learn which other 
variables are associated with perception on police 
legitimacy (see Table 4).
Regression analysis shows that in regards to 
police legitimacy, police authority is a significant 
predictor of police legitimacy in Russia, Romania, 
Poland, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Croatia. Procedural justice is a significant 
predictor in Romania, Poland, F.Y.R.O.M, Serbia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. The 
strongest predictor of police legitimacy in Serbia 
is procedural justice (0.57). Police effectiveness 
is a significant predictor in Slovenia, Russia, 
Romania and Poland, while distributive justice 
is significant in F.Y.R.O.M only. The strongest 
predictor of police legitimacy in Russia is police 
effectiveness (0.36).
DISCUSSION
It is necessary to point out that the results are 
generalisable for the law student population 
in the studied countries but not to a general 
population. The results do give an insight about 
perceptions of policing and trust in policing in 
the present time by potential future professionals 
in the justice system in the studied countries, 
be it police officers, prosecutors, judges, prison 
officers or advocates of crime suspects.
The seven factors which were included in further 
analyses (one-way anova and regression analysis) 
are legitimacy, trust in police, willingness to 
cooperate with the police, police authority, 
procedural justice, distributive justice, and police 
effectiveness. Mean values show that all results 
imply lower values in legitimacy, trust, police 
authority, procedural justice, distributive justice, 
and police effectiveness. The only factor that 
has a higher mean value (3.19 on a four-point 
scale) is willingness to cooperate with the police, 
which is a promising one and the police should 
reconsider their communication strategies with 
young people.
One-way anova results show that trust and 
perceived legitimacy of policing are not high 
in all the studied countries and that the police 
still have many challenges as statistically 
significant differences in the comparison of all 
countries were found out. Nevertheless, the 
results imply a significance of the development 
towards democratic policing and the impact 
Betas
Slovenia Russia Romania Poland F.Y.R.O.M Serbia B&H Croatia
Police 
Authority
0.03 0.39** 0.24** 0.26** 0.12 0.19* 0.38** 0.31*
Procedural 
Justice 
0.20 -0.05 0.30** 0.26** 0.17* 0.57** 0.32** 0.36*
Distributive 
Justice
0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.22** -0.12 -0.10 0.06
Police 
Effectiveness
0.31** 0.36** 0.25** 0.21** -0.03 0.07 0.18 0.04
R2 adj. 0.32 0.35 0.43 0.49 0.25 0.54 0.44 0.46
Table 4: Perception of police legitimacy — regression analysis
Non-significant factors are not presented in the table. VIF multicollinearity coefficients are lower than 
2.5 for all independent variables.
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of a membership in the European Union 
(e.g. unification and harmonisation of police 
legislation and practices), especially in Slovenia 
and Poland with the highest means regarding 
trust in police and legitimacy.
In addition, trust is highest in Slovenia despite 
the fact that the data were collected in times of 
socioeconomic crisis and public protests against 
the government and corrupt politicians, and 
the lowest in Russia. The results for legitimacy 
also imply the highest perceived legitimacy in 
Slovenian and the lowest in Serbia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.
Regression analysis shows that police authority 
and procedural justice are related to trust in the 
police in all countries and police effectiveness in 
Slovenia, Russia, Romania, Poland, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Croatia. To draw a tentative 
conclusion, the police should strive to improve 
their authority and increase procedural justice, 
especially their interactions with the public 
generally and with vulnerable social groups. 
In addition, police authority should also be 
improved, but not only by presentation of police 
statistical data but with successful convictions 
of criminals on the one hand and prevention of 
illegal acts on the other. Community policing, 
especially policing by consent, could improve 
legitimacy, as shared values are a prerequisite for 
successful work with communities which do not 
share (or share a small amount of) values with the 
majority of population. We know that all these 
factors have also some political connotation 
because the police are an extended arm of the 
state.
Unlike in the other studied countries, due to the 
economic crisis, the end of 2012 was characterised 
by the public protests against corrupt politics and 
politicians in the capital city Ljubljana and several 
other larger towns across Slovenia. This fact has 
to be taken into consideration in understanding 
the results of our survey, especially in regard to 
Slovenia. Another survey on trust in the police 
before and after the demonstrations shows that 
people who participated in the protests believed 
that the police exceeded their powers and 
report the decrease in trust in the police while 
others trusted the police even more than before 
(Simončič, 2013). Nevertheless, the results of our 
survey show that trust and legitimacy are the 
highest in Slovenia in all of the studied countries 
(see Table 2) presumably due to the fact that 
community policing has been quite developed 
over the years (Meško, Fields, Lobnikar, and 
Sotlar, 2013) and the police were also affected 
by the austerity measures (a significant reduction 
of a public budget for the police, reduction in 
staffing, early retirements due to the austerity 
legislation) and increased activities of the 
police union in fighting for the labour rights of 
the police. The Slovenian public opinion poll 
conducted in 2010 reveals citizen satisfaction 
with police work and attitudes in general. Two-
thirds of respondents expressed their satisfaction 
with police attitudes towards residents and 
reported respectful behaviour of police officers 
in police procedures. Moreover, two-thirds of 
respondents believe that police officers are 
honest and unbiased (Kurdija, Malnar, Uhan, 
Hafner Fink, and Štebe, 2012).
Tyler and Fagan (2008) proved that legitimacy 
influences citizens’ cooperation with the police. 
Results showed that legitimacy is linked to 
police authority and procedural justice; whereby 
positive personal experience in police procedure 
increases the legitimacy. Bearing this in mind, 
the police can influence their legitimacy by 
paying attention to their behaviour towards the 
people. Bradford, Jackson and Hough (2013: 
563) found out about the same with placing 
measures of trust and legitimacy at the centre 
of policy assessments of police actions and 
behaviours. In Slovenia, Jere (2013: 159) studied 
citizens’ attitudes toward the police provision 
of safety/security and found that citizens will 
only cooperate with the police when they are 
able to justify and legitimise the common goal 
in the context of their own values, norms and 
goals. To conclude, to increase trust in the police, 
perception of police legitimacy, politicians should 
also take a moment to reconsider their role in a 
democratic society. We believe that there can 
never be too much integrity, honesty, fairness in 
dealing with clientele of criminal justice system, 
be it in police proceedings or in any other formal 
social control activity.
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Abstract: The relative levels of trust in the police are explored, using data from the fifth round of the 
European Social Survey (ESS) which covered mainly 28 European countries. In this article, the position 
of Germany is examined within the international context. German trust in the police, for both German 
natives and ethnic minorities, for those 15 and over is high in comparison to other European countries. 
The article also tests if it is the fair treatment of citizens by the police, or the high value placed on rule 
adherence and conformity, that is driving the German citizen’s trust. It shows that the German police 
is trusted due to their perceived fairness, effectiveness and shared moral values, rather than on value 
placed on conformity to authority.
INTRODUCTION
The 1960s through to the 1980s was a 
challenging period for the German police, as 
they were faced with the tasks of managing 
public disorders, riots, left-wing extremist 
terrorism, and environmental demonstrations, 
their handling of which tainted their positive 
image (Cao 2001: 170). In 1995, Amnesty 
International published a report damaging 
for the German police concerning their use 
of excessive force in restraining or arresting 
citizens, and the ill treatment of detainees in 
police custody (Amnesty International 1995). 
The report also argued that the ill treatment 
appeared to be racially motivated, many of 
those targeted being foreign nationals including 
refugees, asylum seekers and people from ethnic 
minority backgrounds (Ibid.).
More recent studies of the German police, 
mainly focusing on adolescents, however, depict 
a ‘bürgernahe (citizen friendly)’ security force. 
In a comparative study between German and 
French adolescents, the preliminary analysis 
showed that the degree of positive experience 
with, and perception of, the police was much 
higher in Germany than in France (Oberwittler 
& Roché 2013). Whilst in France African and 
Turkish migrants have particularly low opinions 
of the police in comparison to native French 
adolescents, the German data show very little or 
no difference between the amount of contact, 
the quality of contact, and general perceptions 
of the police between Turkish migrants and 
native Germans adolescents (Ibid.) Other studies 
of German adolescents also paint a similar 
picture with small or no ethnic difference in the 
levels of trust in the police (e.g. Heitmeyer et al., 
2010; Baier et al., 2010). Studies exploring the 
everyday relationship between migrants and the 
police such as Hüttermann’s qualitative analysis 
(2000) and Gesemann‘s (2003) survey showed 
that while migrants tend to be less accepting of 
the police in comparison to native Germans, the 
police also manage to establish informal styles of 
interaction with migrants, thus being accepted 
‘on the street’ within the community. 
In a project titled ‘Police in conflict with ethnic 
minorities and social marginalised groups’, 
(1) Corresponding author
(2) Corresponding author
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it showed that Russian Germans who are 
segregated in Germany have low trust in the 
police because they import their mistrust 
from their country of origin (Strasser & Zdun, 
2006). In the same project, many young Turkish 
men living in three problematic city quarters 
expressed mistrust in the police because of the 
random stop-and-search, and other negative 
encounters with the German police (Celikbas & 
Zdun, 2008). Nevertheless the authors of these 
studies conclude that overall, the majority of the 
foreign population trusts the police (Schweer 
& Strasser, 2008). In a recent study of western 
German juveniles and adults, trust in the police 
was analysed from 1984 to 2011 by using 
nationwide surveys to enable a longitudinal 
analysis (Reuband, 2012).The study showed 
that the police enjoyed an extraordinary high 
reputation among the population that was 
quite stable over time with a modest rise (Ibid.). 
The most remarkable finding was the change 
of the socio-structural determinants of trust in 
the police in the course of time: in the past, 
younger and better educated people tended to 
have reservations against the police; however, 
the recent data shows the level of trust is 
overall higher and shared across various socio-
structures (Ibid.).
The aforementioned change in attitudes towards 
the police in Germany is partly explained by 
changes in values and life conditions (Reuband, 
2012). The development to post-materialism 
which characterises younger people fell over and 
has proceeded at the expense of autonomous 
values and in favour of conformist values 
(Ibid.). Under the conditions of this change 
Reuband presumes that state institutions gained 
more trust of sub-groups that are particularly 
affected by this change. Additionally, the 
connection between post-materialistic values 
and the evaluation of the police and other state 
institutions seems to dissolve. This suggests 
that the evaluation of the police is becoming 
less dependent on people’s value orientation, 
but more and more on direct experience with 
the police or perceived performance of the 
institutions (Ibid.).
Perhaps the efforts made during the 1980s and 
1990s to modernise the German police, such as 
the integration of women and ethnic minorities 
into the police force, may also have contributed 
to the more recent high levels of trust reported 
in the above studies. For example, the 
proportion of female police officers has risen 
from approximately 3 % in 1986 to 43 % in 2009 
in the North Rhine-Westphalia police (Frevel & 
Kuschewski, 2009: 66). As for immigrants in the 
police force, the German Ministry of Interior 
took the official position that ‘employment in 
the police service of candidates from immigrant 
families is the right path to controlling specific 
forms of crime particularly by young non-
integrated members of the foreign population 
and to reach more normality in this population 
group’ (German Ministry of Interior 1993 cited 
in Frevel & Kuschewski, 2009: 66). While the 
aim was to incorporate those with Turkish 
or ex-Yugoslavian migration backgrounds, in 
reality, it was difficult to recruit a substantial 
number of such officers that satisfied the entry-
level conditions, such as minimum levels of 
education, to enter the police force (Ibid.)
Procedural Justice theory, tested and confirmed 
in the UK and the US, argues that public 
perceptions of the fairness of the police is a 
critically important factor in shaping public 
cooperation with the police and compliance 
with the law. Indeed perceptions of police 
fairness turn out to be better predictors of 
cooperation and compliance, as opposed to 
public perceptions of their effectiveness (eg 
Hough et al., 2013a, 2013b; Jackson et al., 2012; 
Tyler et al., 2007; Tyler, 2011). In this sense, 
for the police to be seen as fair and respectful 
by the ethnic minorities may be particularly 
important. A sense of isolation or exclusion that 
they may already be facing due to their minority 
status may significantly increase if the police 
treats them unfairly or make them feel that they 
have been approached due to their negative 
group stereotype. The negative experience, 
either direct or vicarious, may decrease their 
willingness to turn to the police when they 
become a victim of crime and make them much 
less likely to cooperate with the police (e.g. 
Tyler, 2005; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003).
While fair and respectful treatment may also 
be the reason for the high levels of trust in the 
German police reported above, Cao (2001) 
offers an alternative theory in explaining the 
nature of public trust in the German police. 
Using data from the 1990 World Values Survey, 
he confirmed that confidence in the German 
police was overall positive (though lower than 
the US), but proposed that levels of trust may 
simply be an expression of the German value 
of Rechtsstaat (the law-centred state) — ‘the 
culture that emphasises legalism, or close 
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adherence to rules’ rather than actually ‘liking 
the police’ (Cao, 2001: 170). He argued that:
‘Germans are basically Hobbesian in their 
approach to government. Their fear is that 
questioning the legitimacy of a particular 
government action questions the legitimacy 
of the entire governmental structure and can 
lead back to the “state of nature”’, described 
by Hobbes, ‘in which no government exists. In 
other words, any order is better than disorder. 
That is why Germans respect the police.’ (Cao, 
2001: 179)
In this article we first explore relative levels of 
trust in the police, and examine the position 
of Germany within the international, mainly 
European, context. Secondly, we focus on 
the German data, which includes not only 
adolescents but also adults, and compare the 
level of contact with, and trust in, the police 
for ethnic minorities and German natives. We 
will also test if it is the fair treatment of citizens 
by the police, or the high value placed on rule 
adherence and conformity, that is driving the 
German citizen’s trust.
DATA
This article uses data from the fifth round of the 
European Social Survey (ESS). In this round, the 
ESS covered 28 countries with a rotating module 
on trust in the police and the courts. The sample 
used in the ESS is a random probability sample, 
with a minimum target response rate of 70 %. 
Germany was one of the participating countries 
of the fifth round of the ESS, funded by Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft. The German sample 
covered those aged 15 and over, and used 
stratified two-stage probability design separately 
for East and West Germany (3).
TRUST IN THE POLICE: 
GERMANY’S POSITION WITHIN 
EUROPE
The ESS data paints a positive rating of the 
German police relative to other European 
countries (Figure 1). Germany ranked sixth out of 
28 countries on a scale of zero to ten. Ten being 
(3) For more information concerning the methodology of the German data, go to the European Social Survey Website: http://
www.europeansocialsurvey.org/essdoc/doc.html?ddi=2.3.1.4&year=2010&land=276.
(4) While the native German group were slightly more positive about the police, the difference was not statistically significant.
Figure 1: The level of trust in the police (0-10; 0: ‘no trust at all’ — 10: ‘complete trust’)
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the highest level of trust, Germany scored 6.9. It 
was preceded mostly by Scandinavian countries, 
Finland (8.0), Denmark (7.7), and Norway (7.2), 
and scored very close to Sweden (7.0) and 
Switzerland (7.0). The gap between the most 
trusting country and the least trusting country 
was quite large, with Finland scoring 8.0 and 
Ukraine scoring 2.5. Countries that scored below 
the overall average (5.6), shown in a white bar in 
Figure 1, tended to be Eastern European.
COMPARISON: ETHNIC 
MINORITY VS NATIVE GERMANS
The ESS asked several questions on ethnicity and 
citizenship, including the interviewees’ parent’s 
native country of origin. One of which contained 
a self-reported assessment of whether the 
respondents ‘belong to a minority ethnic group 
in Germany’. We used this variable to compare 
those who considered themselves as an ‘ethnic 
minority’ and those who did not, referred to as 
‘German natives’ in this article.
First, we looked at the trust in the police question 
used in Figure 1 which ranged from ‘no trust at 
all (zero)’ to ‘complete trust (ten)’, and compared 
the overall level of trust between the two groups. 
This comparison showed that there was almost 
no difference between both groups: ethnic 
minority group scored 6.8 and the German 
natives scored 6.9. The lack of difference between 
the two groups was further confirmed when we 
examined particular aspects of public perception 
of the police. We compared the questions about 
public perception of fair treatment by the police 
(‘How often do police treat people in [Germany] 
with respect?) and public perception of ‘moral 
alignment’ (Jackson et al. 2013) with the police 
(‘Police stand up for values that are important to 
people like me’). Figure 2 shows the distribution 
of these questions by ethnic group. Again, we see 
very similar distributions of opinions (4). Both the 
ethnic minority group and the native German 
group considered the German police ‘often’ treat 
people with respect, and that they also largely 
‘agree’ that the police share the important values 
with them (Figure 2).
The similar positive evaluation of the police 
continues when we turn to police contact, rather 
than perception, and the level of satisfaction 
concerning that contact. In the ethnic minority 
group, 38 % had been ‘approached, stopped or 
contacted by police in the last two years’ while 
native Germans also reported the same frequency 
of police-initiated contact (37 %). It is only when 
we start looking into the level of satisfaction 
concerning the police-initiated contact that 
we see a difference in experience (Figure 3). Of 
those who were contacted by the police, 40 % 
of the ethnic minority group was dissatisfied in 
comparison to 22 % native Germans. That said 
in both groups the majority of those contacted 
were satisfied though native Germans reported a 
higher satisfaction rate.
In sum, the analyses conducted on the ESS echo 
earlier findings on German adolescents such 
as Oberwittler & Roché, 2013; Heitmeyer et al., 
2010, and Baier et al., 2010, showing similar levels 
of contact, trust and satisfaction between ethnic 
minority and native Germans. However, it should 
be noted that while overall findings show that a 
high share of German and non-German young 
people trust the police (Weidacher, 2000), there 
are differences between and within migrant 
Figure 2: Fairness and moral alignment: 
comparison
‘How often do police treat people in Germany with 
respect?’
‘Police stand up for values that are important to 
people like me.’
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groups. For example, eastern German and Turkish 
migrants have less trust in the police than Greek 
and Italian migrants as well as western German 
youths (Gesemann, 2003). Low levels of trust were 
also expressed by segregated Russian Germans 
(Zdun, 2008). The German Centre for Studies on 
Turkey states that Turkish migrants aged 30 and 
below have the least trust in the police whereas 
senior citisens emanating from the first generation 
of Turkish immigrants are more sympathetic to 
the police (Der Spiegel 30/2006). Research on 
perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the police of 
socially disadvantaged population groups illustrate 
that low levels of trust in the police corresponds 
with direct negative experiences rather than with 
the general image of the police held within that 
ethnic community (Oberwittler& Lukas, 2010).
WHAT DETERMINES TRUST?
In this section, we examine what explains trust in 
the German police. The analysis focuses on the 
predictive power of ethnic status, evaluations of 
the police, including their fairness, and the level 
of importance placed on rule adherence. For this, 
multiple linear regression was used to predict 
trust. The dependent variable is trust in the police 
measured from zero to ten (ten being high trust) 
as used above. The independent variables were 
divided into three blocks: conformity, evaluations 
of the police, and demographics. All variables used 
in the analysis were tested for multicollinearity. 
‘
CONFORMITY’ BLOCK
• Schwartz human value scales (5) — ‘important 
to do what is told and follow rules’ 1-6 (1:’not 
like me’)
• Schwartz human value scales — ‘important to 
behave properly’
• Duty to obey the police scale, 0-30 (0: ‘no 
duty’) created from three variables: ‘duty 
to back decisions made by police, even if 
disagree’, ‘duty to do what the police say, even 
when you don’t understand’, and ‘duty to do 
what the police say, even if treated badly’ (6).
‘EVALUATION OF THE POLICE’ BLOCK
• Perceived fairness of the police scale, 0-10 
(0: ‘low fairness) created from three variables 
‘how often do the police treat people in 
German with respect’, ‘how often do police 
make fair, impartial decisions’, and ‘how often 
do the police explain their decisions and 
actions when asked’ (7).
• Perceived effectiveness of the police scale, 
0-20 (0: ‘low effectiveness’) created from 
two variables ‘how successful the police are 
at preventing crimes in Germany’, and ‘how 
successful the police are at catching house 
burglars in Germany’ (8) (9).
Figure 3: Police contact and satisfaction with police among ethnic Germans and ethnic minorities in 
Germany
(5) Schwartz human value scale consists of ten human values (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, 
universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security) which are included in the core questions of the ESS. For more 
detail, see: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/core_ess_questionnaire/ESS_core_questionnaire_
human_values.pdf .
(6) Cronbach’s Alpha for the three variables was.86.
(7) Cronbach’s Alpha for the three variables was.62.
Ethnic Minority    Native Germans
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• Perceived moral alignment with the police 
scale, 1-9 (1: ‘low moral alignment’) created 
from two variables ‘police have the same 
sense of right and wrong as me’ and ‘police 
stand up for values that are important to 





• Being an ethnic minority (‘belonging to an 
ethnic minority group’).
The result of this analysis is displayed in Table 1. 
Firstly, all three blocks contributed in explaining 
trust in the police; however, by far, the ‘evaluation 
of the police’ block was the most powerful in 
explaining trust in the police, as can be seen when 
comparing the R2 change. This means that the 
ESS does not provide support for Cao’s (2001) 
hypothesis that the importance placed on rule 
adherence is the main driving factor for the high 
levels of trust in the German police. In other words, 
support for the police flows from evaluations of 
the police, rather than from a generalised sense 
that state institutions ought to be obeyed.
Secondly, we look at individual variables and 
scales used within blocks. In the ‘conformity’ 
block, the two personality variables measuring 
conformity were not statistically significant, while 
the felt duty to obey the police was a statistically 
significant predictor. In the ‘evaluation of 
the police’ block, all scales were statistically 
significant. From the procedural justice literature 
examined above, we expected perceived fairness 
and moral alignment to be significant. What 
makes the German data distinctive, however, is 
that perceived effectiveness of the police is an 
equally strong predictor.
Lastly, as already illustrated in the previous 
section, being from an ethnic minority group 
was not a statistically significant predictor in 
explaining trust in the police. Similarly, gender 
and education were also not significant. The only 
significant predictor within the demographics 
block was age, with younger people having 
higher trust in the police.
Table 1: Predicting German citizens’ trust in the police
(8) Cronbach’s Alpha for the three variables was.69.
(9) These three variables originally intended to measure ‘police legitimacy’ have been used as a proxy to measure German 
respondents’ importance placed to rule adherence as these variables all provide scenarios’ where the respondent is in 
disagreement with the police but feel the duty to obey and cooperate with the police.
(10) Cronbach’s Alpha for the three variables was.76.
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Abstract: Trust in the police varies a lot across European countries. In this paper it is asked, why is that, 
what are the reasons for those big differences between European countries.
Research literature approaches people’s trust 
in the police mainly from the perspectives of 
efficiency and fairness of police activities. In 
other words, variation in trust is analysed in 
terms of the function of efficiency, justness 
or fairness in policing. However, the country-
level differences cannot be deduced from the 
individual level findings: societies are different 
as societies, not just as a composition of 
different individuals and their experiences. 
In this presentation, which is based on the 
data of the European Social Survey and some 
other sources in 16 European countries, three 
potential country-level explanations for the 
country-level variation of the trust in the police 
are given. Multilevel models are not included. It 
seems that the high level of trust in the police is 
in connection with 1) high welfare spending, 2) 
high quality of governance and 3) high level of 
social capital.
1. INTRODUCTION
In democratic societies, the citizens must be 
able to trust the police, because the police have 
been granted extensive authority to control, 
monitor or even directly punish citizens for 
undesirable behaviour. Citizens must be able 
to trust that the police use this authority in 
accordance with the democratically enacted 
laws and decrees. On the other hand, citizens 
simply expect police to provide results: the 
police must ensure the safety of the citizens by 
preventing crime, solving suspected crimes, 
and promoting general safety and order in 
other ways. In fact, these are the two points 
of view used in studying the trust of citizens in 
the police: instrumental and procedural. The 
instrumental approach studies trust from the 
point of view of the effectiveness and impact of 
the activities of the police, and the procedural 
approach uses the point of view of the methods 
used by the police. Citizens expect the police 
to act efficiently, but also equitably and in an 
ethically acceptable manner (see e.g. Tyler & 
Huo, 2002).
The trust of the citizens in the police can 
therefore be considered important for 
democracy and civil rights. In addition, the trust 
is thought to improve the cooperation between 
the citizens and the authorities. Police activity 
cannot be efficient without the support of the 
citizens. Trust increases law-abiding behaviour 
and promotes the exposure of crimes and their 
resolution (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Jackson & 
Bradford, 2009).
How much do the citizens trust the police, 
then? We have data from several international 
surveys, which we can use to make fairly reliable 
observations. One of the best European projects 
is the European Social Survey, which has been 
conducted since 2002 and is repeated regularly 
every other year. Almost all countries currently 
in the EU have participated in the survey, as well 
as several other European countries. The survey 
material is mainly collected via interviews 
during personal visits. From its inception, the 
survey has also included a question on the trust 
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placed by the respondents on certain institutions, 
such as the police. Figure 1 shows the results of 
the year 2010 for 16 countries.
As we can see, trust in the police varies significantly 
between the different European countries. The 
police are clearly trusted the most in the Nordic 
countries and Germany, and the least in certain 
Eastern European countries. The indicator used 
has an integer scale with a range of 1–10. Since 
the country-specific averages of this kind of an 
indicator vary from less than four to eight, the 
differences can truly be considered great. In 
addition, it seems that these country-specific 
differences are fairly stable, if we observe the 
results of previous ESS-studies, for example.
Naturally this presents the question of what 
really causes these significant country-specific 
differences in trust. Is the police in Northern 
Europe both more efficient and treating the 
citizens better than their colleagues in the Eastern 
Europe or certain countries in Southern or Central 
Europe? It is not possible to draw such a simplistic 
conclusion, for several reasons.
Firstly, the empirical studies that have been 
conducted so far to bolster instrumental and 
procedural explanations have been mainly 
conducted in the United States and the United 
Kingdom (e.g. Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Jackson 
& Bradford, 2009). However, there are already 
some published studies from Continental Europe, 
and the study activities in this field seem to be 
increasing (see e.g. Hough, Jackson & Bradford, 
2013; Van Damme, Pauwels & Svensson, 2013; 
Kääriäinen, 2008).
Secondly, most of the surveys referred to above 
measure more the images and expectations of the 
respondents rather than their real and personal 
experiences with the activities of the police. Most 
of those who responded to the questionnaire 
surveys have no personal experiences with the 
Figure 1. Trust in the police in 16 European countries. Mean scores of the question: ‘Using this card, 
please tell me on a score of 0 b- 10 how much you personally trust each of institutions I read out. 0 
means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust’. Source: European 
Social Survey. 
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activities of the police, or their experiences are 
only superficial.
Thirdly, we must remember that if we want to 
explain the differences in trust on a country level, 
we must include both individual- and country-
level explanatory variables in our explanatory 
model. In other words, if we had European data 
consisting of individuals with experience with 
the activities of the police, we could observe on 
the level of an individual whether the quality of 
the experiences would explain the differences in 
trust. If we also wanted to look for reasons for the 
differences in trust between the countries, we 
would have to add independent country-specific 
explanatory variables into our explanatory model. 
If no such variables could be found, we could 
conclude that the differences in the country-level 
trust would be due to individual experiences with 
the activities of the police or other individual-level 
courses.
In this paper I bring forward some potential 
independent country-level explanatory variables 
for the differences in trust in the police. Multilevel 
models are not included; instead, there is only 
a reference to a previously published study by 
the author, where some of the same factors that 
are studied now were included in the model 
(Kääriäinen, 2007). This study is limited to 16 
European countries on the basis of data availability.
2. INVESTMENTS IN POLICE OR 
IN WELFARE?
We should start by examining how much 
European societies invest in police services on one 
hand and in welfare services on the other hand, 
and the relationship between these factors. The 
attached figures are based on the information 
published by Eurostat on public expenditures in 
relation to the gross domestic product (GDP). The 
statistics use the so-called COFOG classification, 
where police services and social protection are 
separate classes (see Eurostat 2013).
Figure 2 shows investments in police services and 
social protection for certain European countries. 
When examining the figure, we see a fairly strong 
negative correlation between these variables: 
it seems like a strong social policy and a strong 
policy of control do not usually appear in the 
same societies. Or from the reverse point of view: 
police resources are the strongest in societies 
where the investment in social protection is 
lower than average. However, it should be noted 
that the connection is not completely linear. For 
example, a lot of resources are invested in police 
services in the UK, Spain and Portugal, while the 
level of social protection is at a good European 
average. On the other hand, in countries such 
as Latvia and Lithuania, both police services and 
Figure 2. Public expenditures on police services and social protection in 16 European countries 2010. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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social protection are clearly under the average 
level.
In European societies, the role of the state in 
levelling the differences in the population’s 
welfare has been constructed in different ways 
throughout history. The most common division 
between welfare states is the Esping-Andersen 
(1990) division, where welfare states are divided 
into three types based on how much they 
decrease the dependence of welfare from the 
market (decommodification) and how much 
they affect the level of stratification.
In liberal welfare states, the greatest trust is 
placed in the ability of the market, individuals, 
and families to produce and share welfare, and 
the state’s duties are as minimal as possible: 
social policy consists mainly of test based poverty 
policy. The model includes heavy emphasis on 
work and individual survival and the meaning 
of family. Typical countries featuring the liberal 
model are USA and the United Kingdom. As 
the second type, Esping-Andersen mentions 
corporatist welfare states, where the role of the 
state is more extensive than in countries with 
a liberal regime, but which try to maintain 
the existing professional and class status, 
and which are based strongly on a traditional 
gender system where the man is the provider 
for the family. A typical country in this group is 
Germany, as are many other countries in Central 
Europe. The third type of welfare state in the 
Esping-Andersen classification is the social 
democratic regime. In countries of this type, 
which includes all of the Nordic countries, the 
effort to decrease the dependence of welfare 
from the market is the most active. At the same 
time, there is an attempt to decrease social 
stratification by promoting the ‘equality of 
opportunity.’ The universal social rights of the 
citizens are a central tool, and their realisation 
is supported by social transfers for everyone, as 
well as public services.
The Esping-Andersen model has been developed 
further later and it has been expanded to 
also include the Mediterranean countries, for 
example (e.g. Ferrera, 1996), and post-socialist 
countries (Manning, 2004; Fenger, 2007). 
Studies in the effects of regimes on the division 
of welfare also continue to be active (see e.g. 
Kammer, Niehues & Peichl, 2012).
It seems that there is an interesting link with 
the penal policy practised and what has been 
described above: the most punitive penal 
policies have been practised in the post-socialist 
countries, the Mediterranean countries, and 
the countries with a liberal regime, and the 
least punitive in the social democratic Nordic 
countries and Japan (Sato & Hough, 2013; Lappi-
Seppälä, 2011; Cavadino & Dignan, 2006). This 
is likely due to the fact that the methods used 
to solve social issues or problems depend on 
the welfare policy practised. If social problems 
are considered to be linked primarily with crime 
and disturbances, the police and other security 
authorities have plenty of resources. On the 
other hand, if the goal is to actively prevent 
social problems with an active welfare policy, 
fewer resources are needed by the police, the 
judicial system, and prisons, and there are fewer 
expectations placed on these institutions by the 
people. This is also indicated by the attitudes 
of the people in countries with strong welfare 
being generally less punitive than elsewhere 
(see e.g. Van Kesteren, 2009)
The global economy and neoliberal economic 
policy have severely questioned the principles of 
the welfare state in the last few years in Europe, 
as well as the whole world. On the other hand, 
studies still show that a welfare state continues 
to be able to even out the differences in the 
welfare of people effectively (see e.g. Kammer, 
Niehues & Peichl, 2013).
3. THE POLICE’S RESOURCES 
AND TRUST
How do the public investments in the welfare 
of the people then affect the citizens’ trust in 
the police?
Based on Figure 3, we can observe that the 
connection between investments in welfare 
and trust seems fairly strong: the more 
public expenses the societies invest in social 
protection, the more the citizens trust the 
police. The country-level correlation between 
these factors is .66. On the other hand, from 
Figure 4 we see that the more of their GDP 
the societies invest in police resources, the less 
the citizens trust the police! The country-level 
correlation with the data for 2010 is -.59. An 
even stronger negative correlation can be found, 
if we measure the police resources simply based 
on the number of police officers per citizen; in 
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Figure 3. Public expenditures on social protection and trust in the police in 16 European countries 2010. 
Sources: Eurostat and European Social Survey. 
Figure 4. Public expenditures on police services and trust in the police in 16 European countries 2010. 
Sources: Eurostat and European Social Survey.
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that case, the country-level correlation is -.66 
(Figure 5). Therefore, the more police officers 
per inhabitant, the less the citizens trust them.
4. QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE
A central factor generating trust in public 
administration is its ability to treat citizens 
fairly and justly. This means equal treatment 
of citizens regardless of their social status, 
ethnic background, age, gender or any other 
background factor (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008).
Corruption can be considered a sign of the 
administration’s inability to treat citizens 
equally and impartially, and it can be seen as 
an important indicator of the general quality 
of administration (Holmberg et al., 2009). As 
we can see from Figure 6, the corruption of 
the administration seems to have a fairly strong 
connection with the trust in police on a country 
level; the correlation coefficient is as high as .91. 
Here the Corruption Perception Index 2010 of 
Transparency International is used as an indicator 
for corruption. The scale of the indicator is 
constructed so that a high value indicates a low 
level of corruption.
5. SOCIAL CAPITAL
Trust in police means that we trust in the formal 
aspects of social control. On the other hand, we 
must keep in mind that the aspects of informal 
social control are at least equally important.
If we have social capital, this means that we are 
members of several social networks, and that we 
have learned to trust the people around us. We 
trust not only those whom we know personally, 
we trust people in general. This is referred to as 
generalised trust (see Nannestad 2008; Paxton 
2007). Social capital can therefore be seen as a 
resource for an individual, offering both unofficial 
social support and unofficial social control for 
the members of the community. Trust promotes 
interaction, which in turn increases trust. (See 
e.g. Putnam 2001 and Field 2004) Studies have 
also shown that the official social support offered 
by the society and the unofficial support from 
the immediate community do not exclude each 
other; on the contrary, they complement and 
support each other. Social capital has been found 
to be the strongest in countries with the most 
support for the welfare of the people thanks to 
the public welfare policy (Oorschot and Van Arts, 
2005; Kääriäinen & Lehtonen 2006)
Figure 5. Number of police officers per capita and trust in the police in 16 European countries 2010. 
Sources: European Sourcebook of Criminal Justice and European Social Survey.
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This means that we can assume that there is less 
need for formal support and control in societies 
with a lot of social capital than in countries with 
little social capital. In countries with strong social 
capital, the people probably expect less from 
the police than in countries with weaker social 
capital, and they also resort to unofficial support 
and control. On the other hand, in societies with 
less social interaction and trust people are forced 
to use the formal aspects of control and there 
are greater expectations on issues such as the 
police’s ability to act.
As we see in Figure 7, the country-specific 
correlation between social capital (measured 
as generalised trust) and trust in the police 
Figure 6. Corruption and trust in the police in 16 European countries 2010.  
Sources: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index and European Social Survey.
Figure 7. Generalised trust and trust in the police in 16 European countries 2010.  
Source: European Social Survey. 
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is significantly high at .89. People trust the 
police particularly in countries where they also 
trust their fellow citizens, and where they have 
opportunities for receiving unofficial support 
and control from their immediate community. It 
clearly seems that it is easy to trust the police if 
you can trust your fellow citizens.
There is already a fair amount of research-based 
information on the trust of the citizens in the 
police. But only rarely has anyone looked at the 
other side of the coin: do the police trust the 
citizens? A large portion of the literature on the 
so-called police culture includes observations of 
the police having a cynical attitude towards the 
citizens. Cynicism would seem to be connected 
to the police as a profession, and to the special 
characteristics of the police organisation as an 
institution generating social control (Skolnick 
1966). However, the few empirical studies have 
been conducted as local studies, mainly in 
large cities in North America or Britain (see Van 
Maanen 2005 and Loftus 2009). It is difficult 
to find comparative studies from elsewhere in 
Europe.
In our own study (Kääriäinen & Siren, 2012), 
where we used cumulative ESS data, we 
observed that the trust of people working as 
police officers in their fellow citizens depended 
strongly on the overall trust capital in the society 
(see Figure 8). The country-specific correlation 
on the generalised trust of those working as 
police officers and the rest of the respondents 
was .90. In societies with strong trust, people 
doing police work also trust their fellow citizens. 
Respectively, cynicism among the police is 
found particularly in areas where people have a 
suspicious attitude towards their fellow citizens 
in general. Therefore, it seems that social capital 
generates trust between the authorities and the 
citizens and vice versa.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusion is that we must explain country-
specific variations in the trust in police by society-
level factors. European societies remain quite 
different, and the role and status of the police 
in the societies is also different. Here, the main 
object of study was police resources in relation 
to the GDP and how those resources are related 
to the welfare policy practised. Based on even a 
short study such as this, there is a suspicion that 
the welfare policy practised may be significant 
for the expectations placed on the police by the 
people, and how important they see the role of 
the police as a guarantee for safety in their lives.
Figure 8. Generalised trust score for police officers vs. other respondents in 22 European countries. 
Estimated marginal means from LM by country.  
Source: Kääriäinen & Siren 2012. 
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Perhaps it is easy to trust the police if you hardly 
ever need the police services and if you live in a 
safe society, where social conflicts are solved long 
before the police are needed. Or if you can trust 
your fellow citizens and if you are surrounded by 
communities that provide unofficial support and 
control. Or, if you are generally used to trusting in 
public services, their equality and ability to serve.
In other words, when we ask why citizens trust 
the police, a reference to the police’s own 
activities may not be a sufficient answer. As far 
as I can tell, we do not have strong evidence for 
the police being the most effective or the most 
professionally skilled where it gains the most 
trust. The observations I have presented above 
rather indicate that way how the society as a 
whole operates to guarantee a life with safety and 
human dignity for its citizens is very significant.
Of course, we must remember how difficult it is 
to draw conclusions based on simple correlations 
on the aggregate level. This means that more 
comparative and national research is absolutely 
necessary for solving these issues. In any case, 
I hope that the examples on country-level 
variation in the trust in police I have presented 
are useful for further study.
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Abstract: This essay looks at the adoption by the United Kingdom Police Forces of social media (i.e. 
Facebook and Twitter) as part of their engagement strategies. It highlights the policy drivers that have 
informed this work. It indicates areas for future research.
There are many dimensions concerning police use 
of social media — some commentators identify 
three main areas: engagement, intelligence 
and enforcement (Bartlett et al, 2013). This 
essay focuses on police use of social media 
with regard to engagement, defined by Myhill 
as ‘the process of enabling the participation 
of citizens and communities in policing at 
their chosen level, ranging from providing 
information and reassurance to empowering 
them to identify and implement solutions to 
local problems and influence strategic priorities 
and decisions.’ (Myhill, 2006: iv). While the other 
two areas ´intelligence and enforcement’ will be 
mentioned in passing. The primary focus here is 
how the police use social media as part of their 
engagement with their communities.
In his book, A New Study of Police History (1956), 
Charles Reith, a British police historian, discussed 
the vision of policing set out by Charles Rowan 
and Richard Mayne, who, in 1829 were the first 
and joint Commissioners of the newly formed 
Metropolitan Police in London. Rowan and 
Mayne stated that their conception of a police 
force was ‘unique in history and throughout 
the world because it derived not from fear but 
almost exclusively from public cooperation 
with the police, induced by them designedly by 
behaviour which secures and maintains for them 
the approval, respect and affection of the public’ 
(Reith, 1956: 14). This vision of ‘policing by 
consent’ has been part of policing in the United 
Kingdom throughout the following decades; 
Reiner argued that it was a central theme of 
UK policing in the 1970’s and 1980’s (Reiner, 
1992), however Hough argued that in the 1990’s 
newer systems of police management meant 
the concept was less in favour (Hough, 2007) 
The current century, it is argued, has found two 
different models of policing in tension with each 
other: the crime control model based on law 
enforcement and punishment and more subtle 
models of social control based on procedural 
justice. (Hough et al, 2010). The procedural 
justice model moves the emphasis away from 
understanding why people commit offences and 
greater emphasis on understanding why people 
comply with the law (Bottoms, 2002). This 
vision is restated from a political perspective that 
policing in the United Kingdom is carried out, as 
much as possible, with public support, with ‘the 
power of the police coming from the common 
consent of the public, as opposed to the power 
of the state.’ (Home Office, 2012)
Since 2008 the United Kingdom police 
forces have been using social media such as 
Facebook and Twitter as significant channels to 
communicate and facilitate engagement with 
the communities they serve. By the end of 2013, 
they have a substantial and increasing presence 
on social media platforms — analysis by Norfolk 
Constabulary shows that Police Force’s official 
accounts on Facebook have been ‘liked’ by just 
under one million people, while the Force’s 
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accounts on Twitter have 1 400 000 followers, 
and on the more recent Google + platform, 
Police accounts have 3 300 followers. (Norfolk 
Police, 2013). On Twitter, there are numerous 
of official police Twitter accounts for a range 
of police officers from the most senior level to 
the neighbourhood beat officer; there are now 
over 2 000 of these accounts (Keane, 2013). This 
essay will examine the factors that drove that 
widespread level of adoption and will discuss 
the policy issues, which have been addressed or 
remain to be addressed.
The past few years has seen the growth of 
Internet usage, the exponential rise of mobile 
communications technology and a widespread 
adoption of social media sites. In 2013, the 
European Commission reported that, across 
the European Union 40 % of the population 
post messages on social media sites and instant 
messaging (in the UK this is 57 %) (Eurostat, 
2013). In addition, the use of social media is 
growing; in May 2011 it was reported that the 
micro-blogging site, twitter.com had 200 million 
registered accounts worldwide and was growing 
by 460 000 every day (BBC, 2011). In the same 
month, Sheryl Sandberg, Chief Operating Officer 
for Facebook stated that their site had over 500 
million active users, 30 millions of whom were 
from the United Kingdom (Sandberg, 2011). 
These figures too are set to increase with a recent 
report stating that just under 1 million people 
now join the site everyday (Observer, 2011).
Central to understanding how UK policing has 
adopted social media platforms for community 
engagement has been increased importance 
in relation to the police commitment to 
neighbourhood policing (ACPO, 2006). 
The national initiative for the roll out of 
neighbourhood policing had its antecedents in 
the National Reassurance Policing Programme 
which trialled to address the gap between the 
public perception of crime in their locality (which 
they saw as high) together with the trends in the 
rates of local crime (which were dropping) (Tuffin 
et al. 2006). Guidance published emphasised the 
importance that the police service should meet 
the expectations of their communities of:
• ‘Access, to the police through a named 
contact,
• Influence over the community safety priorities 
for the area,
• Interventions to solve problems and
• Answers to include feedback on results’ 
(ACPO, 2006: 4).
The programme was seen to be achieving success 
and in 2009 the British Crime Survey reported 
falls in many areas of reported crime and in the 
fear of crime and increases in the confidence in 
the police. (Home Office, 2010).
It was against the background of these changes 
that the police began to adopt social media to 
explore its potential as a means of engaging, 
communicating and tackling crime. In 2008 a 
neighbourhood policing officer P.C. Ed Rogerson 
of North Yorkshire Police was identified as 
an early adopter of social media use, using a 
combination of YouTube footage and a Facebook 
group to highlight the issue of graffiti on his beat 
in Harrogate, leading to the arrest of an offender. 
(CRP News, 2008). It was the identification of 
the work of P.C. Rogerson and other early police 
adopters, which led to, the following year, a 
UK Policing Conference on social media, being 
held in October 2009. As a direct result of the 
conference, two policy areas were identified and 
addressed; the need for senior officer support 
and leadership and the need for guidance for 
police officers and forces. The former issue 
was addressed with the appointment of (then) 
Assistant Chief Constable Gordon Scobbie as 
ACPO lead for Digital Engagement and the latter 
was addressed by the publication, the following 
March, of the first national guidance for the Police 
Service in using social media. Engage: Digital and 
Social Media Engagement (ACPO, 2010) was a 
joint publication between the Association of 
Police Officers (ACPO) and the National Policing 
Improvement Agency (NPIA). It provided police 
forces with examples of use from early adopters, 
guidance on using Twitter and a set of principles 
for engagement, stating the need to be ‘credible, 
consistent, responsive, an ambassador, inclusive, 
ethical and personable.’ (ACPO, 2010: 7-8). This 
guidance was widely circulated with UK forces 
and is still available in 2014.
Later in 2010, saw a UK Police Force demonstrate 
how they were taking social media seriously. 
On 14th and 15th October Greater Manchester 
Police (GMP) used Twitter to publish information 
about every incident they dealt with in a 24 
hour period. Using the Twitter hashtag #GMP24, 
GMP tweeted details of the 3 025 incidents 
they dealt with. The Chief Constable, Peter 
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Fahy, commented ‘Policing is often seen in very 
simple terms, with cops chasing robbers and 
locking them up’. However, the reality is that this 
accounts for only part of the work they have to 
deal with’ (BBC, 2010). This was seen as raising 
awareness of the range of incidents (many non-
crime) that police have to deal with. At the end 
of the exercise, GMP reported an increase in their 
Twitter followership from 3 000 to 17 000.
In August of the following year outbreaks of 
grave public disorder in England put public 
and police use of social media once again in 
the policy spotlight. While the social media 
sites of Twitter and Facebook received much 
media coverage, it quickly became clear that the 
Blackberry messaging service (BBM) had been 
much used. (Techcrunch, 2011). Police use of 
social media was one of the subjects in reports 
following the disorder, Her Majesty’s Inspector 
of Constabulary (HMIC) in its review of the 
disorders, commented on social media saying 
‘it is imperative that the Police Service is able to 
embrace these new developments’ (HMIC, 2011: 
73) While a special committee set up by the Prime 
Minister to report on the riots stated that ‘police 
services that use social media well are more likely 
to have better engagement with communities’ 
and recommended that ‘every neighbourhood 
policing team should have its own social media 
capability’ (Riots, Victims and Community Panel, 
2012: 105) and while the report has since been 
archived and this recommendation is still being 
acted upon in the Metropolitan Police.
In 2012 the Composite project published a 
comparative study of how European Police forces 
were adapting to social media (Composite, 2012) 
and reported social media was being used by 
police forces as a source of criminal information, 
to have a voice in the community, to push out 
information, to leverage the wisdom of the crowd, 
for public interaction and community policing, 
to show the human face of policing, support the 
Police IT infrastructure and for efficient policing. 
It also highlighted that adaption by various police 
forces in Europe varied widely and that future 
research could focus on a comparison between 
countries who were adapting to new technology 
and those that (for various reasons) were not.
The current situation with UK Policing and using 
social media is that the police service have built 
a network of social media contacts throughout 
the UK and globally and that this can support 
increased and more focussed community 
engagement. There are signs of innovation and 
leadership, the use of Facebook by Staffordshire 
Police has been recognised by Facebook itself, 
producing the first public sector case study 
showing the use of their platform (Staffordshire 
Police, 2013), while Surrey Police recently won 
the Social Buzz awards, more usually given to 
companies in the advertising industry (The Drum, 
2013). What remains to be seen is how well the 
police are able to use both the infrastructure and 
their organisational skills and knowledge to make 
best use of this opportunity. 
In other European Police Forces there has been a 
range of approaches to adopting social media as 
a form of engagement with their communities. 
The United Kingdom experience with social 
media demonstrates that with leadership and 
support, it is possible to build and develop both 
the organisational learning and infrastructure to 
have a visible presence for policing on social media 
sites and that, as these social media continue to 
grow and form part of the everyday life of the 
citizens of Europe this work will continue to have 
relevance for policing organisations.
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Abstract: The paper reviews academic literature which is relevant to the better understanding of the 
police use of social media. It concludes that much of the practitioner literature has focussed on issues 
of adoption. Academic work has supported this in its focus on authorisation and legitimacy. Other 
research has looked to use social media as a source of big data in support of predicting social trends 
and operationally significant shifts in public behaviour. This is inherently problematic, as social media 
researchers in other fields have shown. 
Research into social media usage by the police is 
still a relatively new field, and there are benefits 
to be had through closer collaboration between 
disciplines. There is a pressing need for more 
research, particularly ethnographic research, 
into the impact of new communications media 
on the internal working of policing organisations 
and on their interactions with the public.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I look at some of the work of 
practitioners and academics about social 
media usage by the police. I argue that most 
of the practice based evaluation is rooted in a 
discourse about the advantages of adoption and 
barriers to adoption. The academic work has a 
number of strands. One focuses on regulation 
and authority, which is within the adoption 
discourse. A very different one looks at social 
media as a source of big data with a view to 
creating predictive model of future major events, 
such as disorder. I conclude that there are major 
themes which have yet to be explored, and in 
particular the organisational impact of new, 
relatively open communications channels in 
hierarchical organisations which necessarily 
rely on command and control models for their 
operations. I note that research into social media 
in policing has yet fully to exploit some of the 
opportunities which online ethnography and the 
sociology of networks offer. There remains much 
to be gained from a closer relationship between 
social media scholars and the police research 
community.
Police organisations in a number of countries 
began to look at social media as both a source of 
knowledge about the communities they police, 
a source of intelligence about the activities of 
people of interest to them, and as a channel for 
communications with the public at the same 
time as platforms, such as Facebook, achieved 
significant popular presence. Innovators in police 
organisations began what were often local, small 
scale experiments with the new media, and 
they began to reflect on what they had learned. 
Three major events have raised the profile of 
social media in the policing world and attracted 
political and media interest. The Arab Spring, 
the London riots in 2011 and, since June 2013, 
the revelations made by Edward Snowden about 
relationships between social media companies 
and the national security agencies have all 
underlined the significance of social media 
for policing and law enforcement , as well as 
national security. These have properly attracted 
the attention of researchers. The more modest 
police experiments in the use of social media 
have been studied in less detail by the academic 
community. I argue here that, while there is 
no shortage of practitioner reflection on these 
innovations, there is scope for a lot more, and 
more challenging, research into the institutional 
impact of social media on routine policing.
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Much practitioner work has aimed at raising 
awareness of the opportunities presented to the 
police and emergency services by new platforms. 
There is a growing literature of experiential 
case studies by practitioners themselves — 
the Queensland experience in the floods of 
2011 (Queensland Police, 2010) or the Greater 
Manchester Police experience of using Twitter 
(GMP 2011) to raise public awareness of the 
range of their control room activities. Indeed, 
much of the efforts of organisations such as 
the College of Policing in the UK, or the IACP 
Center for Social Media in the US can be seen 
as a bringing together lessons learned from this 
practical experience.
A comparative approach is taken in ‘Best 
Practice in Social Media Adoption’ by published 
by the Frauenhofer-Institute as part of the 
FP7 COMPOSITE programme (Denef 2012), 
comparing practice in 13 countries, using 
as data interviews with practitioners. Denef 
summarises the aims of this work and describes 
how COMPOSITE has identified the emergence 
of social media as a pressing issue for the police. 
The programme takes the view that social 
media can support the police in engaging in 
a closer dialogue with the public, support the 
identification of missing people and help large 
scale police operations in crises situations. Social 
media, however, also threaten the police, as 
offenders, for instance, increasingly use social 
media to coordinate their actions. Social media 
makes police actions transparent and challenges 
the ways in which the police operate.
2. RESEARCH THEMES
The need to understand how the police could 
best exploit social media was made more urgent 
by the experience its use by non-state actors in 
public order incidents such as the anticapitalist 
protests of 2010 and the UK riots of 2011, and 
by the debate about the role of social media as a 
tool for popular organisation in the early phases 
of the Arab Spring in 2011. But while, in the 
UK at least, there was political pressure to react 
and develop operational capability, variously 
articulated by Ministers and the regulatory body 
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, there was less 
pressure for reflection on practice in order to 
understand whether more profound changes in 
police organisations and their relationship with 
the public which were being brought about by 
social media.
There is a strong element of advocacy in the 
practitioner material. There has been the 
development of a community of social media 
users within police forces and organisations, 
which is highly committed to spreading what 
they see as an innovation of undoubted value to 
as many colleagues as possible. Indeed, one of 
the fundamental questions, which COMPOSITE 
addresses, is ‘how to explain the issue of non-
adoption’.
In parallel, the academic world to some extent, 
think tanks to a greater extent and the press 
most of all have developed a discourse about the 
changing nature of the policing task which has 
been brought about by the emergence of social 
media. This is manifested in three ways:
The emergence of new forms of crime and 
antisocial behaviour — online pornography, 
bullying, verbal sexual abuse, new types of fraud;
The opportunity afforded to law breakers to 
improve their own communications and so 
present new risks — rioters, terrorists most 
spectacularly;
The development of new opportunities for 
the police to create and develop sources for 
intelligence, either in relation to the investigation 
of particular offences, covert investigation of 
groups and organisations, or the analysis of wider 
social trends as a basis for predictive policing.
In this last case, social media has become one of 
a number of sources for big data analysis. The 
examples, which have been discussed, include 
big data correlations in relation to natural 
emergencies as much as to criminal or public 
order trends.
Much of this debate has become focussed on 
issues of legitimacy and the safeguards for the 
public in respect of the enhanced capabilities 
of states to mount surveillance operations 
against social media usage. This is after all at 
the heart of the Edward Snowden case and the 
subsequent public debate about whether the 
US authorities have been complying with their 
own regulatory requirements or not (Greenwald 
2013). For social media more generally, the work 
which Jamie Bartlett has led at Demos (Bartlett 
et al. 2012), has identified the challenges which 
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social media provide to existing systems of 
authorisation and regulation, particularly when 
applied to the collection of analysis of material 
produced by individuals on social media sites 
but which are openly accessible. There has been 
similar discussion in recent work by Eijkman 
and Weggemans (2013) and extensive further 
discussion now seems inevitable following the 
disclosures about the activities of the NSA.
There has been less exploration of the 
effectiveness of social media usage. This is of 
course not to suggest that police engagement 
with social media has no effect. Police 
communications leads and investigators alike 
would have little time for it if this were the case. 
But there have been relatively few attempts 
systematically to look at what is different about 
the way the police interface with the police works 
when it takes place in social media environments, 
and how that interacts with, and changes, non-
virtual environments — in so far as this is a useful 
distinction to make. (Bartlett 2013).
Assumptions that are made about the impact 
of social media use need to be well founded in 
evidence. Even if impact seems to be intuitively 
likely, and supported by anecdote, there is still 
a need for scrutiny. For example, in discussing 
social media as a means of pushing information, 
COMPOSITE (Denef et al. 2012) speculates that
‘[w]hile not every citizen is using social media at 
all or is a member of the popular networks, social 
media encourages sharing information across 
people and networks, so that even citizens who 
are not directly subscribed to a police force’s 
information can also receive the updates through 
their friends. By using social media in this way, 
police forces become more independent from 
the press and open to immediate connection to 
the general public’ (p.18).
This touches on a number of issues which 
invite further investigation and call for data. 
One is about the relationship between the 
mainstream press and social media. Social media 
are unquestionably of increasing important as 
a source for mainstream journalists. This was 
notably evidenced in the Arab Spring. There 
now appears to be some consensus that the 
crucial element is the interaction between social 
media and conventional media — and real world 
protest in this case.
It is not necessarily the case that social media 
have had the disintermediating effect implied 
by COMPOSITE. Manuel Castells (2012), for 
example, considers that in Tunisia, ‘there was a 
symbiotic relationship between mobile phone 
citizen journalists uploading information to 
YouTube and Al Jazeera using feeds from citizen 
journalists and then broadcasting them to 
citizens at large’. Nor should we assume that 
the way these relationships work in a particular 
situation, as in extreme events such as riots or 
popular demonstration against the government 
, is a good guide to how people get information 
from social media or the press in, for example, 
less tense neighbourhood policing contexts.
There are also signs of uneven development 
in the way social media are having impact on 
the press’s conceptualisation of its role, and 
of others’ appreciation of it. The discussion of 
police and press relationships which occupied 
public attention in the UK in 2012 during the 
Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practice and 
ethics of the press (Leveson 2012) is a case in 
point ( ). The very cautious acknowledgement 
that things were changing as a result of social 
media suggests at least that there is scope for 
more research.
3. FURTHER DIRECTIONS
There has been extensive academic research in 
non-police contexts about online behaviours 
and identity, the relationship between online 
networks and other social networks and users’ 
attitudes to privacy, but this academic discourse 
has largely left policing to one side. This suggests 
three areas where the work of researchers can 
be further developed and applied to policing 
practice. The first theme is about quantitative 
research and the boundary between quantitative 
and qualitative work. The other two are about 
the scope for more qualitative work.
3.1 BIG DATA
Social media are a source of unprecedented 
amounts of data, a lot of it personal data in that 
it’s about individuals, and much of it apparently 
openly available and public at the same time. 
This looks like a boon for social scientists and 
investigative organisations like the police in 
equal measure. Both are attracted by the sudden 
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availability of what looks like very immediate 
information at a low cost. This is against a 
background in which not only are budgets 
under pressure, but the inherent costs of data 
collection and analysis, and of information 
assurance, have historically tended to rise. The 
sociologist George Homans said in 1974 ‘The 
methods of social science are dear in time and 
money and getting dearer every day’ (cited in 
Goulder 2010). Now, in Vint Cerf’s words, ‘We 
never, ever, in the history of mankind have had 
access to so much information so quickly and so 
easily’ (cited in Boyd 2010).
Danah boyd reminds us that what gets lost in 
this excitement is a critical analysis of what this 
data is and what it means (boyd 2010). She raises 
five cautionary points about the limits of big 
data as a research tool. Although Boyd does not 
consider the application to policing, these are of 
particular concern in trying to use social media 
data as a basis for predictions of large scale 
social behaviour, such as crime trends or possible 
hotspots for disorder.
Boyd’s first point is that ‘Bigger Data are Not 
Always Better Data’. Big Data isn’t always a whole 
data set. Twitter has all of Twitter. But most 
researchers don’t have all of Twitter. At best, 
they have access to the set of public tweets. It 
is more likely though that they have the stream 
of public tweets from the public timeline. These 
tweets aren’t even random, nor is it apparent, 
what selection processes are actually at work in 
the creation of the sample.
The second is that ‘Not All Data are Created 
Equal’. Big Data introduces two new popular 
types of social networks derived from data traces: 
articulated social networks and behavioural 
social networks. Articulated networks are those 
that result from the typically public articulation 
of social networks as in the public list of people’s 
Friends on Facebook. Behavioural networks are 
those that are derived from communication 
patterns and cell coordinates. Each of these 
networks is extraordinarily interesting, but they 
are not the same as what sociologists have 
historically measured or theorised in discussing 
social networks.
Boyd goes on to remind us that ‘What and 
Why are Different Questions’, in other words 
why people do what they do online cannot 
be read from what they do in any simple way. 
Hence it is also necessary to ‘Be Careful of Your 
Interpretations’. Finally, she advises that ‘Just 
Because [the data] is Accessible Doesn’t Mean 
Using It is Ethical’. This is of particular concern for 
law enforcement authorities and takes us back to 
the discussion about authorisation.
In other words, social media aren’t as easy to 
exploit as may have been hoped, and some 
kind of operational benefits are unlikely to be 
straightforward to realise. The COSMOS project, 
based at Cardiff University, identifies four issues 
in particular for the police. Dealing with these 
is a current challenge for computer scientists 
and social scientists alike who are working on 
police data sets. The project has highlighted the 
problems for researchers of handling material 
in bulk. COSMOS archives and collects 350 
million tweets per day (1 % total). Data from 
social media often comes with a relative lack of 
metadata, such as information about location 
or the identity of the author. The content may 
provide no easy means of distinguishing rumour 
from useful intelligence (although this is not a 
unique problem for social media data). Finally, 
and perhaps fundamentally, the reciprocity 
between online expression and offline action is 
still largely not understood. Further investigation 
is necessary before full advantage can be taken 
of the new digital tools of ‘neighbourhood 
informatics’.
In their analysis of social media use during the 
2012 Olympics, COSMOS concludes that not just 
real world events (such as UK gold medal wins) 
but also media comments about those events 
drove peaks in tweeting about games. This has 
led to the conclusion that the results achieved 
through this kind of research ‘provides the means 
of beginning to treat social media data (and its 
analysis) as a social scientific measure of the pulse 
of the world’ (Burnap et al. 2012)
In a recent paper in the international journal 
Policing and Society, Martin L Williams et al. 
(2013) from the COSMOS project have looked 
to apply this approach to the way that police 
forces in the UK to assess tension i.e. potential 
civil unrest and public order issues. They argue 
that the 2011 riots demonstrated the existence 
of what they describe as cyber-neighbourhoods 
but that the police had only limited success in 
collecting and using intelligence from these new 
neighbourhoods. To do so successfully requires 
bespoke tools which can be measured against 
existing sources of intelligence.
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Existing guidance to the UK police about the 
use of intelligence about potential public unrest 
recommends the use of both conventional 
qualitative and quantitative indices. COSMOS 
proposes that analysis of social media 
communications is also used. They believe it may 
reorient both police and public understanding 
of tension and social cohesion through reference 
to the mass of user-generated accounts of social 
problems in particular contexts and in near, 
and possibly real, time. If the social media can 
be adequately sampled and used to indicate 
‘offline’ behaviour, the analysis of this kind of 
data could be a revelation in broadening public 
understanding of civil unrest and attenuating 
dependence on elite, retrospective, constructions 
of social problems.
The COSMOS paper concludes that extremes in 
positive and negative sentiment are not directly 
related to tension and that tension detection 
requires more than sentiment analysis alone. 
Both sets of results provide evidence that their 
social media tension-monitoring techniques are 
faster than human coders, and can handle more 
data, and are more accurate than other machine 
supported classification engines.
It is apparent that sound conclusions based on 
these new methodologies are likely to be limited 
in their scope. This looks like the beginning of the 
development of operationally effective analytical 
tools, not the end of it. The use of social media 
fits into a context in which there are also existing 
sources, and that means that there is a need for 
examination about how the organisation uses 
information in order to make decisions. This 
takes us outside the realm of computer scientists.
3.2 NETWORKS, STYLE AND IMPACT
In 2010, I did a very short piece of research 
into the use of social media by the UK police 
for citizen engagement (Crump 2011). I relied 
heavily on the work which Nick Keane (now 
of the UK College of Policing) had done in 
bringing together practitioners in UK police 
forces, and in mapping the extent to which the 
various forces were exploiting this opportunity. 
What I particularly wanted to look at was how 
notions of online community related to that of 
community policing, since it was in the context 
of neighbourhood policing that forces were 
experimenting with allowing front line officers to 
manage accounts on behalf of the force. I wanted 
to ask the question of how large were the Twitter 
networks that were being formed, who was in 
them, and how far did they create new forms 
of interaction rather than replicating traditional 
forms of police/public communications in new 
contexts. This was before the 2011 riots changed 
the seriousness with which police leaders took 
social media, and the size of the samples and the 
number of interviews I could carry were limited, 
so any conclusions were tentative. 
What I did conclude was that, while most 
networks were small, and the extent of two 
way communication was limited, there was 
scope for police forces to do more analysis of 
who their followers were in terms not only of 
their real world influence but also in terms of 
their influence within networks and look at 
strategies for building engagement with them. 
COMPOSITE has undertaken work on the use 
of Twitter during the London riots which is 
described as ‘…a first step into detailing how 
disparate adoption and usage patterns of Twitter 
emerge during crises’ (Denef et al. 2013). This 
work also provides a first indication of the effects 
on image and relationship with the public.
3.3 SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE CULTURE OF 
POLICE ORGANISATIONS
The discussion of the work of the COSMOS 
programme already hints at the need to begin 
work on organisational issues which relate to the 
social aspects of technology adoption as well as 
the computer science issues. On the whole, this 
aspect of the study of social media in policing 
has yet to be systematically addressed although 
the range of issues for investigation is broad. 
(Bartlett et al. 2013).
There is of course a long tradition of studies of 
police occupational culture. There have been a 
number of studies framing issues of innovation, 
and resistance to it, in terms of knowledge 
and information. For example, Helen Gundhus 
(2013), in a study of change in knowledge 
management in the Norwegian Police Academy 
finds that new knowledge regimes are met with 
resistance, not only because the stubbornness 
of police occupational culture, but also because 
they threaten what is perceived as meaningful 
professional practices.
It is certainly a testable hypothesis, for example, 
that the introduction of social media analysis to 
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established processes for assessment of public 
tension could meet just such cultural resistance. 
Similar approaches to the study of organisational 
culture have been undertaken in relation to 
other professions. Journalism is an instructive 
case, not least because of the long established, 
symbiotic relationship between policing and the 
press, and evidence in some countries of unease 
about its suitability for a more transparent era. 
In their article `Open source and journalism: 
toward new frameworks for imagining news 
innovation’, Lewis and Usher (2013) identify the 
new phenomenon of the programmer journalist, 
a wholly new category from early models of the 
computer-aided reporter. These programmer-
journalists aim to produce not stories but 
filters for information. They become curators 
of the world of user-created content, they 
manage public debate rather than looking for 
scoops. Their values are those of transparency, 
iteration, tinkering and participation, rather than 
exclusivity. In order to try to establish whether 
this challenge to the established world of news 
reporting actually exists, Lewis and Usher 
analysed a large sample of journalists’ blogs to 
look for evidence of journalists deviating from 
their role as nonpartisan information providers 
by expressing personal opinions; sharing their 
gatekeeping role by including postings from 
others in their microblogs; providing a semblance 
of accountability and transparency to their 
professional work by offering their audiences 
links to external websites that background the 
information they provide.
The conclusions are disappointing for the 
innovator, if predictable. Lewis and Usher find 
that while journalists and technologists are 
working together to bring open-source tools 
into the newsroom, this hasn’t challenged old 
processes of news work or old news values. New 
tools are used to help journalists do what they 
have always done. Newsrooms have been quick to 
impose social media ethical guidelines; instead of 
experimenting with how audience participation 
might change the journalism conversation, news 
institutions have tended to retrofit yet another 
reporting tool.
The alternatives are not easy though — 
annotative journalism; journalism as knowledge 
management, with journalists as curators of 
the collective knowledge. This is borne out by 
studies of how journalists use Twitter as well. 
Twitter alike show journalists reluctant to give up 
their gatekeeping role and engage in ‘ambient 
journalism’ (Lasorsa et al. 2011).
Why is this of interest for policing? Because while 
there is a hypothesis that hierarchical, command 
and control police culture and organisation 
is at odds with the openness of the world of 
user-generated content, it is not clear what the 
resolution of this means in practice. As for the 
journalists investigated by Lewis and Usher, 
there has been extensive work in the creation of 
guidelines and codes of practice. There has also 
been disciplinary action on the basis of those 
codes against individual officers. But I don’t think 
we have a systematic, as against an anecdotal, 
view of the ways in which social media, both as 
a source of information coming into forces or 
as a means of communicating outwards from 
them, has had an impact on power relationships 
and organisational structures. Is it, as in the 
journalism examples, a tool for doing established 
work better, or is it the basis of a wholly new way 
of working?
In the intelligence community, one of the 
responses to 9/11 was the publication of an 
article by Calvin Andrus (2005), from the CIO’s 
office in the CIA ‘The wiki and the blog: towards 
a complex adaptive intelligence community’. 
Andrus identified the need for bottom up 
approaches and compressed response times, 
and saw social media tools as the way to achieve 
that. These now include A-Space, Intellipedia and 
TAG|Connect but one could also suggest that the 
kind of networked analytical tools offered by i2 
and Palantir import similar, if more structured, 
approaches. (Werbin 2011)
Police forces have begun to develop similar 
knowledge management systems — e.g. the 
Police Online Knowledge Area POLKA in the UK. 
The research challenge is to know how they are 
changing the way information is created, owned, 
used and conceptualised in forces.
4. OPPORTUNITIES
The impact of social media on policing is still a 
relatively new phenomenon. For the research 
community, the time since police forces began to 
use social media is little more than a single cycle 
of grant application, data collection, analysis, 
peer review and publication ago. During that 
time, social media themselves have evolved in 
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
112
the way and the extent to which they are used 
by the public and the police alike. It is no surprise 
that the research effort has been diffuse and 
heterogeneous up to now, and that it has yet 
to have a strong impact on practice. There are 
a number of observations which may have some 
bearing on the further evolution of this work.
Practitioners’ reflections on their work will remain 
of great importance in sharing good practice. 
Nothing I say here is intended to detract from 
that. But there is scope for the academy to work 
together with police organisations to create 
additional level of analysis and insight. The kind 
of activity which I think would inform these 
include:
• Ethnographical studies of police social media 
behaviours (Skinner 2013);
• Similar studies of social media users which 
begin to understand the effect of police 
interventions. They might consider for 
example how enthusiastic are followers of 
police sites, and how impactful are police 
interventions?
• Structural approaches to police networks: 
who is in them? How do they change over 
time, and how do they work? In particular, 
how do they work in times of stress, such as a 
major incident or a controversial issue?
To do this effectively, there is a need for a more 
systematic approach to data collection. An 
observatory would benefit from the ability to 
formulate research questions and hence data 
requirements in advance of incidents. It would 
also be a means of creating reassurance that 
research ethics were being properly applied in a 
transparent matter to the collection and analysis 
of the data, and the publication of findings. It 
is particularly important for example to bear 
in mind the name to protect the interests of 
individuals even where the expectation of privacy 
is low e.g. if personal details might be revealed 
or unsubstantiated allegations be made about 
individuals. It is for consideration whether the 
COSMOS observatory offers sufficient access to 
bulk Twitter data to form the basis of this activity. 
It may in any case be necessary to establish more 
focussed data collection in order to create data 
to understand the evolution of social networks 
involving contact between the public and the 
police, using both online and survey sources.
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MAPPING POLICE COOPERATION STRATEGIES 
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Abstract: This contribution presents both the EU and the Australian system of police cooperation 
in comparative socio-legal perspective and highlights some of the reasons why law-enforcement 
cooperation in the EU might, to some extent, be considered more advanced. The article also aims at 
answering the question whether EU police cooperation is today comparable to strategies employed in a 
federal system, such as Australia, or whether it is still closer to international cooperation. 
To find out about the structure of police 
cooperation in the EU this study employed a 
comparative socio-legal approach and juxtaposed 
both legal texts and practitioner attitudes in 
the area of law enforcement cooperation in 
the two systems. Interviews with practitioners 
were conducted with a view to investigating the 
extent of implementation of laws fostering police 
cooperation in the EU and Australia. It could be 
concluded that EU law-enforcement cooperation 
is distinctly different from both federal and 
international cooperation strategies. EU strategies 
are more formalised than Australian strategies 
as both bilateral and multilateral strategies 
between EU Member States have often been 
regulated at the supranational level. Compared 
to international cooperation, EU strategies are 
more far-reaching and go beyond international 
sovereignty concerns. What is most striking to 
learn in the comparative context is that the level 
of enthusiasm for cooperation (as measured by 
interview response rates) is much higher in the 
EU than in Australia. It follows that regulation of 
police cooperation, rather than having a strong 
legal effect, could be a major sociological factor 
impacting on practitioner enthusiasm.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article gives a brief summary of the author’s 
recently published comparative socio-legal 
study titled Policing Cooperation Across Borders — 
Comparative Perspectives on Law Enforcement within 
the EU and Australia (Hufnagel, 2013). It outlines 
the main new insights into police cooperation 
that can be gained from this analysis. Drawing 
on interviews with practitioners, a number of 
areas where the EU can be compared to a federal 
system are highlighted and the advantages and 
disadvantages of being a Union or a federation of 
states with a view to police cooperation practice 
are addressed. Particular topics that will be given 
attention are the evolution of legal frameworks 
regulating police cooperation, Joint Investigation 
Teams, Europol and regional cooperation.
An important question to be asked in relation 
to EU police cooperation is whether it is 
today comparable to strategies employed in 
a federal state, such as Australia, or whether 
it is still closer to international cooperation. 
The short answer to this question is that EU 
law-enforcement cooperation is distinctly 
different from both federal and international 
cooperation strategies. With regard to federal, 
and specifically Australian, police cooperation, 
EU strategies are more formalised as both 
bilateral and multilateral strategies between EU 
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Member States have often been regulated at the 
supranational level. Compared to international 
cooperation, EU strategies are more far-reaching 
and go beyond international sovereignty 
concerns. This contribution presents both the EU 
and the Australian system of police cooperation 
in comparative socio-legal perspective and 
highlights some of the reasons why law-
enforcement cooperation in the EU might, to 
some extent, be considered more advanced.
II. COOPERATION STRATEGIES IN 
THE EU
The development of police cooperation in the 
EU in the last 20 years is impressive, not only 
considering that many of its current members 
were in a state of war less than 70 years ago 
(Dedman, 1996, pp. 10-11; Pinder & Usherwood, 
2007, pp. 1-3), but also in comparison to 
cooperation within federal systems, such as 
Australia. The study this article is based upon has 
concluded that many cooperation strategies, like 
access to data such as criminal records, has in 
some federal systems not been developed much 
earlier than in the EU between sovereign nation 
states. This is particularly remarkable considering 
that police and criminal justice cooperation and a 
common security policy were not even envisaged 
when the European Economic Community (EEC) 
was established in 1957 (Preamble to Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community; 
Pinder & Usherwood, 2007, pp. 3-6). The EU was 
formed mainly to prevent future wars among the 
Member States by including them in one entity 
with common interests and goals (Ibid; Craig 
& de Búrca, 2011, p. 7). Economic cooperation 
aimed at establishing an internal market within 
the EEC then culminated in the Single European 
Act in 1986, with Article 8A providing for the 
abolition of border-controls between Member 
States (Single European Act). The Treaty on 
European Union, which was signed in 1992, was 
the first to integrate law enforcement between 
the Member States (Treaty on European Union). In 
its Title VI on Co-operation in the Field of Justice 
and Home Affairs, which was a significant step 
towards a harmonised EU framework on police 
cooperation, it provides for this integration (Den 
Boer, 1996, p. 247; Fijnaut, 2004, pp. 241-242). 
Article 29 of the TEU prescribed that citizens 
should be provided with a high level of safety 
within an area of freedom, security and justice by 
preventing and combating crime through closer 
cooperation between police forces, customs 
authorities and other competent authorities in 
the Member States.
Existing police cooperation strategies between 
EU Member States today go far beyond the 
founding aims of creating peace, economic 
prosperity and stability in the EEC. Advanced 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives 
have developed and require the partial surrender 
of sovereignty rights in order to facilitate the 
exercise of powers of law enforcement on 
foreign territory (See, in relation to the Belgium, 
German, Dutch Cooperation in the common 
border region: Spapens, 2008, pp. 225-226; 
and more generally: Sheptycki, 1996, p. 10). 
This development is particularly remarkable 
as policing is one of the most ‘sovereignty 
sensitive’ functions of a nation state (Wallace, 
1999, pp. 509-510). Furthermore, cooperation 
strategies were developed despite the existence 
of divergent cultures, structures, languages and 
histories of police organisations in the Member 
States (Hebenton and Thomas, 1995, pp. 24-37).
Police cooperation has increasingly become a 
focus of European attention since the 1970s and 
the onset of the threat of terrorism in Europe 
(Busch, 1995, pp. 285-292). This led to the 
development of a number of intergovernmental 
initiatives (which are comparable to Australian 
cooperative federalism). Three ways of promoting 
police cooperation developed in the EU and 
are therefore the focus of this comparison. The 
first are ‘legal’ strategies, such as supranational 
legal frameworks and the harmonisation of 
criminal law and procedure. The second are 
‘compensatory’ strategies, created to counteract 
or compensate for the current lack of legal 
regulation and harmonisation in this field and 
to overcome cultural and structural differences 
of the organisations involved. ‘Compensatory’ 
strategies in this context are common education 
and training, common forums and common 
institutions or agencies. The third are advanced 
‘regional’ cooperation strategies, encompassing 
the previous two strategies but developing them 
further in the regional context.
What can already be stated with a view to Australian 
strategies is that legal strategies are nearly non-
existent. Australia relies on the existence of its 
federal police more than on legal frameworks and 
harmonisation facilitating cooperation between 
its states and territories. However, Australia also 
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has a number of ‘regional’ frameworks, which 
exist bilaterally and multilaterally between some 
of the states and territories. The difference 
between these and EU regional strategies is that 
they have not been formalised through treaties 
and agreements and therefore have no power to 
influence federal law. Australia and the EU show 
most similarities with regard to ‘compensatory’ 
strategies. Both employ liaison officers in the 
other jurisdictions and offer common education 
and training, as well as other practitioner forums 
to overcome the lack of legal frameworks and 
harmonisation. On the sociological rather than 
the legal level, many similarities do therefore 
exist.
With regard to the EU, one of the most important 
developments in the area of police cooperation 
was the establishment of a common legal 
framework under the Schengen Agreement 
(Agreement between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the French Republic on 
the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common 
Borders 1985), which had the effect of relaxing 
common border controls. The Schengen 
Agreement, together with all the decisions of the 
Executive Committee, was supplemented by the 
1990 Convention Implementing the Schengen 
Agreement (Schengen Convention or Schengen 
Acquis, D’Oliveira, 1996, pp. 268-269). The 
Schengen Convention provided for the gradual 
abolition of borders between the EU Member 
States signatories, with the view to creating an 
internal market without frontiers, enabling the 
free movement of goods and persons (Europa, 
Summaries of Legislation, 2014). While it is a 
harmonised EU legal framework today, the 
Schengen Convention commenced as a regional 
initiative and borrowed from other regional 
frameworks, such as the Benelux and Nordic 
countries cooperation and the informal Dutch, 
Belgium and German cooperation network 
‘NebedeagPol’, which highlights the importance 
of regional frameworks to stimulate innovation 
and enhanced police cooperation in the EU.
It is debatable whether the abolition of internal 
borders in the EU genuinely heightened the risks 
of cross border crime, and therefore justified 
enhanced cooperation under the Schengen 
Convention, or whether the calls for greater 
cooperation were simply opportunistic political 
rhetoric (Busch, 1996, p. 319; Anderson, 1994, 
pp. 3, 9-11). It is reasonable to assume that 
suspected criminals entering neighbouring 
countries, and thereby into another jurisdiction, 
pose difficulties for the police pursuing them, 
such as obtaining arrest warrants, permission 
to continue the pursuit or general assistance of 
the police from the country entered (Hertweck, 
2005, p. 721; Schneider, 1998, p. 306; Storbeck, 
1993, p. 175). A heightened significance of police 
cooperation in the EU in the last 20 years can 
probably be attributed to a number of factors, 
apart from the perceived increased risks of 
cross-border crime flowing from the abolition 
of border-controls. These include, for example, 
the effects of globalisation, terrorism, organised 
crime and, generally, the increased mobility 
of offenders (see inter alia, Bowling, 2009; 
Busch, 1996; and in relation to the impact of 
globalisation on policing, Reiner, 1992; Sheptycki 
2009a and b). These factors have clearly affected 
the EU and Australia alike.
In addition to the Schengen regime, many 
regional cooperation frameworks have 
developed in the EU: for example, the Nordic 
Police and Customs Cooperation (in Norwegian: 
PTN) (Gammelgård, 2001, p. 232), the Benelux 
cooperation (Treaty Concerning Extradition and 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between 
the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands), 
the Cross Channel Intelligence Conference 
(CCIC) (Gallagher, 2002, p. 121), the Meuse-
Rhine Euroregion cooperation (Spapens, 2008, 
225-226) and numerous Police and Customs 
Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) (Mitteldeutsche 
Polizeiakademie, 2010; Overview of PCCCs, 
2006). 
While enhanced regional cooperation could be 
regarded as beneficial, it has been claimed to 
lead to the emergence of a so-called ‘patchwork’ 
system of cooperation (Benyon, 1994). This 
can also be observed in the Australian context. 
Being political entities consisting of multiple 
jurisdictions, some of those jurisdictions have 
developed stronger links with each other and 
hence engage in more cooperation, while others 
have remained excluded from more advanced 
practices. While in the EU many neighbouring 
states have developed bilateral and multilateral 
treaties and agreements to enhance cross-border 
cooperation, a multitude of EU initiatives have 
equally developed to improve cooperation and 
set minimum standards in certain areas (Böse, 
2007, pp. 235-279). Due to the resulting diversity 
of bilateral, multilateral and EU strategies, the 
creation of an overarching legal framework 
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governing police cooperation has frequently 
been discussed (Mitsilegas, 2009, pp. 59-110; 
Klip, 2009; Klip & van der Wilt, 2002; Asp, 2001). 
Since the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 (Treaty of 
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community), 
these discussions have become even more vivid 
(Ladenburger, 2008).
Although common legal frameworks can be 
said to exist in the EU, such as the Schengen 
Convention, their implementation is far from 
uniform (Joubert & Bevers, 1996, p. 11 [in 
relation to languages], pp. 15-17 [in relation to 
different interpretations]). EU legal frameworks 
provide general strategies for police cooperation, 
which need to be translated into national 
legislation and bilateral or multilateral treaties 
and agreements to become operational at 
the national level (Article 39, para 5 of the 
Schengen Convention). The differences in the 
implementation processes and in legal systems 
in relation to criminal law, procedure, data 
protection and evidence laws therefore continue 
to hamper cooperation (Joubert & Bevers, 1996, 
pp. 538-542; Interview German-French Police 
and Customs Cooperation Centre). It became 
one of the major tasks of European integration 
to improve cooperation by creating harmonised 
legal regulation and ‘compensatory’ measures 
with a view to common standards, practices and 
institutions (see, for the distinction between the 
three legislative dimensions, Monar, 2006).
Problems in the area of information exchange 
have led to the recent establishment of 
another prominent legal framework, the Prüm 
Convention (Convention Between the Kingdom 
of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of 
The Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on 
the Stepping up of Cross-border Cooperation, 
Particularly Combating Terrorism, Cross-border 
Crime and Illegal Migration), which implements 
a system of mutual recognition in the field 
of information exchange. Furthermore, the 
establishment of Europol in 1995 (Council Act of 
26 July 1995 Drawing up the Convention based 
on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on 
the Establishment of a European Police Office) was 
intended to improve the sharing of data between 
the Member States’ law enforcement agencies. 
Europol can to a certain extent be compared to 
Australian federal agencies, as it provides for a 
law enforcement institution with overarching 
responsibility for national jurisdictions within the 
EU and because it can participate, similar to the 
Australian Federal Police, in Joint Investigation 
Teams, despite its lack of law enforcement 
powers.
III. AUSTRALIAN POLICE 
COOPERATION STRATEGIES
Unlike the EU with its 28 Member States, Australia 
is only divided into nine different criminal 
jurisdictions (Bronitt, 2009, pp. 2, 4). However, 
similar to the EU, each of these is policed by its 
own police force and specialised law enforcement 
agencies (Finnane, 1994, pp. 14-23). Problems of 
border crossing, information exchange and joint 
investigations are therefore confronted due to 
differences between state and territory laws in 
the field of substantive and procedural criminal 
law and data protection laws (Bronitt, 2009, 
pp. 2, 4). Another factor that is less frequently 
considered, but no less important, is the difference 
in organisational culture and investigative 
techniques of the state and territory police forces. 
The difficulties of cross-border enforcement in 
Australia are particularly apparent in relation 
to calls for new laws to enable cross-border 
investigation in the last decade. These reform 
proposals deal primarily with mutual recognition 
of law governing controlled operations, assumed 
identities, electronic devices and witness 
anonymity (Standing Committee of Attorney 
General and Australasian Police Ministers Council 
Joint Working Group on National Investigations, 
2003, i).
While similarities between the EU and Australia 
are apparent in relation to the situation of policing 
across borders, major constitutional differences 
exist that need to be considered when comparing 
both systems. Unlike the EU, Australia is one 
nation, established as a constitutional democracy 
(Chapter I, Australian Constitution). It therefore 
is governed by constitutionally established 
federal organs of government with clear federal 
competences (Chapter II, Australian Constitution). 
However, similarities are created by the sub-
division of Australia into states and territories 
following the former system of colonies (Parkinson, 
1994, p. 148). The power to enforce state and 
territory laws and the autonomy in making these 
laws stems from the Australian Constitution, which 
confers some degree of autonomy in relation to 
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legislative powers on the states. This has similar 
effects, in practice, as EU Member States’ national 
sovereignty. By cooperating with other states 
and territories, for example, by exchanging 
information or allowing foreign police on one’s 
territory, state sovereignty in relation to national 
jurisdiction and law enforcement is endangered. 
Only Australian states have sovereignty under 
Chapter V, s 108 of the Australian Constitution, 
while the two territories (Northern Territory and 
Australian Capital Territory) are more dependent 
on the federal state. However, the territories also 
have their separate jurisdiction, police and criminal 
legislation. This constitutional framework led to 
the need for states and territories to either trade 
powers on a bilateral and multilateral basis or give 
up competences to the federal government to 
enhance cross-border police cooperation.
Like EU Member States, Australian states and 
territories can enter into bilateral and multilateral 
relationships amongst themselves. On this basis, 
Australian states and territories have developed 
a number of initiatives to counter cross-border 
crime, mostly in the form of Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs), with other domestic 
jurisdictions. A recent multilateral cross-border 
initiative, called Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara 
Yankunytjatjara lands (NPY lands) cooperation, 
between the Northern Territory (NT), Western 
Australia (WA) and South Australia (SA), for 
example, led to the ceding of competences 
between a territory and two states (Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
2009, Chapter 2).
The most prominent agencies in the areas of 
multijurisdictional policing and information 
exchange are the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) and CrimTrac, an agency created under a 
multilateral MOU between all states and territories 
and the Commonwealth to facilitate information 
sharing (CrimTrac, 2009). Another initiative to 
harmonise cross-border policing standards and 
practices in Australia is the creation of model 
legislation (Standing Committee of Attorney 
General and Australasian Police Ministers Council 
Joint Working Group on National Investigations, 
2003, i), though this is, similar to EU framework 
decisions and conventions, rarely implemented 
uniformly by states and territories. Despite 
Australia being a Federation, a uniform legal 
framework for police cooperation does not exist. 
This causes problems for police cooperation 
comparable to the ‘patchwork’ system in the EU.
Despite the similarities of the EU and Australia 
at the legislative level, the comparability at the 
executive level is more unbalanced. Both objects 
of the comparison differ considerably in relation 
to their population size and degree of historical, 
cultural and organisational diversity. Australia’s 
population size is about 23.4 million (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2014). This compares to 
503 million inhabitants of the EU (Europa, 
2014). Australia covers a total area of 7,692,024 
sq kilometres (including islands) (Australian 
Government, 2009). This compares to the EU 
area, which covers about 4,300,000 sq kilometres 
(Europa, 2009). All police forces in Australian states 
and territories have developed according to the 
British model, and at about the same time, with 
some necessary adaptation to the colonial context 
(Finnane, 1994, pp. 14-23). The differences in 
history, structure and culture of Australian police 
forces are therefore much more subtle than those 
in EU countries. Policing structures in the EU differ 
significantly from Member State to Member 
State according to the particular state structure 
(whether centralised or decentralised), historical 
events (e.g. wars) and legal cultures (e.g. common 
law or civil law) (Fijnaut, 1994, pp. 600-603). 
However, both systems are today promoting 
‘compensatory’ strategies, such as common 
education and training of police across different 
jurisdictions (Lafferty & Fleming, 2000; Pagon, 
1996; and in relation to CEPOL, Occhipinti, 2003, 
pp. 126-129). This shows that similarities exist 
even at the executive level.
IV. EU SIMILARITIES WITH THE 
FEDERAL AUSTRALIAN SYSTEM
The existence of common ‘compensatory’ 
strategies in both systems indicates that police 
organisations share many sociological similarities 
with regards to police cooperation. A major 
difference and advantage of EU cooperation 
compared to Australian strategies is the existence 
of harmonised legal frameworks, such as the 
Schengen Convention and the 2000 Mutual 
Legal Assistance Convention, governing police 
cooperation in the EU. They could hence be a 
model that has the potential to improve police 
cooperation in Australia (as confirmed by the 
recent calls for legal frameworks by Australian 
practitioners).
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Another advantage of EU police cooperation is 
that advanced regional cooperation initiatives 
have been developed and implemented in trans-
national and supra-national legislation. The 
importance of this ‘law generation’ process at 
regional and EU levels is not so much the greater 
legal certainty and formal fostering of cooperation, 
but the recognition of practitioner efforts at the 
Member State and EU levels. It became apparent 
in interviews conducted in Australia that the 
lack of such ‘law generation’ was frustrating for 
practitioners developing sophisticated strategies 
in border regions. The establishment of such legal 
norms in Australia could therefore potentially 
enhance cooperation in the federal system by 
fostering practitioner enthusiasm.
Furthermore, Australia is, unlike the EU, policed by 
federal agencies and their impact on cross-border 
policing has been assessed with a view to informing 
the development of Europol. The existence of a 
federal police agency, while not possible in Europe 
in the near future, is also very problematic in 
Australia. Cooperation between states has been 
reported to work, at least at an informal level, very 
well, while cooperation with the Australian Federal 
Police is marked by resentment and prejudice as 
well as a fear of loss of competences. However, an 
area where the AFP has received high praise from 
states and territories is the Joint Investigation Teams 
(JITs). JITs in Australia are differently organised to 
those in the EU and often also include non-law 
enforcement agencies, such as social services. 
Throughout the interviews for this study, the AFP 
has been applauded for its leadership, knowledge 
about different legal systems within Australia and 
financial support, which significantly facilitate cross-
jurisdictional cooperation. Here, the similarities of 
the EU with a federal system become particularly 
apparent. Europol, while unlike the AFP bare of 
enforcement powers, can already participate in 
JITs and provide its expertise and other support 
to them. In the light of the Australian experience, 
it could be questioned whether Europol would 
be significantly improved by having enforcement 
powers or whether this would only lead to a 
future fight over competences and resentment of 
the Member State’s police forces similar to many 
federal systems, such as Australia.
It can hence be concluded that Australian 
practitioners would welcome the creation of 
common legal frameworks, such as the Schengen 
Convention on police cooperation. The existence 
of such legal strategies in the EU can hence be 
viewed as a major advantage compared to a 
federal system. However, assessing the political 
and legal development in the Australian states and 
territories, a consensus on such measures will not 
be created in the near future. States are scared of 
giving up their limited powers (which in another 
publication by the author has been termed the 
‘fear of insignificance’ — Hufnagel, 2010) and 
apply the adage ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’. While 
regional strategies have developed in Australia to 
promote cross-border law enforcement, none of 
these have been formalised through legislation 
between participating states or taken up as a 
national strategy. This impacts on practitioner 
enthusiasm with a view to cooperation, as none 
of their efforts seem to be recognised at the state 
and national level. Compared to Australia, it can 
be noted that the practitioners interviewed for 
this study in the EU, while being critical of the 
legal provisions, showed a much higher level 
of enthusiasm towards cooperation than was 
apparent in Australia. This might point to another 
significant advantage of the EU: cooperation 
within it is still international as it involves sovereign 
nation states and therefore more exciting and 
marked by professional status than cooperation 
within a national system. A last recommendation 
to the EU could therefore be not to lose the 
individuality of the systems and not to harmonise 
too many rules, as the differences seem to keep 
practitioner creativity and enthusiasm alive.
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CRIME, SCIENCE AND POLICING
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Abstract: In almost every country on earth the primary means used by governments in the control of 
crime involves the use of a criminal justice system – police, courts and prisons etc. This paper will suggest 
that, important though these are for delivering justice or retribution, they are not fit for purpose in the 21st 
Century as a major means of crime control. Much greater emphasis needs to be placed on science and 
experimentation in developing ways to control crime and particularly in stopping it before it happens.  
The paper argues for the introduction of crime science as an appropriate discipline upon which to base 
a more rational and empirical approach to crime reduction and discusses the characteristics of this 
approach and what it might mean in practice.
1. INTRODUCTION
Crime (1) rates are notoriously difficult to measure 
and we can argue at length about whether or not 
crime is rising, falling or staying the same. In this 
paper it is accepted that in general rates of crime 
rose throughout a large part of the last century 
in most of the advanced western democracies – 
Europe, the USA, Australia and so on. Much of this 
rise, as has been argued elsewhere, was due to the 
increase in the availability of desirable goods and 
the changes in social organisation that facilitated 
theft, burglary and other property crime (Felson 
and Clarke, 1998; Felson, 2002). As illustration 
Figure 1 below shows the rise in crime per 1,000 
population in England and Wales from 1918-1993. 
Along with the rise in crime we saw a rise in the 
prison populations. In the UK, for example, the 
prison population rose by 2.5% per annum from 
(8) Although this paper discusses crime the discussion applies equally to disorder and anti-social behaviour, organised crime 
and terrorism. 
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1945-1992 and then continued to grow by 4% per 
annum until 2008-2012 when the annual growth 
fell back to 1%. In other words an active criminal 
justice system (CJS) – did not contain the crime 
rate. 
In practice this lack of efficacy is hardly surprising. 
Figures from the UK Home Office show attrition 
through the CJS in England and Wales. For every 
100 offences committed (as estimated from crime 
surveys) the public only report about 50 to the 
police of which 30 are recorded: This 30 result in 
7 offences being cleared up and only 3% resulting 
in a conviction or a police caution. In addition to 
illustrating attrition through the system the data 
provide evidence of the low probability of capture, 
which offenders quickly learn. It also suggests that 
if we wish to reduce the top line figure of crime 
then we have to think more about preventing the 
crime from happening in the first place rather 
than dealing with it after the event. 
So to summarise: Crime rose throughout the 
latter part of the 20th Century in most western 
democracies; imprisonment failed to contain 
that rise; offenders learned that in general they 
were more likely to escape punishment than 
not (although this clearly varied by offence (see 
Burrows, et al, 2005), and the CJS, as a major 
means of crime control, within the limits set in our 
societies (2) , is failing. 
2. HOW MIGHT WE RESPOND TO 
CRIME?
If the present system has failed what might 
replace it? The argument in this paper is that more 
emphasis needs to be placed on the prevention 
of crime before it happens within an overall 
context of experimentation and learning. This 
experimentation should permeate all aspects of 
society’s response to crime including the CJS but 
not restricted to it. In other words we need to learn 
how better to prevent crimes and be prepared to 
experiment both before and after the event. In this 
way we will build up a body of knowledge on what 
works, not only in relation to State funded police 
agencies but to policing in the broadest possible 
sense – we will have an evidence-base to support 
decisions. 
Becoming more experimental means behaving 
more scientifically. Carrying out experiments 
is a defining characteristic of science. Scientists 
are (ideally) rational; they base their arguments 
upon logic and they use data. In carrying out 
experiments they formulate hypotheses and use 
scientific method to test their ideas. If we take this 
approach into crime control what would we do? 
The answer is that at least in the policing field, we 
would adopt problem oriented policing (Goldstein, 
1997) and use the SARA process (Eck and Spelman, 
1987) or something like it. SARA stands for scanning 
(S: taking a broad look at the crime issues across an 
area and deciding on the nature of the problem); 
analysis (A: analysing the problem characteristics 
in depth and particularly looking to identify the 
opportunities that facilitated the commission of the 
crime with a view to taking action to remove those 
opportunities); response (R: the action taken which 
needs to be clear on the mechanism through 
which the offending will be reduced (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1997; Tilley and Laycock, 2002) and finally 
assessment (A: was the desired effect achieved?). 
This process is not trivial. There are issues 
associated with research design, implementation, 
ethics, aesthetics and resources all of which need 
to be considered in the course of working through 
SARA. We have called this overall approach ‘crime 
science’ (Laycock, 2001; Smith and Tilley, 2005) 
now expanded to crime and security science in 
acknowledgement of the inclusion of terrorism 
and organised crime in particular. Crime Science 
is meant to summarise a number of elements 
through which crime might be better managed 
and knowledge on what works more systematically 
developed. Note it is not called police science. This 
is because it is about the scientific understanding of 
crime not of the police, rather as medical science is 
not called doctor science. Crime science is seen to 
include not only the police in the control of crime 
(and by implication the criminal justice system to 
which the police are seen as the gatekeepers) but also 
local government agencies, schools, communities, 
parents and civil society in the broadest sense. As 
indeed is the case in the field of medicine where 
it is not only the doctors who maintain health but 
the government (through the provision of drains, 
sewers and inoculation systems); adults and parents 
(in encouraging hygiene in their homes and in their 
children); industry and commerce insofar as they 
pay heed to food safety and other aspects of health 
and welfare. 
(8) If we were massively to increase police numbers or introduce harsher or more punitive punishment then the situation might 
be different but for reasons of cost, ethics, justice and proportionality we do not do this.
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Similarly with crime prevention, where everyone 
has a role to play from the individual in taking 
care of their goods, homes, family members and 
community to the local government in the careful 
design of street layout and housing through to 
industry and commerce in the design of goods 
and services with crime prevention in mind. It is 
the responsibility of the government to provide the 
police, courts, prisons and so on but also to create a 
context within which we can all take responsibility 
for crime prevention. 
The involvement of the designers of goods, 
services and systems raises the important extent 
to which other academic disciplines might be 
involved in crime control. Engineers, for example, 
have a role to play through their expertise related 
to systems engineering, electronics and computer 
design. Similarly other scientists – for example 
chemists, biologists or botanists – can all assist 
in the prevention, disruption or detection of 
crime. In other words almost every discipline has 
a contribution that might potentially be made to 
crime control. Reflecting this, crime science can 
again be compared with medical science as a 
multi-disciplinary approach to a complex problem. 
But perhaps the most relevant aspect of crime 
science to policing is in the application of 
scientific method – the articulation and testing of 
hypotheses, which is involved at every stage of the 
SARA process. So, for example, the first question 
is do we have the right problem? If we observe 
that mobile phones are being stolen in a particular 
area then we might hypothesise that professional 
thieves are taking them to sell on at a profit. An 
appropriate response might be to redesign the 
phone so that it no longer works when stolen. But 
further analysis might show that the phones were 
disproportionately stolen by school children, from 
each other, on the way to and from school. The 
problem is not one of mobile phone theft but of 
school bullying – and this might involve a quite 
different response reflecting the re-characterisation 
of the problem.
3. DOES IT WORK?
There is evidence that this approach works 
and at various levels. For example, in England 
and Wales the theft of and from vehicles was 
significantly reduced by problem solving action 
taken by central government in the early 
1990s in pressing the motor manufacturers to 
fit deadlocks and immobilisers at the point of 
manufacture (Laycock, 2004; Farrell, et. al., 
2011). By 2012 theft of and from vehicles had 
reduced in the England and Wales by over 65%. 
Similarly, work by Tilley at al (2011) shows that 
the reductions in domestic burglary are related 
to increases in security and further work by Farrell 
(2013) supports the general hypothesis that the 
crime drops that have been observed are related 
to a reduction in opportunities due to increased 
security. 
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The extent of the crime reduction in England and 
Wales is shown in Figure 2 below. It covers the 
period 1918-2013 for comparison with Figure 1. 
(n.b. The changes from 1999-2003 approximately 
are caused by changes to the counting rules and 
shift to measurement by financial year.) Figure 2 
illustrates not only the prolonged increase in crime 
but also the dramatic reductions in more recent 
years.
A systematic review of problem oriented policing 
has also shown the approach to be effective when 
implemented at local level (Weisburd, et al, 2010). 
For example, the Goldstein Awards in the USA or 
the Tilley Awards in the UK are presented on an 
annual basis to local police or partnerships who 
have demonstrated reductions in policing problems 
using the SARA process. These initiatives are carried 
out by staff who have tackled local problems and 
learned from the process. Descriptions of successful 
projects are available on the website www.
popcenter.org which includes all the Goldstein 
and Tilley winners but also a significant number 
of research reviews on how to deal with highly 
specific problems such as robbery at automatic 
teller machines or prostitution in motels. 
It is important to note that it is not the systematic 
application of the SARA process that reduces 
crime but the results of that process. The correct 
identification of the problem, the creative analysis 
of the data and the introduction of the appropriate 
mechanism in the relevant context lead to the 
outcome of crime reduction. The mechanism is 
the ‘active ingredient’, the means through which 
the presenting problem is reduced. At present we 
know of five mechanisms, which, either singly or 
in combination, might reduce crime in a given 
context. These are intended to affect the decision 
making process of the potential offender and have 
been described by Clarke and others as: Increasing 
perceived risk, increasing effort, reducing rewards, 
reducing provocation or removing excuses (see for 
example, Clarke and Eck, 2003).
The challenge for the would-be crime preventer 
is to introduce initiatives in response to defined 
problems within specified contexts which fire 
those mechanisms, and thus lead to a change in 
the outcome – i.e. a reduction in crime. So, for 
example, in certain circumstances the introduction 
of CCTV might lead to a reduction in crime because 
the risk of offending was seen to have increased 
(capture is perceived as more likely) and/or the 
effort was increased (e.g. the offenders had to find 
an alternative location which they believed was 
not overlooked by active camera systems and thus 
decided to ‘give up’.)
4. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Much of this is not new. There are many small-
scale evaluations of locally based initiatives 
available on specialist websites such as the US 
POP Center website, or systematic reviews of what 
research has shown to work, such as the Campbell 
Collaboration (see www.campbellcollaboration.
org) or crime solutions (www.crimesolutions.gov). 
Many of these activities are supported by central 
governments such as the US Justice Department 
or the Home Office in the UK but the ‘take-up’ 
by the police has tended to be patchy and to be 
dependent upon the interests of individuals rather 
than being part of the corporate culture of the 
police. There is now, however, a growing appetite 
amongst governments to encourage the police 
(and other professionals) to base their decisions 
upon established bodies of evidence rather than 
treating the task as a craft-based exercise, which 
can be learned from experience alone. This is to 
some extent being driven by the economic need 
to maintain the recent reductions in crime against 
a backdrop of reduced public sector resources.
To strengthen this approach the UK Government, 
for example, has established six ‘What Works’ 
Centres covering various aspects of public policy 
including crime reduction. The What Works 
Centre for Crime Reduction is based at the new 
College of Policing, which is specifically remitted 
(inter alia) to identify, develop and promote good 
practice based on evidence. This What Works 
Centre is supported by a £3.2m investment from 
the Economic and Social Research Council and 
the College itself, which is to fund a consortium 
of eight universities across the UK. Over the next 
three years the Consortium members, working 
with advisors from other universities around the 
world will carry out a series of systematic reviews 
of what works in crime reduction to inform both 
policing and the work of other agencies with an 
interest in or remit to address crime reduction. 
In addition to carrying out the reviews the 
programme is to include the development of a 
pilot training programme for the police in the use 
of the resultant material and the interpretation of 
research evidence more generally. 
All this is not to deny the relevance of experience 
and individual expertise in, say, acting as a 
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police commander responsible for the policing 
of a significant area with the attendant resident 
community, but it is to suggest that the experience 
and expertise might be informed by knowledge 
of what works, where, and importantly, how. One 
of the obstacles to the development of evidence-
based policing has been the emphasis within 
police training regimes on management issues, 
leadership skills and the law – all of which are 
obviously important but none of which further 
the integration of evidence-based crime reduction 
into the culture of the police. 
The What Works in Crime Reduction Programme 
is ambitious in its aim to change the ways in which 
policing is delivered. Imagine a police commander 
with knowledge of the effective mechanisms 
that might drive crime down and keep it down. 
This requires not only familiarity with the law, 
powers of arrest and criminal justice but also a 
fundamental understanding of research, science, 
statistics and the mechanisms through which 
crime reduction might be achieved in the various 
contexts that form our complex societies today. 
It might mean that the local area commander 
would be overseeing the completion of small scale 
experiments in his or her area and contributing 
directly to the training of the new officers coming 
along behind. Again, the similarity with the ways 
in which the best teaching hospitals operate is a 
useful and thought provoking analogy.
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ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS AND AUSTERITY: 
CONSEQUENCES FOR POLICE TRAINING AND 
EDUCATION — CHALLENGES AND RISKS — 
(STIMULUS FOR RESEARCH INITIATIVES)
János Fehérváry
Austria
Keywords: Police training, economic constraints, austerity
Abstract: As a consequence of programmes for consolidation of state finances you can find dramatic 
reductions of police training related budget figures in many European countries and in the EU (e.g. 
CEPOL). This situation can be seen dangerous for police/policing and at the same time challenging.
The paper presents different measures to overcome 
budget cuts, as well as the potential consequences 
which are similar in many countries. however with 
differences in dimension, extent and direction.
It appears to the author that the economic 
constraints should not be seen only as an obstacle 
for the further development of police training. 
It should be a challenge for all stakeholders 
and decision-makers in this field for a thorough 
examination of the current system and situation 
and for an adaptation of training/education 
according to new and changing conditions. This 
examination has to respect risks, as they are 
seen by experts. Only a few aspects of potential 
challenges and risks are described in the paper.
Conclusion and motivation: Austerity programmes 
and their consequences for police and police 
training necessitate the need of new research-
based knowledge about how police training with 
high quality can be offered to different actors 
of policing in spite of dramatic cuts from state 
budgets.
According to Cordner & Shaine (2011, p. 281), 
“In the twenty-first century, two of the most 
powerful contemporary factors affecting police 
education and training are globalisation and 
the current economic downturn.” The changes 
of the economic conditions for police training 
and education are subject matters for scientific 
considerations (Neyroud, 2011, pp. 156-173) or 
police research projects rather rarely up to now.
It is not necessary to have a look only at some 
EU Member States like Greece, Portugal, Spain 
or Slovenia with very far-reaching austerity 
programmes and drastic cuts in fields of civil 
service – like police and police training. The 
current situation in Europe is marked by dramatic 
reductions of police training related budget 
figures as consequences of necessary programmes 
for consolidation (restoration/overhauling) of state 
finances – or austerity programmes – in many 
(or even all) European countries and in the EU – 
e.g. CEPOL (European Commission, 2013b). This 
situation can be seen dangerous for policing and 
at the same time challenging.
MEASURES TAKEN TO 
OVERCOME BUDGET CUTS AND 
CONSEQUENCES
The following measures to overcome the budget 
cuts –as well as the potential consequences – are 
similar in many countries – however there are 
remarkable differences in size, extent and direction 
across countries depending on the severity and 
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duration of the economic crisis (European Social 
Survey, 2013b, p. 7) and the degree of protection 
offered by national legal and institutional systems 
(European Social Survey, 2013a, p. 3):
• Measures regarding training activities:
 − Reductions or postponements of national 
and international training activities (e.g. 
shortening or cancelling residential 
courses, reducing new distance learning 
and e-learning offers), in particular in the 
field of cost-intensive further/advanced 
training (e.g. training contingent on 
external experts, interpreters or new 
technological equipment);
 − reduction of the number of participants/
trainers/course managers delegated 
to (national and international) training 
courses /programme-conferences;
 − reduction of budget for training/learning 
materials and equipment.
Effects of these cutbacks:
 − Decline of opportunities for police officers 
(and police trainers) taking part in police 
training activities;
 − decrease of innovation in and adaptations 
of police/policing according to needs and 
environmental changes initiated by well-
trained experts;
 − decline of professional job qualifications;
 − insufficient capacity in specialist resources.
• Shift from police in-service training to self-
education (human self-development)
Because of the budget restrictions and the 
reduction of continuing police education/
training more and more police officers have 
to pay costs for training needed for promotion 
and their career out of their own pockets and 
have to organise it beyond their line-duties in 
free-time.
Effects of these measures:
 − Changes of the conditions for the 
(lifelong) learning process of police officers 
to increase police officers’ vocational 
qualifications, improve professionalism, 
productivity and most importantly 
ensure social security (Kordaczuk-Was & 
Sosnowski, 2011);
 − establishment of a two-tier system within 
police if only few (privileged) officers receive 
in-service training while others have to 
organise and pay the training for their 
job-qualification (further development of 
skills and quality of work) and career by 
themselves.
• Measures regarding human resources 
development and structures in training 
organisations:
 − Salary cuts for trainers/teachers and 
other staff at police training institutions 
(shortening of monthly wages, allowances 
and extra pays for specific tasks e.g. exams, 
writing scripts or internet-programmes, 
interpreting) and shortening or ban of 
over-time (by all-inclusive contracts);
 − reduction of the number of police trainers 
and administrative staff;
 − hiring freeze for new trainers and 
administrative staff;
 − rise of work intensity: extension of 
mandatory teaching assignment and more 
time pressure;
 − increase of retirement age for trainers and 
teaching staff.
Effects of these cutbacks:
 − Problems in recruiting the most qualified 
experts/trainers for police training;
 − demotivation, frustration, burn-out, doing 
the job without passion;
 − reduction of innovation and creativity;
 − possible decline of training-quality unless 
there are compensating measures.
• Reforms of national police training system/
organisation:
 − Centralisation and concentration on the 
one side:
 − closing or merging of police training 
units/schools/academies/…; 
 − reduction of contracts with external 
providers;
 − decentralisation on the other side: shift of 
training from police schools/academies to 
police forces;
 − establishment of models with ability groups 
(in particular in basic police training) 
respecting pre-qualifications or expert 
qualifications;
 − shift of police relevant training from the 
police service to public or private colleges, 
universities and private providers close to 
police and cooperating with police (e.g. 
foundations, unions, associations).
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Effects of these measures:
 − Shifting police training responsibilities 
and the associated costs away from 
police training organisations – because 
of their diminished resources – to others 
(e.g. police forces, universities, colleges 
and individuals). This might change the 
quality of vocational training.
• Outsourcing of special and costly training 
(e.g. expert- or management- or language-
training) – without keeping police influence 
on curricula:
Effects of these measures:
 − Inclusion of the subject “police training” 
into the sensitive and controversial political 
discussion about denationalisation and 
partial privatisation of police tasks and the 
state monopoly on the use of force. This 
discussion will deal with questions like:
 − Is police training/education part of 
governmental tasks and has it to stay 
as a governmental obligation or under 
governmental supervision?
 − Will the inclusion of private actors 
undermine the state monopoly on police?
• Savings in infrastructure:
 − Search for (more) cost effective training 
locations;
 − minimising operating/running costs (costs 
for maintenance);
 − postponement/rejection of financing 
urgent renovations, new furnisher or 
equipment at police schools/academies.
Effects of these measures:
 − Much of the energy needed for content 
and modernisation of training/education 
are used for questions of infrastructure – 
real training matters take a back seat.
• Efforts for new/alternative/additional/variety 
of funds – means of generating revenue:
 − Personal attendance or enrolment fees (for 
specific training courses) [with possibility to 
ask the tax authority for respecting these 
fees as allowable expenses] and leadership 
arrangements;
 − refund of training costs from forces to colleges 
or academies (in particular when there is an 
increase of the general force funding);
 − training for and paid by external bodies and 
private partners (e.g. providers for security 
services, local communities without state 
police authority, local neighbourhood watch 
groups);
 − training for and paid by international 
institutions, organisations or funding 
programmes.
Effects of these measures:
 − Traditional national standards can 
no longer be kept. General (legal and 
finance-related) changes regarding the 
general system of financing education and 
training seem to be necessary in many 
European countries. Political feasibility 
and willingness in many places (like in 
Austria or Germany) can be doubted.
• Claiming sovereignty for police training 
organisations in budgetary matters (so that 
they can make profit which can be used for 
overcoming budgetary cuts):
Effects of these measures:
 − Internal conflicts or distrust with external 
effects and potential public image damage 
for police training: petty jealousy, lack of 
understanding and enviousness in other 
parts of police organisation and other public 
authorities without budgetary sovereignty.
In the majority of cases these different measures are 
taken on the basis of overall fiscal decisions without 
thorough and systematic analyses of the police 
training situation and efficiency, as well as without 
examination of the specific needs of police and the 
expected effects of savings on police and policing.
Because of dramatic reduction of the state budget 
in several countries police in these countries have 
to deal with an increase of mass-demonstrations 
and more and more violent protesters. This 
means additional work and challenges for police. 
However, because of strict budgetary restrictions 
necessary adaptation of police training (and special 
equipment) – according to the new challenges 
for police – is almost not possible, unless it is cost-
neutral. Efforts of police unions which fight for the 
police labour rights do not help to improve this 
situation.
This situation implies for senior police officers and 
managers – in charge of planning, organisation and 
administration of police training – that politicians 
and community (public) expect from them actions 
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and decisions to maximise the benefit of reduced 
resources to widen the market and to increase 
the funding sources – if possible without reducing 
quality of training and in line with rules, training 
needs, political and public expectations towards 
police training. Often this seems to be a mission 
impossible.
CHALLENGES AND RISKS
The economic constraints should not only be 
seen as an obstacle for the further development of 
police training. It should be taken as a challenge 
and a chance for all stakeholders and decision-
makers in this field for a thorough examination 
of the current system and situation and for an 
adaptation of training/education according to the 
new and changing conditions. This examination 
has to respect risks, as they are seen by experts.
Here only a few aspects of potential challenges 
and risks will be presented for considerations 




Quick solutions for solving budgetary problems 
in individual countries and in CEPOL without 
respecting European standards of police training 
and the achievements in the last two decades – 
particularly regarding training of senior officers and 
police experts – could have long-term consequences 
not only for the quality of training/education but 
particularly for the international police cooperation.
Effective police cooperation in Europe is not 
only based on contracts, agreements and joint 
institutions and instruments. Just as important are 
police officers with common attitudes, a common 
understanding of and knowledge about police 
and policing. European training standards, training 
programmes (e.g. joint training activities, common 
curricula, and exchange programmes) as well as 
funding programmes can be seen as important 
pillars for international cooperation.
We cannot expect that the budget restrictions for 
police and police training will be eased in most of 
the European countries soon. On the contrary there 
will be new and more cuts. Therefore the situation 
has to be seen as a specific challenge for all decision-
makers in charge of police training in Europe 
to find solutions that will in the end strengthen 
cooperation. Such solutions could be
• Common or joint development, running and 
funding of costly training activities (e.g. master 
programmes, expert training, train the trainers, 
exchange programmes, distance learning); 
• a clear refusal of competition between police 
colleges and a turn (back) to cooperation;
• strengthening bilateral and regional training 
cooperation with splitting the costs.
But the risks have to be taken into account: time 
factor, bureaucracy, and language barriers.
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES
More and more cost-benefit or efficiency analyses are 
taken or asked - as “alibi” for decisions for eliminating 
or reducing “unnecessary” or “inefficient” training. 
In fact the economic situation is an opportunity for 
healthy examinations of existing police training/
education systems, programmes or curricula. 
The economic situation can be seen as a challenge 
for decision-makers to reconsider and modernise 
the current police national training/education as 
well as the cooperation in this field. In all national 
police training systems can be found on the one 
hand removable duplications, non-updated or 
useless parts of the curricula, unnecessary elements/
ballast, unscreened traditions, (party-) political 
interests, idle capacities and on the other hand 
disregarded changes (new threats and technologies, 
internationalisation) in police environment or not 
respected findings/recommendations of police 
research in the curricula.
However, training experts are aware of the 
weaknesses and risks of cost-benefit and efficiency-
analyses in the field of training. They more see 
the necessity of demand analyses, so that a quick 
response by training activities to changes of the 
threat assessment or new police demand will 
be possible. Decisions or measures only based 
on cost analyses may have long-term negative 
consequences for the training system as such. 
It will take away the important innovative and 
creative element of training for police and policing. 
Therefore eliminating or reducing training activities 
should be based more on demand analyses than 
on costs reduction strategies.
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REDUCTION OF RELIANCE ON CENTRAL 
OR STATE BASED FUNDING
In time of budget reduction for police training by the 
government police training institutions are looking 
for other sources. They offer their programmes, 
curricula, trainers and experts as well as infrastructure 
to international organisations like United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (1) (UNODC, 2014), 
OSCE (OSCE, 2014) or DCAF (2) (DCAF, 2014), to 
European Commission’s Twinning Programmes (3) 
(European Commission, 2014) or to EU-Agencies like 
CEPOL (European Police College, 2013) or FRONTEX 
(Frontex, 2014). This way of selling “products, 
know-how and training conditions” is an excellent 
opportunity for producing income and gaining 
international reputation and recognition for an 
institution by making use of the existing capacities 
and experience.
However, regular contracts with external financers 
could cause a certain dependency. Another risk 
for training institutions could be the bureaucratic 
difficulties regarding the application and 
administration of funds. It is very time consuming 
(and therefore expensive) to fulfil all necessary 
requirements for applications without advice from 
external experts.
INCENTIVE FOR RESEARCH 
INITIATIVE
Austerity programmes and their consequences 
for police and police training as outlined above 
necessitate the need of new research based 
knowledge about how police training with 
high quality can be offered to different actors 
of policing in spite of dramatic cuts from state 
budgets. In this situation CEPOL could take over 
an initiative for
• the development of a European research 
concept for the specific subject area reconciling 
national responsibility for police training with 
European aspects as described rudimentary 
in the European Training Scheme (European 
Commission, 2013a) – considering the 
potential consequences as mentioned above 
(as basis for an application for funding);
• a comparative research programme for
 − collecting and comparing empirical 
findings, practical experience and good 
practice regarding efforts to overcome the 
financial distress for police training;
 − analysing possibilities for opening police 
training/education for other stakeholders 
and partners of policing without creating 
conflicts, dependencies or other problems 
(e.g. security for sale, social conflicts, new 
risks for corruption);
 − sharing good practice and offering 
recommendations based on scientific and 
research findings to fiscal policymakers 
and decision makers in the field of police/
policing for the development of strategies 
in dealing with austerity programmes.
Quoting Cordner & Shaine (2011, p. 282) in the 
end as in the beginning: “Increased scrutiny of 
police education and training, driven by tight fiscal 
conditions, will hopefully lead to a more scientific 
approach to training and to healthy examination 
of current systems and courses.”
(1) UNODC delivers a range of trainings to law enforcement officers on topics of relevance to fighting organized crime in 
their local contexts. It also employs modern technical training such as computer-based training as well as assistance in 
improving information exchange between law enforcement agencies, custom and border control authorities in different 
countries.
(2) Training and capacity-building, including the development of training curricula and training courses for police and border 
security personnel, is a major part of the work of “The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces – DCAF”.
(3) Twinning is an instrument for the cooperation between Public Administrations of EU Member States (MS) and of beneficiary 
countries. Beneficiaries include candidate countries and potential candidates to EU membership, as well as countries 
covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy.
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ENHANCING COORDINATION IN THE AREA 
OF SECURITY AT MAJOR EVENTS
Barbara Maria Rohmann
Italy
Keywords: Major Events Security, international coordination, international standards, best standards, 
lessons learnt 
Abstract: The UNICRI programme on security at major events is aimed at supporting policy-makers and 
practitioners in planning security during major events. On account of their scale and/or high visibility, 
major events (defined as any event requiring international cooperation with respect to security planning, 
such as large sporting events, including the Olympic Games, high-level summits and other mass events, 
such as national and religious festivals) are vulnerable target for unlawful activities, including terrorism, 
and can be exploited by organized criminal groups to further their illegal activities. 
UNICRI has developed and implemented 
regional initiatives in this area. The initiatives 
provide training and advisory services to security 
planners in preparation for major events. 
The European regional initiative is entitled 
“Enhancing European Coordination for National 
Research Programmes in the Area of Security 
at Major Events – THE HOUSE” and is being 
implemented from 2012 to 2014. It involves 
24 European Union Member States with the 
coordination and implementation responsibility 
vested in UNICRI, drawing on the achievements 
of seven years of activities and previous UNICRI 
projects. 
UNICRI assists several Member States, within 
the framework of these regional initiatives, in 
organizing major events. These include in the 
past e.g. Trinidad & Tobago for the carnival, 
Mexico for the Pan-American Games and the 
G20 Summit in 2012; Costa Rica for the Central 
American Games; Cyprus and Ireland for the 
EU Presidency, Poland for the Euro Soccer Cup, 
Bulgaria for the World Cup qualification and 
Finland for the Euro Athletics. 
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Interregional Crime 
and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) was 
established in 1967 to support Member States 
in the areas of crime prevention and criminal 
justice. In furtherance of its mandate, UNICRI 
uses action-oriented research to assist in the 
formulation of improved policies and concrete 
intervention programmes. Against this backdrop, 
UNICRI identifies areas of common concern to 
Member States which are of critical importance 
to the international community in general, upon 
which to concentrate. Security planning for 
major events is one such area.
For the purposes of its work, UNICRI defines 
Major Events as events requiring international 
cooperation in respect of their security planning. 
Broadly speaking, these can be separated into 
four categories: sporting events (Olympics, World 
Championships, etc.); political events (summits, 
State visits, etc.); cultural events (carnivals, 
festivals, etc.); and, other mass gatherings 
(scientific conferences, International expositions 
etc.). Major events are windows of opportunity 
due to the fact that they are often accompanied 
by substantial increases in the financial, human, 
technological, and other resources which are 
available to national security planners. As a 
result, major events offer the finance and the 
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availability of resources to expand a modern 
and efficient security infrastructure, which 
allows for increased security while requiring 
decreased levels of policing. Additionally, major 
events allow for the introduction of systems 
and practices, procurement of equipment 
and expertise, development of training and 
expansion of capacity in a manner that is 
innovative and meaningful. In this way, they 
provide a legacy of development in national 
security planning practices and structures, as 
well as new forms of thinking in response to 
emerging threats to national security, and the 
furtherance of international cooperation among 
security planners.
Having identified major events as an area in need 
of international coordination, UNICRI launched its 
global programme on major events in 2002. This 
programme has subsequently received express 
backing from the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council (Ecosoc) Resolution 2006/28, in 
which the Council invited UNICRI to continue 
and expand its work in this area and invited 
Member States to request UNICRI’s assistance for 
the security planning of major events.
Throughout UNICRI’s work, a common thread is 
the focus on activities at regional level. This stems 
from the recognition that programmes and 
projects implemented among countries of similar 
social, political, and economic backgrounds and 
institutional frameworks can be carried out more 
effectively and the legacy of success can be seen 
throughout the region.
Based on this approach, the project EU-SEC was 
initiated by UNICRI in 2004, as the first regional 
platform for the coordination of security during 
major events in Europe.
EU- SEC AND EU-SEC II
EU-SEC, which involved 10 EU Member States (1), 
was funded by the European Commission’s 
6th framework programme — DG Enterprise 
and Industry. It was aimed at supporting and 
coordinating national research activities related to 
security during major events. EU-SEC pioneered 
a common methodology for the coordination of 
national research programmes on security during 
major events at European level. In addition, the 
project developed research on police ethics and 
public private partnerships during the planning of 
major events, and it identified thematic priorities 
for future research activities (all of which would 
later be built upon in EU-SEC II, described in the 
next paragraph). Furthermore, by establishing a 
coordination platform of end-users, EU-SEC laid 
the foundations for the creation of ‘The European 
House of Major Events Security.’
Based on this success, the follow up project, EU-
SEC II, was launched in 2008, now involving 22 
Member States (2). EU-SEC II identified key areas 
of security planning for major events which 
required further coordination. On the basis of this, 
a number of standards and priorities for future 
research (3) were defined and/or elaborated. 
These are split into two main groups: ‘Established 
Standards’ and ‘Tools for Development.’
The project elaborated established standards in 
relation to four areas:
• The IPO (4) Security Planning Model: A security 
planning blue print that can be tailored to 
each country’s specific needs.
• Public Private Partnerships (PPPs): Guidelines 
for assessing, establishing and utilising PPPs.
• Media Management: Guidelines for Police and 
security planners in general on the cultivation 
and management of symbiotic relationships 
with the media.
(1) The Member States of EU-SEC were Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom.
(2) The Member States of EU-SEC II were Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom.
(3) Further information on these standards can be found in EU-SEC II Consortium (2011).
(4) UNICRI launched the International Permanent Observatory (IPO) on Security Measures during Major Events in 2003. In 
2007, within the framework of the IPO, The IPO Security Planning Model was published as a model of best practice in 
security planning to assist planners in their daily work and to unite national approaches in the planning of security for major 
events. The IPO was formally acknowledged for its efforts by the United Nations Ecosoc Resolution E/2006/28 of July 2006. 
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• Ethical and Operational Standards for Security 
and Security Products: A tool used to review 
operational adherence to the Council of 
Europe’s ‘European Code of Police Ethics’ and 
the quality assurance process of bringing any 
new security products into daily routine.
A further three Tools for Development were 
defined:
• Specialist Technical Equipment Pool (STEP) — 
a database of specialist technical equipment 
that partner will be able to share in order to 
support planning and procurement decision.
• European Major Events Register (EMER) — a 
database or register that will allow to register 
by a hosting authorities’ events as ‘major’.
• Training and Networking — to promote and 
raise awareness of ‘The House’ (5) services 
among EU police forces in collaboration with 
European Police College (CEPOL).
The final output of EU-SEC II was the manual 
‘Foundations of the European House of Major 
Events Security’ (EU-SEC II Consortium, 2011) 
and with this ‘The House project’ (elaborated 
upon further below) was brought into being.
IPO AMERICAS
On the basis of the success of EU-SEC and EU-SEC 
II and in collaboration with the Organisation of 
American States (OAS), in 2007, UNICRI launched 
a similar platform for the coordination of major 
events security in the Americas.
IPO Americas is a regional initiative to improve the 
cooperation of OAS Member States in the field of 
major events security. Within the last five years, 
30 Governments out of the 34 OAS Members 
States officially appointed a National Focal Point 
(NFP) to IPO Americas. The NFPs are responsible 
to represent their respective countries, facilitating 
access to relevant information and expertise at 
national level and identifying possible needs 
of their countries within the framework of the 
project.
Since 2010, IPO Americas has been funded by 
the government of Canada, having initially been 
funded by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Its main objectives are:
• Provision of training and advisory services 
to security planners in preparation of major 
events to be hosted in the Americas;
• Supporting the sharing of information and 
best practices among Member States;
• Development of a Knowledge Management 
System (KMS) on major events security and a 
regional training manual;
• Definition of planning standards within the 
American sub-regions;
• Dissemination and adoption of best practices 
for Public Private Partnerships for security at 
major events; and,
• Enhancement of crime prevention capacity in 
the involved Member States.
A proliferation of major events in the region (Pan 
American Games 2011, 2013 Central American 
Games, 2014 South American Games, 2014 
FIFA World Cup, and 2016 Olympic Games) 
which attract worldwide audiences underlines 
the importance of achieving such a common 
regional approach.
The legacy of IPO Americas is hoped to be 
manifold. Firstly, the development of the 
capacities of the partners in respect of hosting 
major events will enhance the reputation of the 
region for hosting safe, secure and incident free 
major events. Secondly, from a socioeconomic 
point of view this will have benefits not just for the 
host state but for the region as a whole. Thirdly, 
the enhancement of international cooperation in 
the region in the build up to and during these 
events will, it is envisaged, produce long-term 
policing benefits in the aftermath of these events 
where the lessons learned and best practices 
established can be converted into a broader 
framework of crime prevention strategies.
(5) ‘The House’ is the independent structure envisioned by the EU-SEC II consortium to eventually take over all of the services 
developed during EU-SEC II and provide assistance to requesting States. The transition between EU-SEC II and The House 
as a permanent sustainable structure is bridged by ‘The House Project,’ described below. 




Building directly on the achievements of EU-
SEC, EU-SEC II, and indirectly from the success of 
the IPO Americas, The House Project runs from 
March 2012 to February 2014 and is funded by 
the European Commission’s 7th Framework 
Programme — DG Enterprise and Industry, and 
was launched to test the standards which had been 
outlined in EU-SEC II as common EU standards. As 
with the predecessor project, ‘The House’ project 
has seen an expansion in the consortium which 
now stands at 24 EU Member States (6).
The process of ‘testing’ these standards as 
common EU standards involved the project 
partners attending the ‘associated events’ and 
discussing the standards of ‘The House’ in relation 
to accepted national practice. After a consultation 
process with the project partners, during which 
over 30 major events were considered, eight 
major events were chosen. Particular importance 
was attached to achieving a balance between 
sports competitions, mass gatherings and political 
summits as the planning challenge presented to 
security planners by each of these events differs 
greatly. The events at which ‘The House’ has 
tested or will test its standards are the following:
• Euro Athletic Championships, Finland, June-
July 2012
• UEFA Euro Cup, Poland, June-July 2012
• Bulgaria-Italy FIFA WC Qualification, Bulgaria, 
September 2012
• EU Presidency, Ireland, January-June 2013
• Rainbow March, Slovakia, September 2013
• EU Presidency, Lithuania, June-December 2013
• CEV Euro Volley, Poland, September 2013
• Nuclear Safety Summit, Netherlands, April 
2014
The ‘association’ of an event to the project 
involved project partners meeting with the 
security planners of the chosen major events in 
order to present the standards of ‘The House’. 
The subsequent discussion/consultation process 
helped to determine gaps and/or overlaps 
between ‘The House’ standards and those 
applied nationally. The dual goals of this process 
are on the one hand to assess the impact of the 
standards as common European planning and 
evaluation standards; and on the other hand, 
to assess their potential impact on the main EU 
security priorities (The Stockholm Programme 
and the EU Internal Security Strategy). The 
results of the consultation with national security 
planners were recorded and will form the basis 
of the final project reports. On the basis of these 
reports, a set of User Guidelines is being drafted 
to complement the manual published at the 
end of EU-SEC II; these guidelines will contain 
practical information for major events security 
planners and other security practitioners, on how 
to make full use of ‘The House’ and its services.
A unique aspect of ‘The House’ project as a 
research project is that national end users from 
24 EU Member States are the main actors/
researchers in the project. They have been 
appointed to various roles ranging from: 
Event Hosts, who organise and facilitate the 
consultation process with national security 
planners of associated events; ‘Standard Owners,’ 
who act as ‘custodians’ of a standard, presenting 
the standards to national security planners at the 
associated event meetings; Task Team Members, 
who attend the associated events gaining and 
recording feedback from the national security 
planners on the impact of the standards as 
common European planning and evaluation 
standards and on their potential impact on 
the main EU security priorities. This method of 
policy development which involves the security 
planners at all stages ensures that they and their 
countries have a real ownership over the output.
Furthermore, the project provides a platform for 
the exchange of ideas/information on security 
issues. Participation in the consortium provides 
all partners access to an international network of 
security experts who they have the opportunity 
to meet at regular intervals, and who they are in 
constant contact with, through their work within 
the project. The consortium also benefits from 
the input of an Advisory Board composed of 
(6) Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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CEPOL and Europol who are both represented at 
project meetings in order to provide their relevant 
technical input to the Consortium and ensure 
coordination with existing European entities and 
initiatives in the field of security during major 
events. In addition, the partners have had the 
opportunity to network with the security planners 
from host countries of the associated events, 
discussing the handling of real scenarios from the 
planning and carrying out of major event security 
and, in doing so, laying the groundwork for future 
cooperation and building towards a common 
policing approach across Europe.
THE FUTURE OF ‘THE HOUSE’
The 24 Member States of ‘The House’ have 
decided that the way forward should involve the 
development of an all encompassing interactive 
web based security planning tool incorporating all 
of the methodologies and technical tools of ‘The 
House’. In this phase, the consortium will attempt 
to ensure that its pattern of expansion continues 
beyond the current 24 Member States. As in the 
previous phases of the project, the involvement 
of the national security planners will be essential 
to ensure that the outputs will have the approval 
of, and will be adopted by, the partner Member 
States. In addition, the consortium will work 
to consolidate the position of ‘The House’ as a 
comprehensive European planning framework 
for major events security in order to ensure that 
established best practices are continually codified 
and that lessons learned from major events in the 
EU are easily accessible to and serve to benefit the 
security of the entire community.
In the long term, the maintenance and expansion 
of the networks of security practitioners, 
methodologies and technical tools will ensure 
that the impact of ‘The House’ goes far beyond 
major events security as it contributes to the 
realisation of the main security priorities of the EU 
— the Stockholm Programme and the EU Internal 
Security Strategy (ISS) which call for ‘more 
effective European law enforcement cooperation’ 
(Council of the European Union, 2009, s 4.3.1).
CONCLUSION
In a broad sense, the method of policy elaboration 
applied in both Europe and the Americas within 
the projects highlighted above could easily be 
adapted to other contexts and other regions of 
the world with the assistance of UNICRI given 
their role in regional policy coordination for major 
events security at United Nations level.
‘The House’ project (plus its predecessors EU-
SEC and EU-SEC II) and IPO Americas have been 
making, and continue to make, a significant 
contribution to the coordination of major event 
security planning in Europe and the Americas 
respectively. The objective of the partners involved 
is to create a lasting legacy of improved security 
capacity, common standards and procedures 
efficiency, and increased regional and international 
cooperation among security practitioners. In this 
way, the windows of opportunity offered by 
major events will be taken advantage of to the 
fullest extent in terms of the security of the event 
itself, the maximisation of the enjoyment of the 
event for all and the potential for development of 
security policies, practices and cooperation.
REFERENCES
Council of the European Union (2009). The Stockholm Programme.
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:en:PDF
EU-SEC Consortium (2008). ‘Toward a European House of Security at Major Events — Best Practices 
for Research Coordination’.
EU-SEC II Consortium, (2011). ‘Foundations of the European House of Major Events Security — A Manual 
for the International Coordination of Major Events Security Research in Europe’.
UNICRI (2007). International Permanent Observatory (IPO) Security Planning Model.
UNICRI (2010). Handbook to assist the establishment of Practices for Public Private Partnerships to 
protect vulnerable targets.
United Nations Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) (2006). Resolution E/2006/28 of July 2006.
EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN
SPECIAL CONFERENCE EDITION
139
 NEW APPROACHES TO COMPARE POLICE 
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Abstract: Police work is a particular stressful occupation. Exposure to stressors everyday impairs physical 
and psychological health and can impact the welfare of citizens. It seems crucial to further understand 
stress among police officers in order to have proactive and healthy European police force. Despite this 
need, previous research on Police stress has been impaired by several problems. These include relying 
largely on self-report measures, retrospective biases, and cross sectional designs, failing to address 
within-person variations. Police forces in most European countries face nowadays extremely challenging 
times due to a combination of factors, including open borders, drug trafficking, terrorism, multicultural 
diversity and the overall use of new technologies in contemporary life (Benyon, 1994; Oakley, 2001). 
Hence, there is an urgent need to conduct comparative occupational health studies among police 
forces in Europe, allowing the development of knowledge in this area and the dissemination of best 
practices to tackle police stress and foster police health and well-being. Despite this need, little work 
has been conducted, mainly due to a variety of reasons discussed in this paper that are likely to emerge 
when conducting European comparative studies on police. In an attempt to overcome some of these 
challenges, recommendations are provided and particularly an innovative interdisciplinary research 
method developed in the SCOPE project is described. Findings of this research will impact theoretical 
and applied knowledge in the area of police occupational health. Finally, this seems to be a promising 
research method to use in future comparative occupational health studies among police forces in Europe. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Police work is a particular stressful occupation 
(McCarty, Zhao, & Garland, 2007). Police officers 
on their daily duties have not only to take care 
of themselves but also assure the safety of the 
public and still be able to keep their emotions 
and reactions under control. As a consequence 
of the demanding occupation, several physical 
and psychological health problems can occur, 
with impact on the welfare of officers and 
citizens. This exposure of police officers to 
potential stress sources over time has been 
associated with several problems (Kop, Euwema, 
& Schaufeli, 1999, Violanti & Paton, 2006), 
affecting not only behavioural (i.e. absenteeism, 
poorer interactions with the public, fatigue, 
attitude towards the use of violence; excessive 
drinking and smoking), but also physical (i.e. 
cardiovascular diseases, digestive problems), 
and psychological components (i.e. increased 
(1) Acknowledgments: Thanks to Prof. João Paulo Cunha (INESC TEC/ FEUP) and Prof. Ana Aguiar (FEUP) for their important 
contribution in the development of the SCOPE interdisciplinary method. Additionally thanks to Polícia de Segurança Pública 
(PSP), Portugal for collaborating in the SCOPE project research.
 This research has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programs ([FP7/2007-2013] [FP7/2007-
2011]), under the SCOPE project Grant Number [PCIG10-GA-2011-303880], the Future Cities Project — FP7 Capacities, 
Grant Number 316296, and from FCT, Portugal (DFRH/BI/51845/2012).
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thoughts of suicide, anxiety, depression, post-
traumatic stress disorder and burnout). Thus, 
the understanding of police officers stress is 
crucial when aiming to improve this population 
health, as well as improve the overall safety of the 
community (Lucas, Weidner, & Janisse, 2013). 
Despite the growth of studies investigating the 
impact of stress on police officers over the years 
(e.g. Violanti & Aron, 1995) further investigation 
in this area is needed (Mikkelsen & Burke, 
2004), controlling previous methodological 
and conceptual shortcomings. Hence, allowing 
the development of knowledge and applied 
implications ready to be transferred to police 
officers training. Previous studies investigating 
stress among police officers relied largely on 
self-report measures (usually questionnaire 
and interview-based) and cross sectional 
designs. While it is believed that this research 
was important to understand the causes and 
consequences of stress among this population, it 
did not fully assess the different sources of acute 
stress, its magnitude based on physiological 
data, and how police officers react and cope 
with a stressful encounter (Violanti & Aron, 
1995). Furthermore, these methods fail to 
address within-person variations and have been 
associated with retrospective bias (Nicholls, 
Jones, Polman, & Borkoles, 2009). Hence, 
findings rely on partial recall and inference 
strategies, due to autobiographical memory 
construction and retrieval biases challenging the 
validity and reliability of the reports (Segerstrom 
& O´Connor, 2012).
Nowadays, police forces in most European 
countries face extremely challenging times. These 
are due to a combination of factors including 
open borders, drug trafficking, terrorism, 
multicultural diversity and inclusion and the 
overall use of new technologies in contemporary 
life (Benyon, 1994; Oakley, 2001). Although 
previous studies have highlighted the effects 
of acute organisational and operational stress 
among police officers across different European 
countries (e.g., Kop et al., 1999; Biggam, Power, 
Macdonald, Carcaldy, & Moodie, 1997; Queirós, 
Kaiseler & Silva, 2013; Recasens i Brunet, 
Basanta, Agra, Queirós, & Selmini, 2009), little is 
known about the effects of these contemporary 
demands on police officers occupational health 
or whether they are somewhat similar or 
completely different across European countries. 
In an attempt to understand this relationship and 
reflect on best practices on police occupational 
health in Europe, it seems crucial to conduct 
European comparative research, contributing 
to the development of a more qualified police 
training system ‘capable of responding quickly 
and intelligently to the accelerating pace of social 
change’ (MacDonald et al., 1987, p.4). Although 
European comparative studies among police 
officers have strong theoretical and applied 
implications at an individual and institutional 
level, little work has been conducted in this area, 
mainly due the difficulties associated with the 
research process and described in the following 
lines.
Firstly, as suggested by Weisburd and Neyroud 
(2011) there is still a gap between science and 
policing. In other words, on the one hand, police 
personnel complicate the use of results from 
academic research and knowledge. On the other 
hand, some academics ignore the real scenarios 
in which the police operate. Additionally, the 
difficulties researchers face when aiming to 
conduct research among police institutions, 
such as the access to data collection procedures 
(Mathur, 1999), should also be seen as an 
explanation for the gap between science and 
policing.
Secondly, there are a diversity of police forces 
and respective duties across European countries 
(Vertovec, 2007), which difficult comparisons 
between countries. Additionally, the language 
and cultural barriers also difficult the use of 
standardised occupational health research 
methods across European countries. In an 
attempt to address this problem, researchers 
could probably contemplate the use of more 
qualitative research approaches, developed 
through European research networks, including 
researchers and police personnel from different 
countries. Additionally, the inclusion of technology 
and the use of interdisciplinary knowledge when 
aiming to compare European police officers’ 
occupational health are also powerful tools to 
consider. These, will not only overcome simplistic 
and traditional methodologies previously used, 
but will also allow comparisons of police officers 
performance under different European real 
world scenarios. An example of an occupational 
health project assessing stress and coping 
among police officers, including technology and 
interdisciplinary knowledge, was developed in 
Portugal — SCOPE (Stress and Coping among 
Portuguese Police Officers - http://www.fpce.
up.pt/scope/index.html ) funded by a Marie 
Curie Action. The ambulatory research tool 
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was designed by an interdisciplinary research 
team (psychology, biomedical and electro 
technical engineers) and it combined wearable 
electrocardiogram and mobile devices, ready to 
assess stress and coping among police officers 
during daily life experience (Kaiseler, Rodrigues, 
Ribeiro, Aguiar, & Cunha, 2013; Trull & Ebner-
Priemer, 2013). The ambulatory method is 
currently being tested in the city of Porto, 
Portugal by the third author of this paper.
2. SCOPE AMBULATORY 
METHOD: ASSESSING STRESS 
AND COPING IN REAL WORLD 
SCENARIOS AMONG POLICE 
OFFICERS
The innovated and interdisciplinary SCOPE 
method proposes a disruptive technology to 
investigate stress and coping strategies used by 
police officers working in real world scenarios. 
Ambulatory Assessment is a recent promising 
research tool that minimises retrospective biases 
while gathering ecologically valid data, including 
self-reports, physiological or biological data 
and observed behavior. It has been successfully 
used across different settings of occupation 
health (Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2013). Thus, the 
current method combines physiological and 
psychological measures of stress and coping, 
combining user-friendly and non-intrusive 
technology, adapted to Police Officers real world 
needs. Vital Jacket® (VJ) (Cunha, 2012) and 
electronic diaries held on mobile android phones 
including GPS (Gomes et al., 2012) are used to 
collect physiological (HRV) and psychological 
measures as well as location where the event 
occur. In this way, police officers use the VJ on a 
daily basis as well as mobile devices containing 
electronic diaries; data is therefore being collected 
throughout the day. Theoretical implications of 
this research will advance the international state-
of-art in the area of stress and coping among 
police officers. Particularly, findings will allow 
us to fully understand what are the stressors 
experienced by police officers working in real 
world scenarios and their psychophysiological 
impact on the individual as well as the coping 
strategies being used to tackle each stressor. 
Applied implications of the research will allow 
the design of evidence based stress management 
interventions, developing the health and 
wellbeing of police officers, and increasing the 
safeguard of the overall community. Additionally, 
this method may be a promising tool to develop 
future comparative occupational health studies 
among police officers in Europe.
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GENDER AND POLICING: NARRATIVES OF 
CRISIS, CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
Marisa Silvestri
United Kingdom
Keywords: Gender; Policewomen; Diversity; Cult of Masculinity; Police leadership
Abstract: The recruitment of a more diverse police workforce has been central to police reform agendas 
across time and place. Police organisations throughout the world have been subject to a number of 
high-profile and damning reports that have emphasised the damaging effects of a lack of diversity. Such 
damaging effects have been repeatedly cited in relation to both external interactions between police 
and citisens, and to the internal interactions between police officers themselves. This paper considers 
more specifically the issue of gender representation within policing. It reflects on the histories that have 
shaped women’s entry, progression and participation in policing over the past century and considers 
some of the contemporary challenges faced by police organisations in maintaining and improving 
women’s representation within a climate of economic constraint. Histories of policing have consistently 
demonstrated that bringing about change to the organisation is a difficult and often protracted process. 
Indeed much research has pointed to the long tradition of police resistance to organisational change 
initiatives. Through reflecting on the past and present, it engages with narratives of ‘crisis’ ‘change’ and 
‘continuity’ in thinking about the future of gender and policing.
The recruitment of a more diverse police 
workforce remains a central feature of 
contemporary police reform agendas throughout 
the world. Encompassing race, religion, gender 
and sexuality, diversity debates within policing 
are wide ranging and go beyond the scope of this 
contribution. This paper focuses more specifically 
on the issue of gender and policing. In 2010, the 
Home Office’s ‘Assessment of Women in the 
Police Service’ detailed considerable progress in 
relation to the increase in female recruitment, 
representation and progression in England 
and Wales, asserting that ‘female recruitment is 
strong and women officers’ chances of promotion 
are generally on par with their male counterparts’ 
(Home Office, 2010, p.3). With the number 
of women in policing in England and Wales 
indicating an upward trend currently standing at 
27 %, there is no doubt that the police service 
has done much to demonstrate its commitment 
to realising equality, diversity and human rights. 
That said, the continued under-representation of 
women within the police workforce, particularly 
at senior levels, remains a key and consistent 
reality for police organisations across the world 
(Dick et al. 2013; Van Ewijk, 2012; Prenzler & 
Sinclair, 2013). This paper calls into question the 
popular mantra that suggests that ‘all things are 
equal now’. It reflects on the histories that have 
shaped the call for women’s entry into policing, 
their progression and participation within 
policing over the past century and considers 
women’s early experiences of policing in relation 
to some of the contemporary concerns about 
women’s participation in policing. It is not 
my aim here to provide a historical account of 
women’s role in policing nor to compare the 
progress made by women worldwide. Rather, 
through historical reflection, we can begin to 
map just how far policing has come in relation to 
addressing issues of gender within its workforce 
and to think more critically about the concepts of 
‘crisis’ and ‘change’. It also affords an opportunity 
to speculate about some of the key challenges 
that lie ahead in relation to achieving gender 
balance and equality, particularly in times of 
global economic constraint and austerity.




Women have been present and engaged in 
the work of policing for over a century now. 
Participating in various forms of social control 
for much of the nineteenth century (in various 
‘moral rescue’ roles), female police officers were 
first recruited in the early twentieth century. 
As the century progressed, their appointment 
continued on a piecemeal basis. In a rare 
international comparison of the progress and 
integration of women in policing, Van Ewijk 
(2012, p1) notes four broad phases of women’s 
recruitment into policing: after the First World 
War; the Inter-War years; after the Second World 
War; and the modern period from the 1980s 
onwards. Despite variation between countries, a 
consistent and familiar pattern of recruitment is 
observed, whereby there is a ‘period of omission, 
followed by limited succession, amalgamation 
or formation of separate women’s departments 
and working towards full integration’. Alongside 
this pattern of recruitment, commentaries on 
early policewomen’s experiences suggest much 
opposition and resistance. Histories document 
a damning picture in which women’s entry and 
progression was vigorously fought, resisted and 
undermined on legal, organisational, informal 
and interpersonal levels (Carrier, 1988; Martin, 
1980; Miller, 1999; Schulz, 1995; Segrave, 1995). 
Whilst countries vary in the dates that women 
were admitted into the police, there is a strong 
consensus that suggests that opposition to their 
entry and integration was almost universal (Brown, 
1996). In making sense of this opposition, Brown 
and Heidensohn (2000) point to a combination 
of paternalistic concerns to protect women 
and patriarchal exclusion of women as being 
unsuitable for the ‘rough and dirty tasks’ required 
by policing. Perhaps best described as a history 
of struggle, the history of women in policing is 
one in which clear and strong gendered markers 
of inclusion and exclusion were established. From 
the very outset, the role and identity of the police 
officer was firmly located within men’s domain 
and associated with ideas of masculinity. With 
physicality and the capacity to use coercive force 
crafted as something that only men possessed, 
women were constructed and deemed to be 
‘deficient’ in the project of mainstream policing 
and routinely and legitimately excluded. Cast as 
‘outsiders’ to the main project of policing, early 
policewomen’s presence in policing was enabled 
only through a focus on social and welfare work 
tasks, working with female suspects and victims of 
crime (mainly those engaged in prostitution) and 
young people (Brown et al, 1999; Heidensohn, 
1992; 2000; Brown & Heidensohn, 2000; Schulz, 
1995).
As the century progressed, the appointment of 
women in policing continued on a piecemeal 
basis with Brown (1996) reminding us that though 
political activation and lobbying contributed 
to changing attitudes towards the idea and 
possibility of women police officers, their actual 
entry was often precipitated by a ‘crisis’. Europe 
for example, saw a growth in the number of 
policewomen after the two world wars; as did Asia 
and Africa in the post-colonial era and emerging 
democracies in Eastern Europe and South America 
(Van Ewijk, 2012); and India, following the crisis 
brought about the mass movement of people 
following Partition in 1947 (Mahajan, 1982). The 
influence of such ‘crisis’ based discourse holds 
much continued resonance to contemporary 
calls for the need to recruit more women into 
policing. The reality of trafficking problems in 
newly emerging African nations for example, is a 
key impetus for the recruitment of more women 
into policing. Important changes brought about 
by Equalities policy and legislation throughout 
established democracies in Western Europe, the 
US and Australia have also contributed much 
to the progression of women into mainstream 
policing in latter part of the twentieth century 
(Brown, 2007; Natarajan, 2008).
Women in England & Wales began their work 
in policing in a separate women’s sphere in the 
Women’s Police Service (WPS). It was only in 
1975 that the police organisation disbanded 
the WPS and integrated women into its ranks. 
The idea that integration would automatically 
improve women’s situation and bring about 
equality however, did not materialise. Relatively 
little was done to prepare the police service to 
become a gender-integrated organisation in the 
aftermath of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and 
much has been written about the disjuncture 
between policy and practice in the decades that 
followed, with studies reporting discrimination 
and sexual harassment as consistent features of 
policewomen’s experiences. Sexist jokes, the 
use of derogatory language, deliberate sexual 
contact, differential deployments, blocked 
promotions, and the allocation of ‘safer’ station 
assignments are all indicative of women’s 
discriminatory experiences of policing over the 
course of the twentieth century (see Brown, 
1997 for a good review of this). Conceived of 
as a moment of progress and gain for women, 
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a number of commentators have observed 
the considerable and simultaneous losses 
experienced in the movement to integration. In 
a review of career advancement during this time, 
Brown (2008) argues that women officers fared 
worse in achieving promotion when compared to 
men. She suggests that this was because women 
were now competing against the total number 
of eligible officers instead of being considered in 
terms of the number of appropriately qualified 
women from the previously separate Police 
Women’s Department. Women who had reached 
senior positions in the separate policewomen’s 
service were forced to relinquish them as they 
joined forces with men. Such findings are 
echoed in the work of Schulz (1995) and Miller 
(1999) who record the double-edged impact 
that integration and the move to patrol in the 
late 1960s was to bring to policewomen in the 
US. In securing the transition into mainstream 
policing, many policewomen were to turn their 
back on their traditional roles. Schulz (1995, p.1) 
notes that in the movement toward equality, 
policewomen were ‘forced to reject their 
history…[and] repudiate their past’. Brown and 
Heidensohn (2000, p.4) concur describing the 
move towards integration as ‘… the striking of 
a somewhat Faustian bargain’ with the price of 
admittance resulting in a loss of a radical agenda 
and the acceptance of male definitions and 
methods of control.
But that was then, this is now. We now exist in 
a post-rights democratic culture in which the 
main tenets of equality have been enshrined 
and embedded into macro and micro structures, 
into organisational and everyday discourse — a 
discourse that suggests that the major battles 
encountered by women have been fought and 
won. We are now living in a reality identified as 
‘the post-feminist era’, a space in which girls who 
have benefited from an equalities policy discourse 
are ‘mobilised as the embodiment of the values of 
a new meritocracy’ (McRobbie, 2012, p58). It is 
here that the young woman more particularly has 
been released from any constraints. Constructed 
as the ‘can do’ girl, if she just works hard and long 
enough, she can do it, anything is possible….
she is a privileged subject, independent, self-
reliant and ‘empowered’ (Harris, 2004 cited in 
McRobbie, 2012, pp. 58-60). This is a world in 
which ‘all things are equal now’ and a world in 
which there is no more need for an ideology such 
as feminism. Twenty first century girls and women 
no longer work within a framework of feminism 
but through a framework of modernisation — the 
project of ‘Gender Mainstreaming’ — the process 
of integrating the aims of gender equality and 
women’s rights into the agendas, policies, and 
practices of governments and organisations. In 
describing gender mainstreaming, McRobbie 
(2012, p.152) asserts that it is best thought of as a:
non-conflictual accommodating kind of 
programme…. [whose]…vocabulary is modern, 
managerial and professional, a programmatic 
approach, with all kinds of tools for evaluation and 
assessment of outcomes which can be rolled out as 
good practice within corporate as well as state and 
public sector institutions.
Alongside other public sector organisations, the 
police service in England and Wales has done 
much over the past decade to mainstream gender 
into its activities, through the development of 
a series of evaluation tools and good practice 
measures. Through such activity, the structural 
obstacles that women police so often described 
in their history of struggle appear to have been 
dismantled and women can be found engaged 
in a range of policing tasks and ranks previously 
closed to them. Above all else, the transformative 
possibilities of recruiting a diverse police 
workforce are increasingly being recognised in 
England and Wales and beyond as an opportunity 
to substantially reform and reconfigure policing 
for the better, bringing about improvements to 
both internal dynamics within policing and to 
external interactions with communities (Silvestri 
et al, 2013).
WOMEN POLICE:  
A TRANSFORMATIVE 
OPPORTUNITY OR  
A RESPONSE TO CRISIS?
A recent joint report published by ACPO, APA and 
the Home Office, Equality, Diversity and Human 
Rights Strategy for the Police Service (2010) outlines 
a number of benefits in relation to the recruitment 
of a more diverse police workforce. These include 
the potential to achieve: a broader range of 
information for decision-making and a wider range 
of possible solutions; a willingness to challenge 
established ways of thinking and consider new 
options; improvements in the overall quality of 
the team; better staff management, leading to 
improvements in staff satisfaction; a reduction 
in the number of employees leaving the service, 
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and fewer grievances and complaints; and better 
relationships with the community, resulting in a 
more effective service and better quality services, 
leading to increased public confidence.
In an era where the emphasis on service in policing 
has become paramount, evidence suggests that 
women may have a positive impact on shifting 
policing philosophy away from a crime control 
to a community and citizen-focused approach. 
Women officers demonstrate a strong ‘service 
oriented’ commitment to policing, emphasising 
communication, familiarity and the building of 
trust and rapport with communities (Brown and 
Woolfenden, 2011; Davies and Thomas, 2003; 
Heidensohn, 1992; Fleming & McLaughlin, 
2010). Miller (1999) found that women police 
are perceived as ‘friendly and service oriented’ 
by members of their communities. Brown et al. 
(2009) present evidence to demonstrate that 
the members of the community recognise the 
value of an increased representation of women 
and the importance of a more diverse police 
service, expressing preferences for women police 
to deal with victims and missing persons. The 
Patten Report (1999) in Northern Ireland has 
also emphasised the positive effect of having a 
much higher proportion of women officers on 
enhancing the effectiveness of policing within 
the community.
In relation to their enactment of everyday practices, 
specifically, interacting with and apprehending 
potential or actual perpetrators of crime, research 
shows that, when compared to men, women 
police appear to be less ‘trigger happy’ and much 
less likely use deadly force (Brown and Langan, 
2001; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008; Waugh et 
al, 1998), utilise threats, physical restraint, force 
and arrest (Rabe- Hemp, 2008; Shuck & Rabe-
Hemp, 2005). In a study of conflict management, 
Braithwaite & Brewer (1998) found that male 
officers were twice as likely as female officers to 
engage in threatening behaviour and physical 
contact with members of the public, which in 
turn elicited greater resistance and aggression. 
Such findings appear to provide explanations for 
evidence which demonstrates that women are less 
likely to abuse their power and attract complaints 
and allegations of misconduct (Brereton, 1999; 
Corsianos, 2011; Lonsway, Wood and Spillar, 
2002). Waugh et al. (1998) found that male police 
attracted two and a half times as many allegations 
of assault as female police. Moreover, successive 
inquiries into corruption and police misconduct 
in Australia have concluded that there is a direct 
association between increasing the number of 
women police officers and reducing levels of 
corruption (Fleming & Lafferty, 2003).
Positive outcomes in relation to policewomen’s 
enactments of police practices can also be found 
in relation to their interactions with victims of 
crime, particularly those that have experienced 
sexual offences and domestic violence. Research 
by Brown and King (1998); Page (2007) and 
Schuller and Stewart (2000) found that women 
police officers are more likely to believe victims, 
attribute less blame to the victim and be 
less accepting of rape myths than their male 
counterparts. Research by Rabe-Hemp (2008, 
2009) also suggests that women officers bring 
a high level of empathy in serving the needs of 
women and children, especially those that have 
been subject to violent or sexual abuse. Using 
data collected by a large scale observational 
project on the impact of officer gender on police 
response to domestic violence, Sun (2007) found 
that whilst there was no significant difference 
between female and male officers in their 
exercise of control actions towards citizens, there 
is some evidence to support the link between 
officer gender and non-coercive actions. Such 
findings are echoed in a recent review of global 
policing which has emphasised the positive 
effects of women for police conduct and police-
community interactions, in the management and 
de-escalation of conflict situations and in the 
support for victims of crime (Brown et al., 2014).
The extent to which the call for more women 
police stems from an appreciation of the benefits 
outlined above remains a contested point. More 
cynically perhaps, the call for more women might 
be better understood as an attempt to re-balance 
a loss in police legitimacy in times of crisis. 
Plagued by a series of high profile events and 
chief officer resignations in England and Wales, 
the past decade has witnessed a growing disquiet 
over the failures of police leaders and of the need 
to transform and diversify the police workforce, 
particularly those working in leadership (Condon, 
1997; HMIC, 1996; HMIC, 1999). The race to 
appoint a new London Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner in September 2011 serves as a 
good example here. In July 2011, Conservative 
Prime Minister David Cameron, told the House 
of Commons that the system for producing 
police leaders was ‘too closed’, and that ‘There 
are too few, and arguably too similar, candidates 
applying for the top jobs’. Following widespread 
media speculation over who might succeed Sir 
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Paul Stephenson, the lack of women and ethnic 
minority officers in the frame for this leadership 
role became unashamedly apparent. The 
appointment of Sir Bernard Hogan Howe from an 
all-male short list served once more to emphasise 
the lack of diversity at the top of British policing — 
no women or black or ethnic minority candidates 
applied for the job. This is not to suggest that 
women were not encouraged to come forward, 
indeed, London Mayor Boris Johnson clearly 
favoured the appointment of a woman to the top 
job, suggesting that this is precisely what policing 
needed. In predicting possible successors, The 
Evening Standard (19th July 2011) newspaper 
ran a double spread feature on potential female 
candidates entitled ‘Can these women save the 
Met? Restoring trust lies with senior females’.
Such calls for more women to ‘clean up’ policing 
have become a familiar mantra in times of 
crises, controversies and ‘integrity lapses’. This 
is nothing new; rather it is a recurring theme in 
women’s engagement with policing. As noted 
earlier, historical reflection demonstrates that a 
discourse of ‘crisis’ has served as an important 
impetus for the recruitment of women into 
policing. Heidensohn (1992; 2000) reminds us 
that at moments of crisis the police service often 
turn to women as ‘a desperate remedy’ to offset 
staffing shortages, avert criticism, as an antidote 
to corruption or symbolically to demonstrate a 
softer side to policing. The same can be seen in 
Australia where the movement towards gender 
equality owes much to organisational crises, with 
official reports pointing to the direct association 
between increasing the number of women police 
officers and reducing the levels of complaints 
against the police organisation (Fleming & 
Lafferty, 2003). Increasing women’s presence in 
policing in this respect forms a crucial strategy 
in professionalising the police. In these cases 
‘women are “allowed in” at particular historical 
points when agencies wish to (re)legitimise their 
practices’ (Prenzler & Wimhurst, 1996, p.16). The 
appointment of South Africa’s first female police 
chief, Mangwashi Victoria Phiyega in 2012, has 
also been firmly located within such discourses, 
being cited as ‘South Africa’s hope, the saviour of 
the nation’s corruption-riddled, scandal-plagued 
police service’ (The Guardian, 13 June, 2012). 
Though not the focus of this paper, it is worth 
noting briefly here, such a characterisation of 
women’s transformative potential is dangerous, 
not least because it inevitably has a tendency 
to essentialise all women (and by implication 
men), but it assumes that women will not only 
bring something different to the work of policing 
but that they bring something ‘better’. This is 
not necessarily a good place to campaign for 
more women in policing; rather, the benefits 
of recruiting more women into policing are 
best aligned to securing equity, social justice 
and legitimacy (see Dick et al., 2013 for a fuller 
discussion of this debate). With equalities law 
and policy firmly established, together with a 
recognition by police organisations that gender 
balance is important, both to the work of 
policing and to securing greater legitimacy with 
communities, what do contemporary studies tell 
us about women’s experiences in policing?
CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLES?
Despite showing an upward trend in the number 
of women police, closer inspection suggests a 
more cautious reading is necessary here. If we 
locate where women are positioned within the 
rank structure, it becomes strikingly clear that 
things are nowhere near equal. The number of 
women working in police leadership remains low 
with women forming only 18 % of those officers 
ranked Chief Inspector or higher. Such figures 
remain a key concern, particularly given that 
research commissioned by the British Association 
of Women Police (BAWP) in 2006 suggests a 35 
% representation of female officers is necessary 
for adequate progression and cultural integration. 
Women fare no better in policing systems across 
the world. Indeed one of the striking truisms 
about policing is that issues of gender transgress 
national boundaries. Despite jurisdictional 
differences in policing systems, there are clear 
parallels in relation to gendered experiences, 
with women police in England and Wales sharing 
much in common with their European and more 
global counterparts. In a rare international review 
of the progression and integration of women in 
policing, Van Ewijk (2012) notes that there is no 
evidence of a fully integrated police organisation 
where women represent 50 % of the officer 
workforce and enjoy an equivalent share of the 
full range of roles and ranks within the police 
hierarchy. Rather, in most developed democracies 
it seems that the percentage of sworn women 
police remains under 25 % and for the most part, 
appears to have reached a plateau. For women in 
non-democratic or emerging democracies, they 
remain grossly under-represented (Natarajan, 
2008). The stark lack of women in senior positions 
is also replicated across jurisdictions (Brown et al., 
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2013; Prenzler & Sinclair, 2013; Fischbach et al., 
2013).
So how do we reconcile the continued absence of 
women in policing in the 21st century? To what 
extent has the struggle so characteristic of early 
women’s experiences in policing been eradicated 
in this new landscape? Do contemporary 
policewomen experience the same resistance and 
struggle as their historic counterparts have before 
them? What are the barriers that stand in the way 
of their full participation and progression within 
policing? Any attempt to address these questions 
requires much more than a simple examination 
of the number of women engaged in policing. 
Here the issue of gender equality goes beyond 
the numeric; for not only do men dominate in 
terms of their number, but policing — as a kind 
of power over time — in all forms and aspects 
remains embedded in notions of ‘masculinities’ 
(Barrie & Broomhall, 2012). It is from such a 
cultural starting point that a more nuanced 
analysis of change and continuity can emerge.
A CULT OF MASCULINIT(IES)
The presence of a ‘cult of masculinity’ has been 
a central element to the study of police culture 
(Fielding, 1994; Reiner, 2010; Westmarland, 
2001). Indeed much of the opposition to women’s 
entry and progression over the last century in 
policing has been firmly located within such a 
concept. In deciphering the ‘cult of masculinity’, 
Fielding (1994) argues that its stereotypical values 
of aggression, physicality, competitiveness and 
its exaggerated heterosexual orientation, may 
be read as an almost pure form of ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’ (Connell, 1987). At the heart of this 
discourse is a narrative that constructs women 
through a language of deficits, conceiving of 
women as lacking in physicality necessary for 
police work. With the perception that police 
work involves strength, action and danger, 
the concept of physicality becomes a defining 
element of the ‘cult of masculinity’ and so the 
work of policing becomes securely defined as 
‘men’s work’. As Heidensohn (1992, p.73) notes: 
‘[A]n elision which is frequently made [is that] 
coercion requires force which implies physique 
and hence policing by men’. In turn, women’s 
lack of success is often justified on the grounds 
of women’s unsuitability with the demands of the 
job, their contributions being perceived in terms of 
‘deficits’ (Heidensohn, 1994). The policewomen’s 
perceived lack of physical presence, tough 
physique and, above all masculinity, are used as 
rational and legitimate reasons for their exclusion. 
The lack of physical strength and the ensuing 
problems in violent situations remains a consistent 
justification offered by policemen for women’s 
continued differential deployment and their 
negative view of policewomen. While the ‘cult 
of masculinity’ remains a valuable frame within 
which to understand some women’s experiences 
of policing, its explanatory power holds less 
value when trying to make sense of the lack of 
women in senior ranks. My argument is a simple 
one: the ‘cult of masculinity’ so often used to 
explain women’s negative experiences and lack of 
progression in policing does not possess sufficient 
explanatory power for making sense of the 
experiences of women who hold rank in policing. 
The ‘cult of masculinity’ to which we have become 
so routinely accustomed characterises and refers 
predominantly to the culture of those at the 
bottom, the male rank-and-file.
With police leaders perhaps the least likely to 
be called upon to exhibit physical displays of 
strength and prowess, it could be assumed that 
on achieving rank, women will no longer endure 
hostility, discrimination and exclusion as they no 
longer face the demands of physicality in the 
same way as their rank-and-file counterparts. 
Yet research has emphasised continuities in the 
resistance and struggle faced by contemporary 
women police leaders in being accepted by 
their male peers and superiors (Silvestri, 2003; 
2006; 2007). As women progress through the 
ranks, Silvestri argues that they join new circles, 
new groups, each with their own distinct set of 
behavioural prescriptions and each with their own 
set of gendered identities. Senior policewomen 
continue to face a gendered environment where 
masculinity persists; this time, however, they 
are faced with a different kind of masculinity 
one where physicality is less obvious, but where 
traits associated with ‘managerial’ masculinity 
dominates. Conceived of as a ‘smart macho’ 
culture, Silvestri argues that the organisational 
restructuring and the reduction of management 
posts appears to have strengthened the 
predominantly male culture of long working 
hours, aggressive and competitive behaviour 
remains. Interview data with senior policewomen 
indicate that the culture of police management 
demands quick decision-making and decision-
makers; the transformational approach takes too 
long and is therefore perceived to be ineffective 
when performed by women. There is a tacit 
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understanding among women leaders that using 
more participatory and consultative approaches 
does not count towards building a suitable profile 
for becoming a police leader. Senior policewomen 
interviewed pointed to the emergence of a 
new managerial culture in policing, highly 
performance-driven and preoccupied with 
meeting performance indicators and targets. 
This new management style promotes a form of 
‘competitive masculinity’ that encourages:
‘a way of relating to the world wherein everything 
becomes an object of, and for, control... [which] 
generates and sustains a hierarchy imbued with 
instrumentalist, careerism, and the language of 
success, emulates competition linked to decisive 
action, productivism and risk taking’ (Kerfoot & 
Knights, 1993, p.67).
The effects of being perceived as not being 
‘tough’ enough or ‘quick thinking’ enough for 
the demands of management and leadership 
hold serious consequences for women engaged 
in developing alternative conceptions of police 
leadership (often associated with transformative 
leadership). Women adopting alternative styles 
come to be labelled not as progressive or 
innovative, but as weak, passive, over-sensitive 
and unable to withstand the rigours and demands 
required of the police leader — again ‘outsiders’ 
to the real project of policing (Silvestri, 2003).
A GENDERED CAREER LADDER
Closer examination of the police career itself 
also provides additional clues to understanding 
the struggle experienced by contemporary 
policewomen. Following the earlier work of 
Kanter (1977) and Cockburn (1988) it was Joan 
Acker (1990) who developed one of the first 
systematic attempts to theorise the processes 
through which organisations and occupations 
are gendered at both institutional and individual 
levels. In her influential paper ‘Hierarchies, jobs, 
bodies: A theory of gendered organisations’, Acker 
argues that organisations are arenas in which 
both gender and sexuality have been obscured 
through gender-neutral, asexual discourses, 
concealing the embodied elements of work. 
As a result, job positions and management 
hierarchies assume a universal, disembodied 
worker. For Acker, the bureaucratic organisation 
has a ‘gendered substructure’, that is, the 
social practices that are generally understood 
to constitute an ‘organisation’ rest on certain 
gendered processes and assumptions. In defining 
this substructure, she notes that:
‘The gendered substructure lies in the spatial 
and temporal arrangements of work, in the rules 
prescribing workplace behaviour and in the 
relations linking work places to living places. These 
practices and relations, encoded in arrangements 
and rules, are supported by assumptions that 
work is separate from the rest of life and that it 
has the first claim on the worker’ (Acker, 1990, 
p.255).
It is within this gendered substructure that 
the ‘ideal worker’ is routinely constructed 
and reproduced and it becomes obvious that 
organisational designs and established norms are 
far closer to men’s lives and assumptions about 
men, than to women’s lives and the assumptions 
made about women. It is men’s bodies, men’s 
sexuality and men’s relationships to procreation 
and production that are subsumed in the 
image of the disembodied worker. Acker’s ideas 
provide an important framework for examining 
the police career. The very way in which police 
work is organised and structured carries the 
dominant meanings of police work that have 
been embedded and carried over time. Whilst 
appearing to offer its workforce a gender-neutral 
career ladder within which to advance, it becomes 
clear that progression within policing is premised 
on an ‘ideal’ type of worker. A recurring obstacle 
for the retention and progression of women in 
policing lies in its working patterns, and whilst 
the police service has done much to acknowledge 
this barrier through the development of part time 
and flexible working arrangements, the police 
career in England and Wales remains bound 
by a century old career model. Unlike some of 
their counterparts elsewhere in Europe and the 
rest of the world, Britain operates a single entry 
system of recruitment with all officers without 
exception beginning their careers as constables 
(1). From here, career advancement is achieved 
through climbing a highly structured career 
ladder through a series of ranks. The ideology 
of internal recruitment together with a rank-
(1) This looks set to be modified following the recent proposal to introduce direct/multi-point entry to the police service as 
outlined in the Winsor Report (2012).
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governed progression system tells us much about 
the importance that the police organisation and 
its members attach to the importance of ‘time 
serving’. The strict linear career model together 
with the continued importance it attaches to 
time served holds serious consequences for all 
officers but impacts in a particularly damning 
way for women. Whilst the police service may 
provide opportunities for part-time and flexible 
working (and can therefore demonstrate progress 
in the name of equality), senior policewomen 
interviewed by Silvestri (2003) remained sceptical 
of the possibility of engaging with such alternative 
working practices. Their narratives suggest a 
strong awareness that utilising alternative working 
patterns do not count towards the profile of 
earning or demonstrating either ‘credibility’ or 
‘commitment’ in the journey to the top. On the 
contrary, it is an ‘uninterrupted, long and full time 
career’ profile that counts in building an identity 
in police leadership. The ‘irresolvable conflict’ that 
exists between balancing family commitments 
and a career in policing remains a major barrier 
for women in policing with research continuing to 
stress that officers working part-time or flexibly are 
perceived as less professional and less committed, 
which in turn, affects the promotion aspirations 
and opportunities of policewomen (Charlesworth 
& Whittenbury, 2007; Dick & Cassell, 2002; 
Fischbach et al., 2013). Constructed as being ‘ever-
available’ and without family commitments, such 
an identity is justified through the conception of 
‘real’ policing and police work and it is here that 
the male identity of the ‘ideal’ officer is upheld, 
assured and preserved.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The past century has been a mixed one for 
women working in policing. There have been 
a number of important and welcome changes 
in equalities policy and substantial inroads 
have been made to advancement and position 
of women in policing. At the same time, there 
is evidence of the considerable continuities, 
ingrained and enduring features of the masculine 
ethos that has shaped the police career over time 
and across place. Characterised by moments of 
progression and regression, gains and losses (often 
simultaneously felt) are an enduring theme of 
women’s experiences of policing over time. The 
history of struggle so often used to describe early 
policewomen’s experiences of policing is not 
confined to the past but rather can be seen in the 
present. Through the dominant mantra that ‘all 
things are equal now’ and the process of gender 
mainstreaming (and its association with progress), 
it is easy to fail to recognise the simultaneous 
‘undoing’ of gender and regression inherent 
in this process. It is true that policewomen in 
England & Wales no longer face or experience the 
visible and audible hostility of the past; they do, 
however, continue to experience the processes 
of gendered inclusion and exclusion — albeit 
in more subtle ways. Despite a discourse that 
suggests otherwise, the police career continues 
to be remarkably resilient to change.
Women have now been afforded opportunities 
to compete on equal terms with men for 
promotion to senior management positions 
and while gender alone is no longer a barrier 
to even the most senior police management 
position, the characteristics required of leaders 
in this new order may be leaving their mark. 
Rather than representing an opportunity for 
change, organisational restructuring and the 
reduction of management posts appears to have 
strengthened the predominantly male culture of 
long working hours, aggressive and competitive 
behaviour, maintaining gendered identities in the 
police organisation. In this context policewomen 
often have to make stark choices between 
pursuing promotion and fulfilling commitments 
outside of work. The contemporary policewoman 
continues to struggle, this time, however, she has 
no recourse to claim that structures are not in 
place — after all, gender has been mainstreamed 
and a system of checks is now routinely part and 
parcel of organisational life. The ‘can do’ woman, 
so symbolic of the 21st century, is independent 
and empowered and if she does not remain or 
progress within policing, then the problem is 
seen to reside within her as an individual and not 
as part of the ongoing and recurring constraints 
posed by the structural and cultural elements 
within policing, which for the most part remain 
unhindered by policies of gender mainstreaming. 
In her analysis of police culture, Loftus (2010) 
suggests that claims regarding transformation 
and change within policing have been 
exaggerated and overstated. The ongoing public 
and police preoccupation with crime and crime 
control reflect the continuing dominance of a 
masculine ethos within the police occupational 
culture. As does the continued ‘male’ advantage 
inherent in the structuring of the police career 
itself (Silvestri, 2003; 2006). And things look set 
to get worse. Recent findings in 2013 from the 
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Independent Police Commission on the Future of 
Policing, for example, indicate a possible moment 
of regression, with four in 10 women police 
officers having considered leaving the force 
because of low morale and concerns regarding 
flexible working and childcare considerations 
(Dick et al., 2013).
Current climates of ‘economic constraint’ austerity 
‘and ‘bureaucracy reduction’ serve to perpetuate 
the problem further. Since the formation of the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government in May 2010, we have seen the 
articulation, and now enactment, of a different 
approach to tackling equality. Rather than 
continuing to develop equality architecture, a 
move to deregulate and cut bureaucracy has 
seen the government restrict rather than build 
on existing state institutions and weaken legal 
provisions. As the policing landscape becomes 
radically reorganised with fewer officers and 
reduced opportunities for promotion, cultures of 
insecurity and competition are enabled to flourish, 
as individuals and groups compete against one 
another for scarce opportunities and resources. 
There is evidence of a dismantling of support 
structures within policing, with cuts being made 
to national police support associations working 
in the area of diversity and reduced investment 
to address diversity and equality issues (Laverick, 
2012). Such change poses further evidence of an 
‘undoing’ of gender in a time of progress. The 
importance of staff networks was fundamental in 
the successes of early women police. Heidensohn 
(2000) reminds us of the importance of 
‘organising’ and ‘collective action’, noting that 
national and international alliances and networks 
that women forged throughout the twentieth 
century were instrumental in developing their 
roles and their cause. With developments 
in globalisation and increasing attention on 
international trafficking, the conditions are in 
place for a greater mobilisation around the 
representation of women in policing — the 
challenge for police organisations across the 
world will be to respond.
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EFFECTIVE CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN 






Keywords: Police, Research, Change, Organisational culture, Management, Leadership 
Abstract: The following article wants to introduce the COMPOSITE project (COmparative POlice Studies 
In The EU). It is intended to give an overview of the project structure, partners and its aims as well as 
to present general results. The COMPOSITE project intends to examine large scale change processes in 
police forces all across Europe and aims to find out what factors contribute to success or failure of these 
change processes. It explores such processes in ten European countries with 15 partners over the course 
of 4 years and will not only generate research results but also implement trainings and diagnostic tools 
for practical use.
INTRODUCTION
COMPOSITE — COMparative POlice Studies in 
the EU — is an interdisciplinary and cross-national 
research project to investigate change processes 
in Europe’s police forces with the aim to identify 
critical success factors of change processes. 
COMPOSITE is supported by the European 
Commission as part of the 7th Framework 
Programme for Research and Technological 
Figure 1: Map of Europe with countries involved in COMPOSITE 
Source: COMPOSITE.
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Development and runs from August 2010 to July 
2014. The consortium of COMPOSITE consists 
of 15 research institutes from ten countries (see 
Figure 1): Rotterdam School of Management 
of the Erasmus University Rotterdam (the 
Netherlands, consortium leader), University of 
Antwerp (Belgium), University of Masaryk in Brno 
(Czech Republic), University of Applied Sciences 
of the Brandenburg Police (Germany), Fraunhofer 
Institute for Applied Information Technology FIT 
(Germany), Capgemini Telecom Media Defence 
(France), National Center for Scientific Research 
(France), Foundation for Research on the Migration 
and Integration of Technologies FORMIT (Italy), St. 
Kliment Ohridski University Skopje/Bitola (Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), University 
of Utrecht (the Netherlands), Police Academy 
in Apeldoorn (the Netherlands), Department 
of Psychology of the Babes-Bolyai University 
(Romania), ESADE Business School (Spain), Business 
School of Durham University (United Kingdom), 
and Sheffield University (United Kingdom).
SOURCE: COMPOSITE.
In addition to the research teams, the project also 
includes an End User and Strategic Advisory Board 
from the participating countries to ensure a close 
connection to the police. The End User Board is 
an important part of the governing structure of 
COMPOSITE and is composed of police officers 
on a senior operational level. The members of 
the End User Board act as a sounding board for 
quality and relevance of the deliverables and are 
especially important for discussions on cultural and 
national differences in police work. The Strategic 
Advisory Board is a group of senior policy-makers 
and police chiefs from the participating countries 
who function as a consultancy and review board 
to ensure the strategic link between the project 
and the police forces in the respective country.
To move the comparative aspect of the research 
beyond written reports and empirical findings, 
COMPOSITE also initiated a photo project 
called COMPOSITE gallery which illustrates the 
similarities and differences in everyday working life 
of police officers in the 10 participating countries. 
Two professional photographers travelled all over 
Europe and caught remarkable scenes as well as 
insightful impressions of the inner workings of the 
visited police departments. The pictures can be 
seen online via www.composite.rsm.nl.
The goal of the COMPOSITE research project is not 
restricted to the extension of scientific knowledge 
and theory building, but it will also help improve 
management of police forces and thus save public 
funds by providing benchmarks and learning 
opportunities, increase the performance of police 
forces across the EU and help to deepen existing 
networks and inter- as well as intra-organisational 
ties between forces.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND 
WORK PACKAGES
COMPOSITE covers a wide range of research 
questions and objectives. It is divided into 11 
work packages (WP), four of which deal with 
project management, academic integration, 
dissemination as well as an exploitation strategy. 
Seven work packages cover the empirical aspects 
of COMPOSITE:
• WP 1 looked at the relevant issues on the 
change agenda in European police forces, 
the opportunities and threats as well as the 
primary stakeholder of police forces (Van den 
Born & van Witteloostuijn, 2011; Van den 
Born, 2013).
• WP 2 investigated the ability of police forces 
to react to social, political and economic 
challenges and identified those police 
practices that serve as strategies to adapt to 
those challenges (Graham, Betteridge, Casey 
& van Witteloostuijn, 2012).
• The focus of WP 3 was on the description 
and comparative assessment of police 
communication while asking the questions 
of how information is distributed and 
communication is organised (Birdi, Allen, 
Turgoose, MacDonald & Vössing, 2012a; 
Birdi, Allen, Turgoose, MacDonald & Vössing, 
2012b).
• WP 4 deals with technical trends and challenges 
to modern police work investigating the 
different ways of technological adaption 
(Denef et al., 2011; Denef, Kaptein, Bayerl & 
Ramirez, 2012).
• WP 5 is designed to identify the influence of 
cultural factors on the ability of police forces 
to change and attempts to measure specific 
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norms that have an impact on change processes 
(first snapshot results: Elliott, van den Oord, 
Pólós & Betteridge, 2013). This work package 
also addressed the following questions: What 
kind of change processes were implemented? 
Which ones were successful and which ones 
were not? What were the success factors and 
which factors contributed to failure?
• WP 6 researches the organisational culture 
of police organisations and the professional 
identity of police officers in order to understand 
which parts of the specific police culture serve 
as facilitators for or barriers against change 
processes (first results: Horton, Bayerl & 
Jacobs, 2013; Bayerl, Horton & Jacobs, 2013a).
• Finally, WP7 looks at the aspect of leadership 
in change processes (first results see: Bayerl, 
Horton & Jacobs, 2013b).
The research process can be tracked via the 
project’s website (www.composite-project.eu) 
where working papers, publications, presentations, 
and general news on the COMPOSITE project are 
released. Information on the on-going project 
progress is also given in a monthly COMPOSITE 
newsletter.
RESEARCH METHODS
The COMPOSITE project uses a multi-method 
approach. Over the course of the project, several 
hundred semi-structured interviews (qualitative 
social research) with police officers of all hierarchical 
levels — operational, supervisory, strategic level 
— were carried out in the participating police 
forces. In WP 1, a PESTL analysis was conducted 
examining the topics of police policy in terms of 
political (P), economic (E), social (S), technological 
(T) and legal (L) trends. As part of WP 2, a SWOT 
analysis was conducted, giving valuable insights 
into the strengths and weaknesses of police 
organisations, as well as the opportunities and 
threats they are faced with. This research also 
focussed on the dynamic capabilities of the police 
forces involved. In most work packages, also a 
case study approach was used to describe specific 
change processes in greater detail. In addition 
to the semi-structured interviews and the case 
studies, a core survey (quantitative social research) 
was conducted in all countries in order to test 
the hypotheses that were formulated on the 
basis of the previously conducted interviews. The 
data was collected through an online and paper-
based questionnaire distributed to the individual 
participants between September and October 
2013. At the time of writing (March 2014), the 
analysis of the assembled data was still going on.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
Police forces all over the world are constantly 
forced to change in order to react to political, 
social, technological, economic, legal and 
environmental developments (Van den 
Born & Witteloostuijn, 2011; Van den Born 
et al., 2013). Most of these changes do not 
encounter significant resistance nor do they 
run into any kind of significant problems. 
Examples of routine changes may include the 
introduction of more advanced technologies, 
legal changes, or procedural improvements. But 
some changes can create significant irritation 
among the members of the organisation 
or major stakeholders, trigger criticism and 
resistance and may not yield the desired results. 
Particularly, changes that do not take into 
account organisational, professional, or cultural 
parameters, often turn out to be risky and 
prone to failure (Jacobs, Christe-Zeyse, Keegan 
& Pólós, 2008). Therefore, COMPOSITE focuses 
on organisational structures, organisational 
identities and cultures, leadership styles, and 
processes in the context of change.
In this respect, police forces to a large degree 
depend on their organisational environment. 
In order to be successful, police forces need 
to operate in networks and cooperate with 
different external stakeholders — municipal 
administrations; educational institutions; 
media; citizen; justice, to name but a few — in 
due consideration of their mutual expectations 
(cf. Gruschinske & Hirschmann, 2013, p. 
187). As part of WP 1 and 2, the stakeholder 
management of the participating police forces 
was examined with respect to how important of 
the stakeholder is for the police and what kind 
of influence the stakeholder has upon the police 
(Barlage, van den Born & Jochoms, 2012).
There is strong evidence that in most police 
forces, there does not seem to exist a 
strategically oriented stakeholder management, 
meaning that many police organisations invest 
too much time and effort in stakeholders that 
are not particularly relevant for them, and at 
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the same time neglecting stakeholders that 
are or might be of critical importance. Thus, 
the researched police forces should monitor, 
reconsider, or change the way they deal with 
their external stakeholders (especially the ones 
they depend on) in order to improve their 
networking-performance.
This also applies to the management of 
citizens’ relationship. The research reveals that 
in most police forces, citizens are seen as one 
of the most important external stakeholders. 
Consequently, citizens’ expectations could 
and should be managed much more actively; 
this aspect of police work is more difficult than 
anticipated, however, because — from a police 
officers’ perspective — the average citizen does 
not seem to have a sufficient understanding of 
police work. Still, increased communication and 
awareness training as well as a more professional 
information and communication strategy seems 
to be needed in most of the police forces that 
participated in the research. This also implies 
the use of social media.
The analysis of the way police forces use social 
media was part of a separate work package (WP 
4) in which technological trends, performance, 
and technology adaption were analysed (Denef 
et al., 2011; Denef et al., 2012). Sebastian Denef 
et al. (2011) identified six major themes in the 
context of information and communication 
technology within police forces; one is about the 
emerging challenge of social media applications. 
In a second study, Denef et al. (2012) focussed 
on best practice in police social media adaption. 
Our data clearly show that the use of social 
media was significantly more advanced in 
countries such as the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom as opposed to most other European 
countries. In the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, social media are also seen as among 
the most effective ways to communicate with 
citizens and manage the public image of the 
police. This may lead to the conclusion that the 
organisational culture of the police forces in the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands is more 
open to adapt swiftly to social changes such as 
the increasing use of social media compared 
to other forces (see: Denef, Bayerl & Kaptein, 
2013). Our research gives clear indication that 
the use of social media is a highly relevant topic 
of organisational change and needs therefore — 
with all its benefits and costs — to be handled 
with a strategic perspective. However, Denef 
et al. (2013) emphasise that these findings 
should not be seen as a blueprint or a step by 
step instruction of how to implement social 
media within the police. They rather illustrate 
best practice examples of the technological 
adaptability of European’s police forces bearing 
in mind that different organisational cultures 
and different perceptions of the role of police 
in society have to be taken into account before 
police forces embark on a way to use social 
media as a means to communicate with the 
public.
As important as the issue of social media may 
be, it is embedded in a wider issue area that 
deals with information and communication in 
general. Here, the differences between police 
organisations in Europe are also striking. Birdi et 
al. (2012a; 2012b) focussed on the capabilities 
of police organisations to share knowledge 
within their own organisation, with other forces 
nationally as well as internationally, and also 
with respect to the public and other relevant 
stakeholders. Their findings suggest that the 
researched police forces differ strongly in their 
preferences regarding knowledge sharing and 
their method of communication. Even if one 
particular communication method is seen as 
most effective in one culture, it may play a 
significantly different role in another. One thing 
most police organisations had in common, 
however, was a clearly stated preference 
for direct personal contact and face to face 
communication whenever it was possible and 
justifiable (see Figure 2).
The findings by Birdi et al. (2012a; 2012b) are 
integrated into a conceptual framework of 10 
types of factors found to influence knowledge 
sharing effectiveness in different domains. 
Based on these findings, a diagnostic tool 
(EKSPO-DI) was designed specifically for police 
organisations in order to help benchmark 
knowledge sharing performance in different 
domains, identify and underline major barriers 
for knowledge sharing and offer strategies to 
overcome these barriers (Turgoose et al., 2012a; 
Turgoose et al., 2012b).
A first data analysis regarding organisational 
culture, identity and leadership illustrates 
that successful change processes have several 
factors in common: they are usually originated 
from within the police forces, the need for the 
change can be expressed in police terms, and 
good leadership is critical (Bayerl et al., 2013b). 
Despite the seemingly wide-spread assumption 
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that all police officers are ‘somehow the same’, 
our data clearly show that organisational cultures 
and professional identities in the police are vastly 
different (Bayerl et al., 2013a). Furthermore, the 
data analysis explored different reconciliation 
strategies which may be used to tackle identity 
threats and conflicts to maintain commitment 
among the members of the organisation (Horton 
et al., 2013). At the time of writing (March 2014), 
the analysis of the identity and leadership issues 
is still in progress. The final results promise to be 
highly relevant and insightful.
CONCLUSIONS AND 
CHALLENGES
Very often we try to change organisations 
although we hardly understand how they work. 
Very often we dream of improving things by 
changing the organisational architecture. Very 
often we touch upon cultural identities without 
being aware of them. Very often we trigger 
resistance against change and do not know 
where it comes from. And very often we falsely 
assume that police cultures and practices are 
basically the same all over Europe. Moreover, we 
often try to improve things by looking for best 
practices without taking into account the cultural 
and organisational context. The COMPOSITE 
project attempts to shed light upon these issues 
using a multi-disciplinary, multi-level, multi-
method and multi-country approach.
But COMPOSITE also provides valuable insights 
into the specific problems one may run into doing 
research in the police. As we have seen so far, 
most European police organisations are subject 
to permanent change. This makes the analysis 
of the impact of individual change processes 
highly complex, because there are always several 
change processes going on at the same time that 
influence each other and lead to interference 
effects that make it hard to isolate consequences 
of the change. In addition, research methods 
developed in the private sector are of limited 
use in the police. Police performance cannot 
be measured the same way as the performance 
of a company, critical statistical data and key 
performance indicators are hard to come by 
or often unreliable. This issue turned out to be 
one of the major problems of doing research in 
the police. Moreover, the political leadership is 
often reluctant to have politically difficult change 
processes evaluated scientifically. As one of the 
interviewed police officers said poignantly: 
‘Most police organisations are still ruled by two 
simple principles. 1. Don’t do anything that 
might question the impression of organisational 
rationality and, 2. Never let the chief look bad’.
Figure 2: Top ten most effective methods of knowledge sharing within forces across all ten countries 
(number of references made; total no. of references made: 389)  
Source: Birdi et al. 2012a.
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